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INTRODUCTION 
0.1 Why Study Professional Judgment?
The exercise of judgment is not only essential to the practice of disciplines such 
as law, medicine and accounting, but is also what distinguishes these domains as 
professions (Boritz, Gaber & I^m on, 1987, cited in Gibbins & Mason, 1988). Recent 
advances in cognitive psychology research have given an impetus to research focusing 
on the nature of professional judgment, expert-novice cognition, heuristics and biases in 
decision making as well as decision strategies, the acquisition of knowledge and the 
effects of experience, and the development of expert/decision support systems (Ashton, 
1982a; Smith & Kida, 1991; Chi, Glaser & Farr, 1988). The central importance of 
experience and the interaction of judgment with professional expertise and standards is 
evident from works devoted to explicating "professional judgment" in medicine (Dowie 
& Elstein, 1988) and accounting (Gibbins & Mason, 1988). Internally, exponential 
growth in knowledge and burgeoning technology have made it extremely difficult for 
"experts" to keep abreast of all new developments; externally, rising public expectations 
and lawsuits have significantly altered the institutional and legal contexts within which 
professional-client relations occur (Dowie & Elstein, 1988). In an environment calling 
for greater accountability for professional judgments, the basis for the exercise of 
professional judgment is increasingly coming under scrutiny: Experts are being compelled
1
2to disclose how they reached their conclusions, what reasoning they employed, what 
evidence they relied upon (Simon, 1977).
It is imperative that professional judgment and decision making be actively 
studied, for we cannot proceed to improve a process unless we first understand it 
(Hogarth, 1991; Ashton, 1982b). With the appropriate strategy, methods, and 
techniques, theories from cognitive science can be usefully integrated with the applied 
theory of any practicing profession to the benefit o f both disciplines (Skipper, Diers, & 
Leonard, 1967; Smith & Kida, 1991; Ashton, Kleinmuntz, Sullivan & Tomassini, 1988). 
Given the preponderance of professional judgment across domains, such research will 
likely enable us to understand the nature of expertise and thus provide the foundation for 
developing a general theory of expertise.
0.2 Professional Judgment in Auditing
The professional auditing environment is dynamic, uncertain and complex (Joyce 
& Libby, 1982). To cope with such a challenging environment, there exists a strong 
motivation to understand, evaluate and improve professional audit judgment performance 
(see Ashton, 1988; Ashton et al., 1988). The origins of the "auditing school" of 
behavioral accounting research date back to the 1970s (e.g., Ashton, 1974a; Boatsman & 
Robertson, 1974'), supplemented by Ashton’s (1974b) exploration of the relevance of 
Brunswik’s (1952) lens model and Libby’s (1975) application of the lens model to
' As one of the earliest published papers in audit judgment research, it is interesting to
note that the topic of Boatsman & Robertson (1974) was "policy capturing" on selected 
materialitv iudgments of auditors.
3investigate both the predictability and stability of loan officers’ judgments. Within a few 
years, research interest in studying professional audit judgment surged, and Libby’s 
(1981) book and Ashton’s (1982a) monograph became influential reviews of human 
information processing research in accounting that carved out behavioral auditing 
research as an important area o f interdisciplinary research in accounting (Birnberg & 
Shields, 1989). However, it should be pointed out that the systematic study of auditors’ 
professional judgment requires careful consideration o f several methodological issues. 
In general, research investigating professional judgment by auditors should seek to 
simulate the naturalistic settings in which auditors function, it should preferably make use 
of realistic tasks and use professional auditors as subjects, and most important, it should 
address questions whose answers have significant implications either from theoretical, 
applied, or both perspectives (e.g.. Smith & Kida, 1991; Hogarth, 1981; Hogarth & 
Makridakis, 1981; Libby, 1989).
0.3 Goals of Study
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (1978) observed that judgment 
pervades accounting and auditing, and especially so, in resolving questions of materiality 
and adequacy o f disclosure. This dissertation study seeks to better understand how 
professional auditors make planning materiality judgments, a general planning decision 
that is typically made at the inception o f an audit (for those unfamiliar with the auditing 
profession and the audit process, an outline is provided in Appendix A). This research 
has an interdisciplinary orientation and attempts to integrate research from the psychology
4of judgment and decision making with tlie research and professional literature in auditing. 
In particular, the dissertation study uses experimental methods from psychology to 
examine the factors that influence auditors’ judgments under varying conditions. It is 
hoped that the findings from this study will have implications both for advancing research 
in the psychology of decision making and judgment and in auditing, and, given the 
participation o f professional auditors, yield insights that have direct relevance for the 
audit practice environment.
0.4 Organization of Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter I provides an overview of the 
issues, conceptual and methodological, that make the study o f auditors’ planning 
materiality judgments both important and challenging. Chapter II proceeds to develop 
the theory, drawn from research in the psychology of judgment and decision making and 
from the professional and research literature on auditing, which undergirds the 
hypotheses to be tested in this study. Chapter III describes the method used for 
collecting data, including experimental materials and procedures employed. Chapter IV 
provides a summary of the data collected, the statistical methods employed to analyze the 
data, and the major results obtained. Chapter V is intended to be a discussion section: 
significant findings from Chapter IV and their implications are discussed. Finally, 
Chapter VI offers concluding comments, including an acknowledgment of the limitations 
of the study as well as suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER I
CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
1.0 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate how auditors use professional judgment 
in making an important quantitative determination during the planning phase of an audit. 
The research motivation primarily arises from concerns about professional auditing 
practice (i.e., it is problem-centered) and the methodology is responsive to 
recommendations made by Gibbins & Jamal (1993), and Shanteau (1987, 1989) which 
are delineated in section 1.2. Part of the motivation for this dissertation topic also 
emerges from a similar, earlier study by the author, reported in Ramamoorti & Myung 
(1994). Although this dissertation study examines very different issues and has 
professional auditors rather than students as participants, the technique used for eliciting 
materiality judgments (i.e., programming in Microsoft’s Visual Basic to create a 
computer-administered experimental task environment featuring a mouse-supported point- 
and-click interface) is very similar and draws upon the author’s earlier experience.
In section 1.1, the early portion of this chapter, the motivation for the research 
topic is provided. Next, in section 1.2, focused literature reviews including state-of-the 
art overviews of behavioral auditing research, the psychology of judgment and decision 
making, and auditing theory and practice, are presented. This is followed by a 
discussion, in section 1.3, of a conceptual framework for auditors’ planning materiality
5
6judgments, a general "prcx^ess" model that appears to underlie the making of materiality 
judgments and finally, the role played by decision framing and efficiency/effectiveness 
trade-offs in these judgments. Section 1.4 addresses some methodological issues in such 
research, including questions pertaining to external validity. Finally, section 1.5 
summarizes anticipated contributions of the study.
1.1 Why Study Auditors’ Planning Materiality Judgments?
Decisions made by an auditor at the planning stage are important because they 
set the stage for the design of all subsequent audit procedures-thus, poor planning 
judgments will likely lead to the undesirable outcome of conducting an inefficient and/or 
ineffective audit (Robertson & Davis, 1988). At the inception o f an audit, an important 
general planning decision is making a preliminary judgment about the amount to be 
considered material to the financial statements taken as a whole (Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) 47, AICPA, 1983). "Materiality" is an accounting concept that refers 
to the magnitude of an omission or misstatement of financial information that would 
influence a user’s decision (FASB, 1980). Materiality helps auditors distinguish the 
important from the trivial' (Hicks, 1964; Carmichael & Willingham, 1989); it enables 
auditors to direct their efforts to those areas o f an audit where the relative risk is greater 
(SAS 31, AICPA, 1980). Several uses for the "planning materiality" judgment may be
* Selley (1984) cites with approval Hicks’ (1964, p. 158) short definition of materiality: 
"If it doesn’t really matter, don’t bother with it." Indeed, each Financial Accounting 
Standards Board’s (FASB) Statement includes the following remark at its conclusion: 
"The provisions of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial items."
7contemplated: identifying components of financial statements with greater relative risk 
and to which audit effort should be appropriately directed (SAS 31, AICPA, 1980); 
branches of a multinational company deemed important to visit; whether specific 
information about tlie client needs disclosure, and, of course, the magnitude o f an error 
to be regarded as being material when planning tlie nature, timing, and extent of specific 
auditing procedures, including sample size (Carmichael & Willingham, 1989; Robertson 
& Davis, 1988; Stettler, 1974). Materiality judgments are complex and require 
considerable knowledge and experience. Stettler (1974, p. 109) provides the following 
partial list of factors tliat would make a figure or difference more material, (a) the factor 
base can be precisely determined (cash) or is merely an approximation (depreciation); (b) 
the percentage of a difference is relative to a normal amount of net income, rather than 
an abnormally low net income; (c) the difference would cause an existing trend in the 
figures to be reversed rather than reinforced; (d) the difference would affect a relatively 
important total, such as current assets, rather than noncurrent assets; (e) there are other 
similar differences that affect a given figure, and the differences have a cumulative rather 
than a canceling effect. Stettler (1974) argues that the melding of “materiality, relative 
risk, and the reliability of the evidence being sampled” in the determination of sample 
size requires considerable professional skill, acquired through extensive experience.
Although materiality judgments are complex, they lie at the very heart of auditing 
and are critical in determining the scope of an audit (Krogstad, Ettenson & Shanteau, 
1984). This study seeks to address, at least in part, a question posed by Ashton et al. 
(1988, p. 114) as being worthy of further research: "To what extent do audit decision
8frames influence risk assessment, materiality judgments, and planning in the audit 
process?" Solomon & Krogstad (1988, pp. 5-6) also call for further research in this area 
of audit judgment by asserting that "...investigations o f how  and how well auditors 
perform this task [assessing materiality] would be very worthwhile" (emphases added).
Past research in auditing has noted significant variance in auditors’ materiality 
judgments (see, for example, Pany & Wheeler, 1989; Mayper, 1982; Mayper, Doucet 
& Warren, 1989), presumably leading to differences in audit scope decisions. However, 
in the absence of quantitative guidelines from the profession this may be expected to 
happen to some extent.^ Moreover, Bonner and Pennington (1991) have concluded that 
past research has shown auditors to make "poor" decisions with respect to planning 
materiality judgments (see also, Moriarity & Barron, 1979; Newton, 1977; and Ward, 
1976). Low consensus among professional auditors with reference to materiality 
judgments is disturbing because of the attendant differences in audit scope decisions and 
the adverse implications for audit efficiency and effectiveness (Leslie, 1977; Elliott, 
1977; Elliott, 1981). While previous studies have acknowledged the role of contextual 
factors and experience levels in explaining this low consensus, the influence of 
psychological (i.e., cognitive and motivational) variables has yet to be systematically 
explored with reference to the making of planning materiality judgments.
 ^ Further, Cushing & Loebbecke (1986) in their comparison of the methodologies of 12 
public large accounting firms point out that generally, all participant firms comply with 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) with the only possible exception being 
inadequate consideration of preliminary estimates of materiality during audit planning.
9A substantial amount of research in psychology has focused on the cognitive and 
motivational factors that influence judgment and decision making behavior. Two 
behavioral decision theories are particularly relevant for this study, viz., Kahneinan & 
Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, and Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990) venture theory. 
Further, investigation of the mediating effects of decision strategies (e.g., 
efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs) with respect to the manner in which a problem is 
represented is also planned.
By way of a literature review, we will now examine the extant research in the 
psychology of judgment and decision making and in auditing theory and practice which 
bear upon the research questions being addressed.
1.2 Literature Review
In this section, an overview of the types of past behavioral auditing research and 
recommended future directions from the viewpoint of a psychology researcher (Shanteau, 
1987; 1989) as well as two accounting researchers (Gibbins & Jamal, 1993) is first 
presented and discussed. Next, relevant literature from the psychology of judgment and 
decision making, and from auditing research and professional literature, is reviewed. 
This review will help clarify the substantive content of the interdisciplinary research 
questions sought to be addressed.
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1.2,1 Past Behavioral Auditing Research and Recommended Future Directions
Shanteau (1987) observes that, from his perspective, there have been three types 
o f behavioral auditing studies: replication studies, adaptation studies, and finally, 
problem-driven studies. Replication studies totally import the methods and procedures 
used in psychology and check to see whether the original findings replicate with auditors 
as participants, e .g ., behavioral auditing research on heuristics and biases (see Smith & 
Kida, 1991, for a review of this line of research). Clearly, replication studies lag 
developments in psychology research and offer little advance in theory, methodology or 
analysis as compared to the original psychological research. Adaptation studies examine 
research issues that have their roots in auditing but use the methods of behavioral 
research. While such studies constitute an advance over replication research, they may 
prove insufficient to investigate many complex issues in auditing, e .g ., technical and 
policy issues in auditing. Finally, unlike the first two types of studies which are largely 
"spin-offs" from extant behavioral research, problem-driven studies are designed uniquely 
around the concerns of behavioral auditing and lead to their own methods and 
proeedures. Shanteau (1989) asserts that future behavioral research should be such 
problem-driven research, a viewpoint endorsed by Gibbins & Jamal (1993).
Gibbins & Jamal (1993) discuss tlie importance o f problem-centered research and 
knowledge-based theory in professional accounting settings to enhance the contributions 
o f accounting judgment research to theory development and accounting practice. In 
particular, Gibbins & Jamal (1993, p. 451) emphasize that research effort could be 
greatly improved by a "mutually reinforcing combination o f theory development and
11
field-oriented empiricism." Like Shanteau (1987) above, Gibbins & Jamal (1993) also 
decry the transference of simplified models from psychology v/hich unfortunately lack 
the very richness of audit settings that makes them challenging. They believe that 
analogous to the medical profession, there is a need for social definitions of e r r o r a n d  
taxonomies o f accounting tasks and settings, lacking which, inappropriate criteria for 
performance evaluation are likely to be employed. Calling for a highly task-oriented 
theory development that emphasizes accounting tasks and their internal representations, 
Gibbins & Jamal (1993) point to the need for "exploratory and descriptive studies in 
ecologically rich settings," preferably by creating explicit computer simulations (cf. 
Hogarth, 1993).
Indeed, a serious attempt has been made in the design and implementation of this 
study to heed the recommendations made in Shanteau (1987, 1989) and in Gibbins & 
Jamal (1993). These will be highlighted and discussed in later sections.
1.2.2 Psychology Research: Judgment and Decision Making under Uncertainty
Solomon & Krogstad (1988, p. 5) have argued that “assessing materiality 
effectively amounts to a special case of formulating judgments under uncertainty.” 
Consequently, it would be useful to trace the history of judgment and decision making 
under uncertainty, starting with Daniel Bernoulli, the 18th century mathematician.
 ^ In this connection, Gibbins & Jamal (1993, p. 454) observe that Bosk (1979) was able 
to report that physicians classified errors as "judgmental" (good decision under 
uncertainty, bad outcome), "technical" (mistakes made in learning the task but hopefully 
not repeated) and "normative" (disregard of accepted standards o f conduct).
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Because the language of probability can be used to capture the notion of uncertainty, 
Bernoulli (1738/1954) proposed a descriptive model of gambling decision behavior based 
on the definition of mathematical expectation with reference to a probability distribution. 
Bernoulli’s (1738) framework assumes that people maximize expected utility in choosing 
among gambles. The expected utility E(U) o f a gamble can be simply stated as follows:
E lU ) = 2 p , # , )  (1 .1)
/ = i
where U(x;) is the utility of the /-th outcome and p is the probability o f that outcome. 
Christensen (1982) notes that Bernoulli’s (1738) work influenced the subsequent 
important contribution of Laplace (1814/1952), although both assumed probability and 
utility to be objectively measurable; indeed, probability and utility were seriously treated 
as subjective quantities only after Ramsey (1925). Although some mathematicians and 
economists, notably Edgeworth (1881), Marshall (1890), Cournot (1897), de Finetti 
(1937) and Roy (1942) discussed the notion o f utility in some detail, few attempts since 
Bernoulli (1738) were successful in describing functions relating utility to various 
objective magnitudes. Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944/1947) were the first to 
axiomatize the notion of expected utility (EU) maximization: they demonstrated the 
feasibility of an empirical solution to this problem by proving that if a person’s 
preferences possess certain elements of consistency, then it is possible to relate apparent 
utilities to the pattern of preferences of the person between every possible pair of 
gambles (Christensen, 1982). Indeed, the axiom system proposed by von Neumann &
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Morgenstern (1947) was so reasonable and the chosen axioms so appealing that their EU 
model quickly became the major paradigm of rational decision making behavior, 
normatively in management science, predictively in economics and finance, and 
descriptively in psychology (Schoemaker, 1982; Hilton, 1985). Subsequently, in the 
1950s, both Savage (1954) and Edwards (1954) proposed subjectively expected utility 
(SEU) models wherein a subjective probability function is used along with a utility 
function to represent risky preferences. Several variants of the EU model have since 
appeared in tlie literature, and an excellent summary of this line of research is provided 
by Schoemaker (1982).
Although the EU and SEU models of decision making behavior have dominated 
the literature for several decades, they do not offer a sufficiently rich descriptive tiieory 
of problem representation and therefore, it is no surprise that they do not readily predict 
new context effects (Schoemaker, 1982). Indeed, systematic violations of most of the 
basic axioms of EU theory have been found to occur (e.g., Davidson, Siegal & Suppes, 
1957; Coombs, 1975; Tversky, 1969; Kunreuther, 1976), leading Schoemaker (1982, 
p.548) to conclude that the failure of the EU model, both descriptively and predictively, 
is directly attributable to its "inadequate recognition of various psychological principles 
of judgment and choice." Increasing dissatisfaction with the descriptive capacity of the 
EU model prompted Kahneman & Tversky (1979) to develop an alternative model called 
"prospect theory," which, at least one applied researcher enthusiastically hails as the 
"...most important advance in our understanding of behavioral decision-making processes 
in the last 20 years" (Bazerman, 1994, p .73).
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The essential ingredients of Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory are 
now described. Unlike EU models, prospect theory underscores the importance of 
decision framing^ in understanding choice behavior. Prospect theory assumes that a 
decision maker initially "edits" a problem. Editing operations include determining what 
reference point to use ("coding"), deleting terms common to both options ("canceling") 
and ruling out dominated options ("eliminating"). Then, in the second phase, edited 
alternatives are evaluated using an expectation-type model of the following form:
V = S n(pi)v(x) (1.2)
where pi represents the probability of outcome x, occurring for i =  l , . . . ,n;  ir(pi) is a 
probability weighting function and v(X|) a value function. Because editing operations 
precede evaluation, the manner in which problem representations produce particular 
conceptualizations (or "decision framing") during editing exerts a powerful influence in 
determining how a problem is evaluated.
It should be noted tliat although the ir function relates to decision weights applied 
to the given probabilities, Eir(Pi) need not sum to 1 ; consequently, decision weights are 
distinct from being merely subjective probability transformations. An interesting 
property of the shape of the ir function is that it permits overweighting of small 
probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities. The value function, v ( X j ) ,  is
Kahneman & Tversky (1984) defined framing as a cognitive perspective elicited by task 
characteristics; they have demonstrated that subjects respond differently to stimulus 
restatements that are logically equivalent, e.g ., is the glass half full or half empty?
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defined in terms of levels and changes in current, rather than terminal, wealth position 
(assessed relative to a fixed "reference point") for a utility function. The reference point, 
in turn, depends on framing of the decision (negative, if  a loss, and positive, if a gain). 
The shape of the value function is such that it is concave for gains (implying risk averse 
behavior) and convex for losses (implying risk seeking behavior); this differs from 
traditional utility theory models which assume risk aversion throughout. Following 
Bazerman (1984), the major "tenets" of prospect theory can be summarized thus: (i) 
gains and losses are evaluated relative to a neutral reference point, (ii) potential outcomes 
are typically expressed as gains or losses relative to this fixed reference point, and (iii) 
the resulting change in the financial position is assessed by an S-shaped value function, 
with an added implication that decision makers respond to losses in a more extreme 
fashion than they respond to gains. In summary, prospect theory holds that among the 
crucial components of decision making behavior are factors such as the manner in which 
decision problems are coded and edited, and the location of the reference point (Kim, 
1992).
Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990) "venture theory" attempts to offer some 
psychological support to the decision weight, or tp function, in prospect theory. Using 
the prospect theory value function, Hogarth & Einhorn (1990) have developed venture 
theory which provides an account of how decision weights (which appear to replace 
probabilities when people evaluate risky outcomes) are influenced by variables that are 
both cognitive and motivational in origin. Venture theory assumes that people initially 
anchor on a stated probability and, depending on factors like the absolute size of payoffs.
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the extent to which the anchor deviates from the extremes of 0 and 1, and the level of 
perceived ambiguity concerning the relevant probability, adjust the anchor by mentally 
simulating otlier possible values. The net effect o f the adjustment, with reference to the 
anchor, reflects the relative weight given in imagination to values above as opposed to 
below the anchor. The relative weight is regarded as a function of both individual and 
situational variables, particularly the sign and size of payoffs. Specifically, to make 
Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990, p. 783) "venture theory" model operational, it is necessary 
to specify: "...(1) how the anchor, p,\, is established, (2) what affects the amount of 
mental simulation, and (3) what determines the sign or direction of the adjustment 
process." Because the present study will elicit planning materiality judgments from 
professional auditors in terms of actual dollar amounts rather than probabilities, it is only 
possible to use Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990) venture theory as a guiding metaphor for 
investigating auditors’ planning materiality judgments. Indeed, there is sufficient 
parallelism in the concepts underlying venture theory with the present study’s scenario 
(e.g ., "payoffs" and "ambiguity" discussed more fully in Chapter II) that it may be 
possible to use it to derive predictions as well aid in the interpretation of results.^
 ^ Consider, in particular, the following remark of Hogartli &  Einhorn (1990, p .800), made 
with respect to probabilities and decision weights: "The structure of venture theory allows 
explanations of contextual effects on decision making." This ability of venture theory in 
explaining contextual (or framing) effects can be profitably exploited in interpreting the 
results o f this study.
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1.2.3 Materiality in Professional Auditing Literature and Prior Research
Statement on Auditing Standards #47 (AICPA, 1983) distinguishes between the 
preliminary judgment made about materiality for audit planning (planning materiality) and 
the subsequent revision o f this preliminary judgment owing to circumstances arising 
during the audit (evaluative materiality). Planning materiality establishes the precision 
of an auditor’s verification procedures; it determines how much misstatement auditing 
procedures are (should be) designed to detect (Solomon & Krogstad, 1988). Although 
evaluative materiality pertains to the interpretation o f audit results (i.e., 
reporting/disclosure issues), planning materiality and evaluative materiality are 
nevertheless linked because insufficient precision of an auditor’s verification procedures 
may preclude identification of potential material misstatements (SAS 47, AICPA, 1983). 
Nevertheless, the planning materiality judgment must be made first, and this study 
primarily concerns itself with planning materiality judgments.
Previous auditing research has devoted considerable attention to an examination 
o f the materiality construct and to factors influencing materiality judgments (see 
Holstrum & Messier (1982) and Ashton (1982a) for reviews of this extensive literature). 
Numerous studies have revealed that materiality judgments are complex and are 
influenced by a host of financial and non-financial factors being particularly sensitive to 
context effects as well as to the experience level o f the materiality planner (Krogstad et 
al., 1984); also, it has been well-established that auditors’ materiality judgments exhibit 
significant variance (Mayper, 1982; Pany & Wheeler, 1989; Mayper et al., 1989; Elliott, 
1977, 1981; Leslie, 1985).
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Further, Leslie (1985) notes that the most common bases for materiality 
computation (and hybrid computations thereof) are (pretax) net income, total revenues, 
total assets, equity and gross profit, although this finding comes from research in the 
context o f industrial companies (see Holstrum & Messier, 1982; Warren & Elliott, 
1986). Other findings and interpretations from past research encompass the following: 
internationally, 5% to 10% of net income is the most preferred factor base for materiality 
computation (Pattillo, 1976; Leslie, 1985); materiality intentions may differ from 
subsequent materiality adjustments (Coakley & Loebbecke, 1985; Icerman & Hillison, 
1991); materiality judgments may be systematically influenced by audit firm structure 
(M orris & Nichols, 1988; Stone & Ingram, 1988; Cushing & Loebbecke, 1986); 
materiality judgments may be responsive not only to perceived internal control 
weaknesses (Leslie, 1977) but also to an entity’s financial structure and the accounting 
choices made by management (Leslie, 1985).
However, despite substantial research on audit materiality judgments both of 
recent origin and in the past tliree decades (see Ashton et al., 1988; Holstrum & Messier, 
1982; Ashton, 1982a), scant attention has been paid to the question o f how "decision 
framing" (i.e., the manner in which a problem is represented) may influence an auditor’s 
perception of the degree o f risk associated with a client and the attendant impact on 
planning materiality judgments. The term "risk" in this context encompasses both audit 
risk and business risk. Audit risk is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to 
appropriately modify her opinion on financial statements that are significantly misstated 
(SAS 47, AICPA, 1983). To decide what constitutes a "significant misstatement" we
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need to rely upon the concept of materiality. Business risk represents the risk of loss or 
injury to an auditor’s professional practice from litigation, adverse publicity, or other 
event arising in connection with financial statements examined or reported upon. 
Carmichael & Benis (1989) correctly interpret SAS 47 by observing that while increased 
likelihood of litigation or adverse publicity may increase audit scope, assessing business 
risk to be low does not provide the auditor with justification to perform less extensive 
procedures than would otherwise be appropriate under Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS).
One basic premise of this study is that because the materiality threshold and risk 
evaluation are inversely related (i.e., higher risk evaluation dictates more audit effort to 
collect "sufficient" evidence thus implying a lower materiality threshold; see Leslie, 
1985; Arens & Loebbecke, 1991; and Carmichael & Benis, 1989), systematically 
manipulating auditors’ perceptions of client risk by introducing "normal audit" and 
"suspected fraud" scenarios will reveal important insights into the making of the 
associated materiality judgments. In this connection, the expression "normal audit" 
corresponds to what Schultz (1982, p. 159) labels an "ordinary audit*" (i.e., where there 
are no obvious red flags warranting the auditor’s attention) while the "suspected fraud" 
scenario corresponds to a situation where Grinaker (1980) would suggest "auditing in a 
fraud mode" as indicated by appropriate warning signals. Another basic premise relies
* Schultz (1982, p. 159), somewhat facetiously, argues:"What is an ’ordinary’ audit?...An 
ordinary audit involves an auditee who is not in financial distress, who is not an apparent 
merger target, who is not intent on spinning off subsidiaries, who is not registering 
securities, who is not blessed with management of doubtful integrity and who is not 
encumbered with a lousy internal control system."
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on the causal relationship between good internal controls and the decrease in the 
probability of material error in the financial statements (SAS 1, AICPA, 1972; SAS 55, 
AICPA, 1988; NCFFR, 1987; COSO, 1992). Obtaining reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements are not materially misstated is a primary objective o f an auditor; 
consequently, an evaluation of the effectiveness of internal controls automatically enters 
into materiality Judgments because the auditor must inevitably rely on the strength of 
internal controls to prevent or detect material error (Leslie, 1985). Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to relate the extent of compliance testing to the planning materiality threshold. 
In fact, the construction of the experimental task takes into account the implication that 
perceived weaknesses in internal control would lower planning materiality thresholds, 
thus increasing audit scope. However, it must be mentioned that the perpetration of 
management fraud frequently involves the overriding of internal controls; therefore, in 
such cases one must not look to internal controls that are not designed to prevent or 
detect this type of fraud (Sullivan, 1988; Wallace, 1991; COSO, 1992).
1.3 Task Conceptualization and Components
This section describes a general "process" model that attempts to portray the 
planning materiality judgment task as a two-stage process involving an "anchor" that is 
suitably "adjusted" as more information is received. The later part of the section 
discusses the role played by decision framing and the importance of decision strategies 
such as efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs in arriving at these judgments.
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1.3.1 General "Process" Model: Anchoring and Adjustment Paradigm
A major aspect of uncertainty is ambiguity, that is, the prevalence of situations 
where outcomes cannot be precisely, or even probabilistically, specified. Einhorn & 
Hogarth (1985) have suggested that one means of coping with ambiguity is the use of an 
anchoring and adjustment strategy: decision makers modify probability judgments through 
a mental simulation process that takes into account the level of anchor (initial 
probability), the amount of ambiguity involved, and the decision maker’s attitude towards 
ambiguity. Based on the extensive literature in auditing that suggests professional 
auditors’ use of an "anchoring and adjustment" strategy in arriving at various types of 
judgments (e.g., Joyce & Biddle, 1981; Kinney & Uecker, 1982; Biggs & Wild, 1985) 
a model that attempts to broadly characterize the materiality judgment process is now 
proposed. Typically, an auditor starts out with an initial baseline number (a preliminary 
calculation that may be based on a rule of thumb, e .g ., 5% of pretax income) that is 
(conservatively) modified in light of new information becoming available (Steele, 1992). 
To understand the underlying cognitive mechanisms that might be operating, we draw 
heavily upon Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) "prospect theory" and Hogarth & Einhorn’s 
(1990) more recent "venture theory" outlined earlier. To make this description explicit, 
consider the following simple mathematical model:
~ '^0 * ^ a c  (1-3)
where =  the resulting, modified planning-materiality (PMAT) judgment; Jq =  the 
initial anchor chosen, possibly making use of a materiality rule-of-thumb computation
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(i.e ., percentage o f a computation base chosen); and A ac=  the change or adjustment 
necessitated by the influence of relevant and significant cognitive and/or contextual 
factors (Figure 1.1 referenced in section 1.4.1 presents a conceptual framework that 
depicts the cognitive and contextual factors that possibly influence planning-materiality 
judgments).
The form of equation (1.3) above suggests tliat planning materiality judgments are 
subject to continual revision as the audit proceeds and more information is gathered, i.e., 
a kind of Bayesian updating of the auditor’s beliefs occurs (Steele, 1992; Corless, 1972; 
Felix, 1976; Abdolmohammadi, 1985; Ashton & Ashton, 1988). Consequently, such 
judgments are best described as dynamic decision tasks that must reflect the time 
dimension. Unlike static decision tasks which involve only a single stage and a single 
outcome, dynamic decision tasks are sequential thus allowing for choices and outcomes 
at later stages to depend on choices and outcomes occurring at earlier stages, giving rise 
to order effects (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). A host of 
factors may influence choices in dynamic decision tasks; however, in the audit setting, 
two important factors seem to be the accumulation of evidence and the provision of 
feedback as part of the "review process," required by standards of fieldwork with respect 
to supervision of audit work. This issue is discussed more fully later in section 1.4.2.
1.3.2 Role o f Decision Framing and Efficiency/Effectiveness Trade-offs
The manner in which the information about a problem is presented invokes 
particular "decision frames" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) which are simplified mental
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structures of the world. This study will use the term decision framing to cover context 
effects as defined by Helson (1964), including the influence of stimulus factors, 
background factors and personality factors. In particular, if  the presentation mode 
evokes negative images for the decision maker, the decision frame induced is "negative," 
and, similarly, positive images evoke "positive" frames. In an audit setting, a "normal 
audit" assignment may be viewed as a "neutral" if not a "positive" frame, and thus 
possesses some plausibility as a reference point; however, a scenario wherein fraud is 
suspected is most definitely one that induces a "negative" frame. Clearly, the perception 
o f a problem resulting from a positive or negative decision frame can have dramatic 
effects on the judgment of decision makers; indeed, this is a robust finding from prior 
research in psychology (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981; Pious, 1993; Bazerman, 1994).
This study, by featuring both "normal audit" as well as "suspected fraud" 
scenarios, seeks to induce both neutral and negative frames and systematically investigate 
the magnitude, direction and relative extent of changes in auditors’ planning materiality 
judgments. It can be argued that a client with very low audit risk would certainly evoke 
a positive frame, hence the remaining part of the study refers to the normal audit 
scenario as evoking a “positive frame” in order to be consistent with the literature.
Pragmatic, goal-specific considerations such as effectiveness and efficiency have 
to be taken into account in the conduct of an audit. In this regard, Stevens (1991, p. 22) 
echoes the Treadway Commission’s report (NCFFR, 1987) as follows: “Intense 
competition among accounting firms contributes to significant pressure on audit fees, 
often with corresponding pressure to reduce staff, time budgets, and partner involvement
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in audit engagements...Such pressures may not be conducive to the thorough investigation 
of red flags indicating the potential for fraudulent financial reporting, or to the thorough 
exercise of professional judgment and skepticism.” Despite these very real pressures, 
professional auditors do strive to strike a balance between conflicting goals of 
effectiveness and efficiency. This is reflected in their focus on careful planning and 
budgeting of time, cost and audit effort (efficiency criteria) while not compromising on 
the quality of the audit (effectiveness criteria may encompass, e .g ., opinion correctness, 
defensibility of decisions, audit quality control through peer review). More technically, 
with reference to the Statements on Auditing Standards, Kinney (1988, p .55) defines 
audit effectiveness as the "...achieving [of] appropriately low audit risk that error might 
exceed material limits." Similarly, he defines audit efficiency as "...the achievement of 
a given level of audit risk at minimum cost." Given resource constraints, the adoption 
of decision strategies such as efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs appears to be a rational 
response on the part of professional auditors. Also, effectiveness or goal-accomplishment 
is typically far more important than efficiency. This study will look at the magnitude 
(level) of planning materiality thresholds to assess the impact of decision framing and 
how it is mediated by decision strategies such as decision making efficiency/effectiveness 
trade-offs.
1.4 Methodology
In this section a conceptual framework for auditors’ planning materiality 
judgments is first described (see Figure 1.1). Next, the computer-administered nature
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of the experimental task in the context of dynamic decision making and the participation 
o f professional auditors (in a task that was designed with input from practitioners) is 
highlighted. The implications for the external validity of the experimental findings are 
emphasized.
1.4.1 Conceptual Framework for Auditors’ Planning Materiality Judgments
Figure 1.1 depicts a conceptual framework for auditors’ planning materiality 
judgments; it features the cognitive and contextual factors that impinge on the making of 
such judgments, embedded within a complex professional and institutional environment. 
Judgment, whether in a professional or other context, should be understood within a 
framework in which person, actions and environment all influence and are influenced by 
one other (see for instance, Hogarth, 1987, based on Bandura, 1978). Gibbins & Jamal 
(1993) emphasize that professional accounting settings consist of the problem or task and 
the person within a larger professional context; this professional context shapes task 
perception and the person’s approach to it. The person brings to bear oh the problem 
several cognitive, motivational and judgment processes (e.g., perception, memory, 
values, preferences and goals). Finally, all these interact to produce a judgment, choice 
or other behavior that the person exhibits.
Figure 1.1 shows that planning materiality judgments are a function of the audit 
engagement objectives, a broadly construed task environment and the (cognitive) 
characteristics of the materiality planner. The audit engagement objectives, very 
generally, are to perform an effective, high quality audit, within pre-specified time and
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budget constraints. The general audit task environment is characterized by the auditor’s 
understanding of the general business and client’s environment, and the requirements 
imposed by the professional standards about collection of evidence (cf. SAS 31, AICPA, 
1980), as well as decision strategies such as efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs to 
recognize constraints of time and budgets. In this environment, the cognitive 
characteristics of the materiality planner and the particular problem context have a 
complicated reciprocal relationship and involves considerable interpretive subjectivity (cf. 
Berliner, 1983). The goal of developing such a conceptual framework is to lay the 
foundation for a meaningful discussion of the "inevitable" professional judgment that is 
associated with tlie making of materiality judgments. Such a framework can support the 
development of decision aids for use in audit practice"'. The conceptual framework will 
permit a more careful examination of the theoretical underpinnings of SAS 47.
1.4,2 Computer-Administered Experimental Task
In real world audit settings we frequently encounter situations where later 
information is contingent on the consequences of earlier decisions and decisions made 
have long-term ramifications. Further, rather than assume independence, it appears 
reasonable to build dependencies into experimental situations and study them 
systematically (Rapoport & Wallsten, 1972). To adequately study continuous and 
interactive audit decision settings (e.g., the audit "review" process) that permit feedback-
 ^ In this regard, Elliott (1982, cited in Selley, 1984) remarked, "It seems reasonable to 
conclude that if decision aids and models can reduce uncertainty in the audit process, it 
is sensible to develop them even if they reduce auditor judgment"(emphasis in original).
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driven responses, a computer-administered experimental task environment that resembles 
the naturalistic audit environment is used. As Brehmer (1990, p .264) observes,"...one 
cannot study dynamic tasks using the ordinary paper-and-pencil approach of 
psychological research...interactive computer simulaüons of dynamic tasks are required." 
Further, Brehmer (1990) points out that, conceptually, normative models are unable to 
capture real-time, dynamic decision making behavior. Proposing computer simulations 
as constituting the appropriate methodology to study complex and dynamic decision 
settings, Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz (1981) used simulated task environments resembling 
medical decision problems to study decision strategies. Further, Kleinmuntz (1985) 
incorporated outcome feedback in dynamic medical decision settings to investigate 
performance of heuristics and concluded that they are a rich source of additional 
information.
The present study, based upon the author’s training and background as a 
professional auditor, attempts to introduce these methodological advances (i.e., computer 
simulated task environments and incorporation of feedback) to research that seeks to 
understand the cognitive processes underlying professional audit judgments (cf. Gibbins 
& Jamal, 1993).® In addition, by systematically manipulating the scenario ("normal
Skipper et al. (1967, p. 137) make a strong case for the integration o f behavioral science 
theory with the practicing professions. However, they are quick to point out that such 
integration is difficult to achieve without a general working knowledge o f both behavioral 
science and the practicing professions on the part o f the researcher. Further, they also 
suggest that it is crucial that the researcher have a very "...specific knowledge o f the 
particular practicing profession in question." Interestingly, Libby (1989) emphasizes the 
same viewpoint and goes on to suggest that academic accountants engaged in behavioral 
research may have a "comparative advantage" in conducting such research by virtue of 
their extensive background, training and domain-specific knowledge.
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audit" then "suspected fraud" from screen to screen), the study attempts to investigate 
the impact of altering the problem representation and context for the same set of financial 
statements ("decision framing"). The balancing of audit efficiency and effectiveness 
considerations by professional auditors, as reflected in their planning-materiality 
judgments, is also examined.
The computer simulation o f the experimental task environment has at least two 
important implications. First, it constitutes an excellent basis to develop decision support 
systems for audit practice that highlights critical decision parameters in establishing 
planning materiality while possessing enough flexibility to accommodate subjective 
assessments by individual auditors (cf. Steinbart, 1987). Second, it is a useful tool for 
use in professional audit training programs as well as auditing pedagogy that enables 
inexperienced auditors to learn from outcome feedback in a laboratory environment. 
Most complex audit judgment tasks occur in environments that Einhorn (1980) has 
characterized as "outcome irrelevant learning structures" (OILS) where it may not be 
possible to unambiguously establish correspondences between previously made judgments 
and their consequences. This creates a serious problem because not only is systematic 
learning inhibited but the making of less than optimal decisions may get perpetuated and 
become "conventional wisdom." Further, Bédard & Chi (1993) point out that with lack 
o f outcome feedback, a critical condition for learning may be missing. One way to 
circumvent this problem is through laboratory simulations o f actual auditing tasks and 
the"review process" with the computer serving as the reviewer (with stored expert input 
being the surrogate "answers" to difficult problems).
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1.4.3 Professional Auditors* Participation in a Realistic Task
The study uses a realistic auditing task and a large number of professional 
auditors as participants. Several justifications exist to support the involvement of 
professional auditors as opposed to auditing students or novices in studying complex 
judgment tasks: task realism, comprehension of complex phenomena, immediate 
relevance, and the interpretableness of findings and their implications for both theoretical 
and applied work. Taking seriously Gibbins & Jamal’s (1993) recommendation that 
accounting researchers attempt to generate more task realism by better capturing 
information rich environments, practitioner input was actively solicited as the study was 
designed and developed. Johnson (1983) has argued for inclusion of "veridical tasks" 
which are sampled from the environment and reflect the constraints and goals as well as 
the demands of individual tasks in the domain of practice. Efficiency/effectiveness trade­
offs are necessitated by one such set of constraints faced in audit practice. The difficulty 
with tasks other than veridical ones is that performance on non-veridical tasks yield little 
information about the expertise of interest being studied (Johnson & Jamal, 1988). 
Further, Libby (1981) has argued that removing participants from a familiar decision 
context severely hampers interpretableness of the data. Similarly, Smith & Kida (1991) 
note the importance of drawing conclusions and ascribing interpretations to aspects of 
professional audit judgment only from those studies that are clearly founded upon 
investigations that use tasks and participants representative of the naturalistic 
environments in which auditors function. Finally, the decision to use professional 
auditors as subjects was based upon results from Krogstad, Ettenson & Shanteau (1984)
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which questioned the appropriateness of students as surrogates for professional auditors, 
consideration of the useful suggestions about "subject’s knowledge of the environment" 
made in Berg, Coursey & Dickhaut (1990, p. 837), and from personal experience in a 
previous study in which student subjects were used, and were found not to comprehend 
the planning materiality judgment task adequately (Ramamoorti & Myimg, 1994).
1.5 Anticipated Contributions and Implications
This line of interdisciplinary research will likely be relevant for behavioral 
researchers studying judgment and decision making, auditing researchers and audit 
practitioners. Shanteau (1989) has remarked that the "heuristics and biases" literature 
spawned by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) has largely focused on examples of "poor" 
decision behavior. However, participants who are professionals, such as medical doctors 
(Schwartz & Griffin, 1986) and auditors (Shields, Solomon & Waller, 1987) have shown 
less proneness to biases and have generally exhibited "good" decision behavior. 
Accordingly, behavioral decision research will benefit from studies focusing on the 
performance of professionals and assist in better understanding the nature and 
determinants of expert judgment. In this respect, audit judgment researchers enjoy a 
unique advantage in being able to explore, in professional settings, the demands placed 
on cognition and its effects (see Gibbins & Jamal, 1993; Hogarth, 1991; Hogarth, 1993). 
Such research has broad relevance for the study o f professional judgment in other 
domains such as medicine and law and thus helps lay the foundations for the development 
of a general theory of professional judgment and expertise. In addition, decision framing
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effects appear to be mediated by decision strategies responding to goal-specific 
constraints. The current study seeks to advance extant psychological research by 
systematically investigating the mediating influence o f one such decision strategy, viz., 
efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs.
This study will make several contributions for the study o f auditors’ professional 
judgment. More specifically, these contributions range from advancing the theory of 
auditing to enhancing professional training programs and the development of expert 
systems by integrating research from the psychology of decision making and judgment. 
In the paragraphs that follow, the nature and impact of some of these contributions are 
discussed.
First, a conceptual framework (see Figure 1.1) that reflects the characteristics of 
the materiality planner, the problem context, and the client’s operating environment as 
well as the general audit environment, has been developed. This conceptual framework 
lays the foundation for a coherent discussion of the myriad cognitive and contextual 
factors that (could potentially) influence planning-materiality judgments and provide the 
basis to explain the variance observed in materiality judgments of professional auditors, 
noted in past research (e.g., Pany & Wheeler, 1989; Mayper, 1982; Mayper et al., 
1989). The conceptual framework, in conjunction with the empirical data collected, will 
enable an examination of the conceptual underpinnings of SAS 47. The study is timely 
and significant not only because SAS 47 is over a decade old now and is in need of 
revision, but also because the auditing environment has considerably changed after a
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series of multi-million dollar lawsuits against public accounting firms (see Public 
Oversight Board (FOB), 1993; Albrecht & Willingham, 1993).
The implementation of a computer-administered experimental task environment 
with a mouse-supported, user-friendly interface, that allows for dynamic decision making 
and incorporation of feedback is a methodological contribution for future researcli on 
professional audit judgment. The computer-administered experiment is designed to 
produce a rich database of professional auditors’ preliminary Judgments of materiality for 
audit planning under different conditions. The findings from this study will likely 
enhance our understanding of the sensitivity of auditors’ materiality judgments to 
incoming information (cf. Steele, 1992; Haskins & Sack, 1994). Such understanding will 
in turn enable us to implement more effective professional training programs, bring 
enhancements to auditing pedagogy, and assist in the development of appropriate decision 
aids geared to improve audit performance.
The design of the study also has implications for some important behavioral 
decision theories. Although a direct test of Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect 
theory or of Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990) venture theory is not feasible given the manner 
in which the study has been operationalized, results from the study will definitely provide 
indirect evidence for the ideas such as framing, decision strategies, decision weights, 
atnbiguity, and payoffs, that underlie these theories. Both prospect theory and venture 
theory were developed in the context of static, “one-shot” experiments, and therefore it 
would be illuminating to learn whether a dynamic decision task affords further insights 
and points to areas for further research with reference to these theories.
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The participation of different kinds of professional auditors, viz., external auditors 
and internal auditors, opens another avenue for comparison o f performance on the 
experimental task. Because of the limited number o f studies examining the cognitive 
abilities and judgments of internal auditors (see, for instance. Church & Schneider, 
1995), such comparisons have been rare and will no doubt provide additional 
perspectives on how professional training and background interact with the environment 
of auditing. These comparisons are likely to yield useful insights that can help advance 
the state-of-the-art in external and internal audit practice and will eventually benefit 
professionals possessing either background.
CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.0 Theoretical Foundations
In this chapter the theory and rationale that ground this study are laid out in more 
detail. Testable hypotheses for the experimental study emerge from the application of 
theories from behavioral decision research to the concern about explaining the sources 
o f variance in auditors’ planning materiality judgments.
In the early portion of this chapter, in section 2.1, the concept of materiality is 
further elaborated upon and some theoretical justification provided for it by comparing 
it to efficient "search processes" adopted by scientists in other disciplines. Section 2.2 
highlights tlie fact that auditors engage in sequential processing of evidence (Asare, 1992) 
and tills inevitably makes their resulting judgments subject to framing and order effects 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). Next, in section 2.3, Kahneman 
& Tversky’s (1979) notion of decision framing of outcomes (redefined for the purpose 
o f this study in terms of Helson’s (1964) "context effects") is discussed with reference 
to the planning stage of an audit. Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990) venture theory is also 
discussed to identify key components of auditors’ planning materiality judgments that rely 
upon constructs such as "payoffs" and "ambiguity." In section 2.4, the professional 
literature in auditing is cited to emphasize goal-specific criteria such as audit efficiency
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and audit effectiveness that every auditor must necessarily contend with in professional 
practice. The theory developed in sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 forms the basis, for 
the theoretical framework depicted in Figure 2.1. In section 2.5, some of the causes for 
the adjustment to the anchor Jq, are ascertained and discussed with reference to a rule of 
thumb computation. Based on the implications derived from section 2.5, section 2.6 
develops testable ordinal hypotheses. The approach adopted to the testing of these 
hypotheses, in turn, drives the experimental design and procedures discussed in chapter 
III.
2.1 The Concept of Materiality in Auditing
Every profession finds it necessary to adapt the legal doctrine called de mininiis 
non curat lex (Latin for "tlie court will not consider trivial matters") and thus define the 
scope of enquiry. Thus, medical doctors are apt to ignore negligible "side effects"; and 
accountants refrain from recording events so insignificant ("immaterial") that the work 
o f recording them would not be justified by the usefulness of the results (Anthony & 
Reece, 1983). Auditors make use of the "materiality" construct to define the overall 
scope of contemplated audit procedures.
To better appreciate the necessity for a concept such as materiality, it may be 
useful to consider the "bandwidth-fidelity" dilemma that arises in radio technology. Fay 
& Wallace (1987, p .69) illustrate the bandwidth-fidelity dilemma thus:"...Both 
[astronomer and microbiologist] begin their study using low-power lenses. The 
astronomer searches the sky until he finds the general area within which he wants to
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study specific bodies more carefully. Similarly, the microbiologist scans the slide under 
her scope until she finds a general area of the tissue she wants to study more closely...At 
this point, [they] are trading fidelity (freedom from error or resolution) for bandwidth. 
They are scanning the object of their study with very broad-band devices in order to 
maximize the chance of capturing the general object they wish to study. Once they have 
located the general area, they lock in the scope and switch to extremely high-powered 
lenses to obtain far more resolution and error-free observation. At this second step, they 
trade bandwidth for fidelity." Materiality judgments appear to be auditors’ lenses to cope 
with the bandwidth-fidelity dilemma.
Leslie (1985) has argued that there is only one materiality level, although the 
context of its uses may differ; similarly, Carmichael (1969) has noted that "...the auditor 
uses materiality in essentially two ways: (1) evaluating the fairness of presentation and 
reporting (materiality in accounting) and (2) in deciding questions involving the 
development and execution of the audit program (materiality in auditing). However, 
materiality in auditing is dependent upon materiality in accounting." In light of the 
bandwidth-fidelity dilemma referred to above, it would appear that materiality in 
accounting corresponds to "bandwidth-materiality" while materiality in auditing 
corresponds to "fidelity-materiality."
An important pragmatic goal o f every auditor is to take into account the limited 
time and resources available and the need for keeping within planned time schedules. 
Constraints imposed by the need to minimize audit effort (while nevertheless meeting 
professional standards) in order to limit audit fees and meet deadlines make a concept
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such as materiality crucial to performing an efficient and effective audit. Moreover, the 
auditor exercises professional judgment circumscribed by a sophisticated network of 
statutes, accounting principles and standards and professional ethics. In such a complex 
setting, it is argued that a psychological variable, viz., "decision framing" (or the manner 
in which a problem is represented) can potentially have a drastic impact on the making 
of materiality judgments.
2.2 Sequential Processing of Audit Evidence
Audit judgment is responsive to sequential processing of evidence (Gibbins, 1984; 
Ashton & Ashton, 1988). Typically, an external audit o f a client involves at least two 
stages, an interim audit stage and a financial year-end audit stage (Anderson, 1984). 
Such “phasing” of the fieldwork results in a phase-by-phase sequential processing of 
audit evidence that continually accumulates and unfolds over this period. Planning 
meetings constitute the means by which the early portion of the audit engagement is 
formally discussed with the staff assigned to the audit to delegate responsibilities and 
assure effective communication. With reference to the contemplated computer- 
administered experiment, it is important that it should reflect and facilitate such 
piecemeal evidence processing in order to preserve the characteristics o f the naturalistic 
environment in which auditors normally function.
Asare (1992, citing Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985) acknowledges the "cognitive 
economy" afforded by sequential processing of evidence, but warns that such an 
incremental approach is frequently subject to framing and order effects. While the
39
present study investigates decision framing effects in audit judgment in precisely such a 
setting, order effects are not examined. The decision framing construct is taken up in 
the following section.
2.3 Decision Framing of Outcomes
Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 453) define the term decision frame to refer to 
"...the decision maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated 
with a particular choice. The frame that a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by 
the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal 
characteristics of the decision maker. " This study uses the term "decision framing" in 
experimental settings in two senses: decision framing by the decision maker and decision 
framing implied by task formulation. Decision framing by the decision maker refers to 
his/her subjective interpretation or conceptualization of a problem and its outcomes as 
being positive or negative, posing a threat or affording an opportunity and, with 
reference to this study, the conduct of a "normal audit" or "auditing in a fraud mode." 
Decision framing implied by task formulation signifies the construction o f a problem 
designed to encourage the adoption of a particular decision frame by the decision maker';
' Note that the experimental participant may yet adopt a decision frame that is different 
from the one implied by the task formulation. In real world settings, where "gaming" 
is common (i.e., a reactive, thinking opponent is present), an audit client may 
deliberately present information in a way that would encourage an auditor to adopt a 
particular decision frame (which would lead to a particular conclusion). Recognizing this 
possibility (called "information risk," cf. Arens & Loebbecke, 1991), the professional 
auditing literature exhoils auditors to exercise professional skepticism. Decision framing 
implied by (deliberate) problem formulation (by the client) could potentially constitute 
an important research issue for "behavioral game theory" especially with reference to the 
construction o f agency contracts (see, for instance, Camerer, 1990).
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Johnson, Grazioli and Jamal (1993, p. 469) have described this as " ...the  manipulation 
of information in the environment for purposes o f creating a representation in the mind 
of an agent." The "framing" construct as used in this study closely mirrors what Helson 
(1964) calls "context effects." Context effects, according to Helson (1964), depend on 
stimulus factors, background factors, and personality factors; consequently, careful 
manipulation of one or more of these factors should produce framing effects.
The framing construct has been used in other studies of audit judgment, viz., in 
the context of overall financial statement evaluations (Johnson et al., 1991), in situations 
involving going concern judgments (Asare, 1992; Trotman & Sng, 1989), and with 
reference to internal control judgments and substantive testing decisions (Emby, 1994). 
This study investigates framing effects with reference to auditors’ planning materiality 
judgments. In particular, with a view to better understand the psychological sources of 
variance in auditors’ planning materiality judgments, incorporating framing effects 
represents an important advance in this line of research. Therefore, section 2.3.1 
discusses the psychological theory that lies behind why such framing effects occur. 
Further, to explain the rationale behind how such framing effects may be induced by 
systematically varying background factors, section 2.3.2 makes use of signal detection 
theory and uses implications from Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory and 
Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990) venture theory. Subsequently, in section 2.4, the issue of 
how these framing effects might be mediated by the use of specific decision strategies, 
e.g ., efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs, is taken up.
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2.3.1 Decision Framing by the Decision M aker
Typically, the process of judgment precedes a choice or decision; it may be 
thought o f as pre-decisional behavior (Joyce & Libby, 1982). Conceptually, the 
judgment process encompasses initial perception and identification o f issues, collection 
of relevant information and its evaluation (including weighing of information and of prior 
knowledge), and finally, consideration of the value or utility of potential outcomes, 
culminating in the decision (Gibbins & Mason, 1988). As noted before, selective 
perception of information (or "editing operations") precedes information evaluation 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); consequently, differences in editing a problem will likely 
lead to differences in evaluating it. In other words, the invoked decision frame 
influences a decision maker’s choice or decision.
Busemeyer & Townsend (1993) point out that Coombs & Avrunin (1988) have 
provided a detailed analysis of "framing effects" according to Lewin’s (1935) approach- 
avoidance conceptual framework. In particular, they refer to M iller’s (1944) discussion 
o f approach-avoidance theory wherein approachable versus avoidable consequences 
correspond to rewards versus punishments. Such notions clearly seem to anticipate the 
distinction between positively and negatively framed outcomes proposed by Tversky & 
Kahneman (1981). Similarly, Coffman (1969), a sociologist, refers to “framing” 
information in his analysis of strategic face-to-face interaction as deriving from 
paralinguistic cues having an expressive rather than semantic character e .g ., facial 
gestures, intonation etc. In particular, Coffman (1969, p. 12) explains that the term 
“control move” in “expression games” concern the “intentional effort of an informant
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to produce expressions that he thinks will improve his situation if they are gleaned by the 
observer.” Such ideas relating to “impression management” are further developed in 
Goffman (1974) and clearly parallel the earlier description o f “decision framing implied 
by task formulation.”
Adopting a broader psychological perspective, Hogarth (1993) observes that the 
key notion of reference points that gives rise to framing effects is another manifestation 
o f figure-ground phenomena. To cope with limited human information processing 
capabilities in the face of cognitive complexity, people tend to pay more attention to the 
more prominent features o f their perceptual fields. Unfortunately, this adaptive 
mechanism to make cognitive operations more "manageable," comes at a cost, i.e ., it has 
the effect of treating all non-prominent features as background. The implication of this 
psychological phenomenon is that the prominent features attended to (i.e., the figure) 
remain relative to the background and are highly sensitive to changes or shifts in that 
background.^ First noted by gestalt psychologists (see Wertheimer, 1912; Koffka, 
1922), Hogarth (1993) notes that the figure-ground phenomenon is captured well in 
phrases such as "losses loom larger than gains" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and 
"goods satiate and bads escalate" (Coombs & Avrunin, 1977), and has motivated research 
issues in choice (Thaler, 1980) and inference (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986).
 ^ A similar line of reasoning seems to have led Helson (1964) to explicitly mention 
background factors as being responsible for context effects.
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2.2.2 Explaining Framing Elffects: Signal Detection and Behavioral Decision Theories 
Using Helson’s (1964) scheme, this study manipulates background factors to 
produce framing effects. It is possible to explain these framing effects using insights 
from signal detection as well as behavioral decision theories.
Signal detection theory applies whenever there are only two discrete states of the 
world ("signal" and "noise") and a human agent is required to perform the classification 
of response categories (Wickens, 1992; Green & Swets, 1988). Combining the two 
states of the world witli the two response categories produces Table 2.1, as shown below.
Table 2.1 
Signal Detection Theory
STATE O F TH E W ORLD
RESPONSE Signal Noise
Yes Hit False Alarm
No Miss Correct Rejection
There exists considerable professional literature describing "red flags," that is, 
variables that are correlated or associated with the perpetration o f fraud and serve as 
indicators of circumstances that warrant the attention o f an auditor (e.g., Albrecht & 
Romney, 1986; Albrecht, Romney, Cherrington, Payne, & Roe, 1982). If we regard 
the presence of red flags as signals arousing suspicion o f fraud and the absence of any 
red flags as situations justifying a normal audit, we can easily construct Table 2.2
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analogous to Table 2.1 above. SAS 53 (AICPA, 1988) delineates the auditor’s 
responsibility to detect and report errors and irregularities; it also recommends audit 
procedures in response to possible irregularities. Thus, it is extremely important for an 
auditor to determine whether to conduct a normal audit or audit in fraud mode (“audit 
in fraud mode” must be distinguished from a “fraud audit” ; the latter expression 
presupposes tliat the existence of fraud has been already established). As shown in Table
2.2 below, should the auditor reach an erroneous conclusion, she will end up either 
overauditing (an inefficient outcome) or underauditing (maybe an ineffective outcome). 
The latter, of course, is the more serious lapse and, if discovered, could prove damaging 
to the auditor’s reputation as well as expose her to possible litigation. In this connection, 
it must be noted that although business fraud is widely seen as a burgeoning white-collar 
crime problem (KPMG Survey, 1994; NCFFR, 1987) with several millions of dollars in 
losses, the occurrence of fraud is still a relatively rare occurrence. It is the publicity that 
surrounds fraud and the astronomical losses involved that compensate for the negligibly 
low probability of occurrence and make an external auditor conservative in this regard.
Table 2.2
Doing a normal audit o r audit in fra u d  model
STATE O F TH E W ORLD
AUDITOR’S RESPONSE Red Flags Present No Red Flags Present
A udit in F raud  Mode Appropriate Overauditing
Norm al Audit Underauditing Appropriate
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It is clear then, that the partner’s comments in the experimental setting suggesting 
the possibility of fraud completely alters the participant’s decision frame by changing 
background factors and shifting the reference point. What was up till then perceived to 
be a low-risk audit suddenly appears fraught with disturbing possibilities. In other 
words, the decision framing implied by task formulation is expected to so change the 
experimental participant’s conception that its impact will be observed in considerably 
lower planning materiality thresholds. In this connection, Haskins & Sack (1994, p .3) 
have remarked: "Information may not be provable, but it provides perspective, and it 
may point out the need for more evidence, or it may even cast doubt on the evidence 
gathered." This is a clear case of additional information (to be regarded as a background 
factor in Helson’s (1964) scheme), increasing an auditor’s professional skepticism with 
respect to the financial statements.
With respect to the suspected fraud settings featured in the experiment, viz., 
inventory theft and illegitimate income smoothing (see Appendix D for the text of the 
details furnished to participants), it may be useful to enumerate some Of the red flags that 
could potentially be noted by the participants. Referring to some of the situational 
pressures mentioned in Albrecht et al. (1983), the following red flags can be identified: 
(a) urgent need for favorable earnings (to buttress stock price or achieve forecasted 
earnings): (b) dependence on only one or two products (i.e., only UPS systems); (c) 
extremely rapid expansion and growth; and (d) sizeable inventory increase accompanied 
by a less than proportionate increase in sales. Moreover, with respect to internal 
controls, the KPMG Survey (1994) concludes that poor or overridden internal controls
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constitute the major reason for the occurrence o f fraud: hence the choice of these 
particular suspected fraud scenarios.
Outcomes are frequently perceived as positive or negative in relation to a 
"neutral" reference outcome; in Kalineman & TVersky’s (1979) "prospect theory" dealing 
with risky prospects, a value function is proposed that is concave for gains, convex for 
losses, and steeper for losses than for gains. In the audit scenario, a very low-risk audit 
engagement can be considered as a positive frame so that it is by invoking a "suspected 
fraud" scenario that a negative frame is induced into the experimental subject’s 
conception. Further, based on SAS 53 (AICPA, 1988), the severity of the negative 
frame presumably differs for a scenario that suggests defalcation (i.e., misappropriation 
of assets, in this case, inventory theft, usually indicative of a breakdown in internal 
controls) as opposed to another scenario that suggests management fraud  (material 
distortion of financial statements, in this case, illegitimate income smoothing^ suggesting 
possible management override of internal controls). In the situation contemplated in this 
study, invoking the suspicion of irregularities (fraudulent acts) would encourage subjects 
to frame the outcome as being negative, by altering their perception of client riskiness. 
Further, as noted before, materiality thresholds vary inversely with risk assessment and
 ^ Several managements of companies engage routinely in “legitimate income 
smoothing,” a practice that is not inherently in violation of any fundamental 
accounting principles (see, for instance. Smith, Lipin & Naj’s (1994) article in the 
Wall Street Journal on November 3, 1994). Hence, it was important that the 
income smoothing described in the study be described as being somehow 
“ illegitimate.”
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hence, with an increase in perceived client riskiness it is reasonable to expect subjects 
to make lower planning materiality estimates.
In addition, one should note the loss functions associated with non-discovery of 
either type of irregularity-certainly, this fact impacts the auditor’s typically conservative 
behavior (e.g.. Smith & Kida, 1991) and will likely produce asymmetry in planning 
materiality thresholds (e.g., Srivastava & Ward, 1992). For instance, management 
fraud is likely to be recurrent in nature and involve large dollar amounts; therefore, it 
has more serious implications than inventory theft which might well be an isolated 
occurrence and may not necessarily be of the same magnitude. Similarly, effectiveness 
is a more important criterion for external auditors than efficiency, despite their effort to 
keep their clients satisfied. Clearly, the exposure from an ineffective audit is associated 
with a more severe loss function and constitutes the rationale for the purported 
"asymmetry" in materiality thresholds (e.g., Srivastava & Ward, 1992)'*. The 
significance of investigating the nature and extent of efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs 
made by professional auditors under differing conditions cannot be overemphasized.
Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1990) venture theory seeks to provide a descriptive model 
of how people assess decision weights. The theory assumes that after having decided 
upon an anchor, people engage in a "mental simulation" while seeking to adjust the
'* Srivastava & Ward (1992) discuss the notion of asymmetric materiality thresholds with 
reference to the tolerable error of overstatements and understatements and the risk of 
incorrect acceptance and the risk o f incorrect rejection. In other words, they consider 
a scenario involving the planning of substantive audit sampling applications (tests-of- 
detail). The situation described here is with reference to the planning o f compliance 
testing (tests-of-control) but is completely analogous.
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anchor. This mental simulation is affected by psychological factors, cognitive and 
motivational, and is considerably influenced by constructs such as "payoffs," deviation 
o f the anchor from extremes, and "perceived ambiguity. " Each of these influences is 
now explained. Payoffs (or loss functions) represent the value o f outcomes, positive or 
negative, that is associated with a particular choice or decision. Clearly, the absolute 
size and sign of payoffs exercise a significant influence over the decision maker’s mental 
simulation or deliberation. The deviation of the anchor from the extremes is relevant 
when considering the extent of adjustment required to the initial anchor. This is because 
of the psychological interpretation o f greater uncertainty being associated with a "single 
shot" gamble as opposed to multiple plays despite the applicable probabilities being the 
same. As for "perceived ambiguity," this expression merely reflects the vagueness about 
probabilities. Although venture theory deals with decision weights and not final dollar 
amounts (as the present study does), the mental simulation referred to above as well as 
the factors influencing it remain pertinent in the context o f auditors’ planning materiality 
(PMAT) judgments. Some essential operational definitions required by their theory 
pertain to how the anchor is established, what affects the amount of mental simulation 
and what determines the sign or direction of the adjustment process. In the scenario 
described in this study, the factor base chosen in light of financial statement and 
background information and the percentage applied to it form a heuristic approach that 
can be used to show how the anchor PMAT is established. Decision framing, suitably 
modified by decision strategies and goals, determines the amount of mental simulation 
that goes on. Further, depending on whether the setting induces a positive frame (e.g..
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low-risk, normal audit) or a negative frame (e.g., suspected fraud) and whether 
efficiency or effectiveness is the goal-specific criteria sought to be optimized, dictates the 
sign of the adjustment to the established anchor. Thus, suspected fraud settings imply 
a lowering of the PMAT threshold, as do effectiveness considerations; normal, low-risk 
audit settings or efficiency considerations should lead to a raising of PMAT thresholds.
2.4 Efficiency/Effectiveness Trade-Offs
Simon’s (1955) notion of bounded rationality emphasizes the limitations of human 
information processing capabilities (e.g., memory capacity) relative to the complexity 
encountered in the real world. Accepting that audit decision tasks are complicated, it 
seems reasonable to argue that professionals would attempt to develop decision strategies 
that adapt to the task in order to optimize their efforts in pursuit of domain-specific goals 
(cf. Hogartli, 1993; Brunswik, 1952). Audit engagements are frequently subject to time 
pressures and deadlines and, despite auditors’ strong desire to meet major audit 
objectives, there nevertheless exist upper bounds on the audit resources that can be 
committed to a specific client. In other words, decision strategies'* such as 
efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs appear to emerge naturally from the auditor’s need to 
adapt to the environment she finds herself in. Efficiency is typically characterized by the
* The bounded rationality argument implies that cognitive effort is expensive (Hogarth, 
1993); also, decisions take time and time is a valuable resource (Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993). These considerations should help explain why people choose specific decision 
strategies from a host of available decision strategies. From a review o f a large number 
of experiments to investigate this question, Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1992) conclude 
that decision makers do trade-off accuracy (e.g., average payoff) for effort (e.g., decision 
time). This is known as the "error-effort trade-off."
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dimensions of time, cost and effort, while effectiveness is characterized by the 
dimensions of goal-attainment, opinion accuracy, user-satisfaction, peer review etc. 
Thus, while efficiency has a common connotation in different professions (i.e., 
professionals would like to minimize cost, time and effort as long as effectiveness, or 
goal-attainment, is not compromised), effectiveness is variously defined in different 
professions. Accordingly, while the conclusions from this study featuring 
efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs may generalize with reference to the efficiency 
criterion, any patterns of behavior influenced by the effectiveness criterion will need to 
be cautiously interpreted. The efficiency/effectiveness trade-off characterization has a 
parallel in studies of "speed-accuracy" trade-offs that has engaged the attention of 
psychologists over a long time (e.g., Woodworth, 1899; Garrett, 1922). In reaction time 
tasks, and in speeded performance in general, subjects often make errors: the reciprocity 
between latency and errors is referred to as the speed/accuracy trade-off (Wickens, 1984; 
Wickelgren, 1977). One can readily replace "speed" with "efficiency" and "accuracy" 
with "effectiveness" and meaningfully discuss efficiency-effectiveness trade-offs*.
Planning materiality assessment is a crucial determinant o f the nature, extent and 
timing o f the audit procedures to be employed (Solomon & Krogstad, 1988). In 
particular, planning materiality lays the basis for audit scope decisions (i.e., determining 
the extent of testing) because o f the basic inverse relationship between audit testing and
* But the analogy is somewhat tenuous in that reaction time and error rate represent two 
dimensions o f the efficiency of processing information; moreover, speed-accuracy 
trade-offs have primarily been observed in the realm o f low-level perceptual tasks or 
recognition-memory tasks (Wickelgren, 1977). Nevertheless, it is helpful to motivate 
the discussion of efficiency-effectiveness trade-offs in this manner.
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materiality: the higher (lower) the materiality threshold, the lesser (greater) the required 
testing (Arens & Loebbecke, 1991). The auditor needs to exercise judgment in resolving 
conflicts between the need to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter (audit 
effectiveness) and the time and the cost of obtaining it (audit efficiency). This 
efficiency/effectiveness trade-off is clearly set out in SAS #31 (AICPA, 1980): "An 
auditor typically works within economic limits; his opinion, to be economically useful, 
must be formed within a reasonable length of time and at reasonable cost." Planning- 
materiality judgments constitute a quantitative tool that enable auditors to fine-tune 
considerations of audit efficiency and audit effectiveness (Robertson & Davis, 1988). 
In other words, a poor judgment relating to planning-materiality could have serious 
consequences with reference to "over-auditing" (compromising the efficiency criterion) 
or "under-auditing" (compromising the effectiveness criterion).
The COSO (1992) report has defined internal control as a process, effected by an 
entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives encompassing efficiency 
and effectiveness of operations, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. This definition applies broadly and seeks to integrate 
various components of internal control such as process, people, reasonable assurance and 
objectives into a comprehensive framework which nevertheless facilitates consideration 
of specific objectives. Indeed, the recently concluded KPMG Survey (1994) emphasizes 
strong internal controls in deterring fraud and the EAT Study (1980) recommended that 
standards/guidelines be developed to clarify the relationship that subsists between
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materiality and internal controls. In the context of internal control evaluations and audit 
sampling, materiality judgments of internal control weaknesses would necessarily be 
responsive to the risk o f  under-reliance and risk o f  over-reliance used in SAS #39^ 
(AICPA, 1981). In other words, the fundamental problem in designing audit procedures 
seems to lie in being able to strike a judicious balance between assessing control risk to 
be too high (under-reliance) or assessing control risk to be too low (over-reliance). 
Because goal accomplishment (effectiveness) is the paramount consideration, it appears 
that efficiency gains in importance once a threshold level of effectiveness has been 
achieved. In an audit context, this means efficiency considerations would be more 
significant for low-risk clients because audit effectiveness can be achieved with minimal 
audit effort. However, for risky clients, audit effectiveness cannot be compromised 
owing to the extreme exposure associated with failure to issue the "correct opinion" and 
in such cases, audit efficiency may only be peripherally relevant.
 ^ Wallace (1991) indicates this equivalence o f terminology from different sources (risk- 
oriented terminology is the most recent; lAC =  internal accounting controls):
SAS 39
Risk of overreliance 
on I AC for compliance 
testing
Risk of underreliance 
on I AC for compliance 
testing
Statistics
Risk of Type II error 
or Beta risk
Risk of Type I error 
or Alpha risk
Risk-Oriented
Assessing 
control risk 
too low
Assessing 
control risk 
too high
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A theoretical framework exhibited in Figure 2.1 relates findings and research from 
psychology to the extant resarch and professional literature on professional judgments in 
auditing. This framework attempts to integrate findings from two disparate fields of 
enquiry to tlie mutual benefit of both (cf., Skipper et al., 1967 and Smith & Kida, 1991) 
and lays the foundations for this research study.
2.5 Anchor and Adjust Process Model: Adjustment to Anchor
The general anchor and adjust process model is now discussed in greater detail. 
As before, from Equation 1.3, we have:
^PMAT “  *^ 0 ^ ^ a c  (2 .1 )
It was pointed out that J q, the anchor, is established by selecting an appropriate rule of 
thumb computation (e.g., 5% of pretax net income)®. The risk evaluation of the client 
and the client size (Carmichael & Benis, 1989), among others, may indicate that the 
initial anchor needs some adjustment. Past research in the psychology of judgment and 
decision making has revealed that decision makers have a tendency to either over-adjust 
or under-adjust the initial anchor (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). In this section 
we look at the Ac/c term more closely. It is possible to recast it as follows:
Holstrum (1982) has remarked that materiality judgment research has been limited to 
public industrial companies and has questioned whether the impact on net income would 
have the same predominance for a nonpublic company as it does for a public company. 
Because the experimental task features a public company (described elsewhere in this 
dissertation), for the purposes of tliis study, basing Jq on pretax net income is presumably 
justified.
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= 5,A, + jjA j + K  (other factors) (2.2)
with s„ S2  e (-1, 1} and A, > Aj > 0.
In Equation (2.2) above, s, and represent the sign, and A, and A 2 , the magnitude 
o f change. Further, the subscript 1 refers to the nature o f the setting (i.e., "normal 
audit" or "suspected fraud") while subscript 2 refers to goal-specific criteria (viz., audit 
efficiency or audit effectiveness). Thus, we hypothesize that s, will take on a positive 
value for an audit scenario (for a low-risk client, close to reference point) while it will 
assume a negative value for a suspected fraud scenario ("negative framing"). Again, 
because effectiveness (goal-accomplishment) is more important than efficiency (time and 
cost considerations), and greater audit effectiveness may require more work suggesting 
a lower materiality tlireshold (Arens & Loebbecke, 1991), we will assert that S2  will take 
on a negative value for effectiveness while taking on a positive value for efficiency. 
Further, "normal audit" and "suspected fraud" are scenarios with a "global" impact 
(hence called "primary framing"), whereas efficiency and effectiveness are simply goal- 
specific criteria subsumed within a specific scenario, hence we have assumed that the 
inequality: A, > A2  > 0 must hold. Note that K is merely a function that captures 
everything else, including, perhaps the interaction term, say, S3 A,A 2 . Of course, K could 
be negative or positive, depending on the dominant influence exerted by its component 
factors. This basic model is used to derive predictions and test hypotheses.
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2.6 Hypotheses
Using the theoretical backdrop presented in the preceding sections, in section 
2 .6 .1 , the major hypotheses of this experimental study are first outlined. Next, in 
section 2.6.2, other minor hypotheses are also described, although these were not the 
main focus of the study when it was conceived.
2.6.1 M ajor Hypoth eses
The effects o f decision framing implied by task formulation are investigated by 
eliciting planning materiality judgments from subjects under two conditions, "normal 
audit" and "suspected fraud." The suspected fraud setting is invoked using partner 
comments (see Appendix B) and will trigger a negative decision frame, and not only 
make participants assess client riskiness higher than for the normal audit setting, but in 
turn, will also yield lower planning materiality estimates. Because two types of fraud, 
defalcation and management fraud, are featured, the relative magnitude of the planning 
materiality judgments can now be compared. Defalcation (inventory theft) could be an 
isolated incident, and therefore, is less serious than management fraud (illegitimate 
income smoothing). More specific information is usually available about inventory 
theft (less ambiguity) whereas knowing the source and manner of illegitimate smoothing 
income is quite difficult (high ambiguity). Because of the perceived higher ambiguity 
for the illegitimate income smoothing condition, it is predicted that mean planning 
materiality thresholds for this condition will be lower. Also, because higher ambiguity
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implies greater uncertainty, PMAT estimates from participants in the illegitimate income 
smoothing condition will likely exhibit larger variance.
Partner comments directing audit staff to pay more attention to audit efficiency 
(competitive audit environment; risk of underreliance on controls) and audit effectiveness 
(litigious audit environment; overreliance on internal controls) are introduced to examine 
the mediation of framing effects by consideration of goal-specific criteria. With respect 
the goal-specific criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, it is clear that effectiveness, in 
general, is the paramount concern of the auditor. Consequently, the partner’s comments 
with reference to audit effectiveness should, in general, elicit much lower planning 
materiality judgments under both normal audit and suspected fraud conditions. The 
partner’s revelation about the suspicion of fraud combined with the emphasis on audit 
effectiveness will produce the lowest estimate of all planning materiality conditions.
In general, planning materiality thresholds will be lower for the suspected fraud 
scenario; they will also be lower for the effectiveness scenario. Because illegitimate 
income smoothing is a more severe occurrence than inventory theft, the auditor will 
make lower planning materiality estimates for the income smoothing condition. All of 
these ordinal predictions are conveniently summarized in Table 2.3 below.
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Table 2.3
Ordinal Predictions Concerning Planning Materiality Thresholds
CONDITIONS Normal Audit Defalcation Management Fraud
General Higher Lower Lowest
Efficiency Higher Lower Lowest
Effectiveness Lower Even Lower Lowest
2.6.2 M inor Hypotheses
Participants will be professional auditors holding the Certified Public Accountant 
(CPA), Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) or both, designations. Accordingly, it would 
be of interest to compare these three groups of professional auditors (i.e., CPA vs. CIA 
vs. Both CPA/CIA) in terms of their materiality tlireshold assessments as well as decision 
strategies. External auditors are more concerned with the financial statements taken as 
a whole, while internal auditors are more concerned with segments of a company. The 
objectives of the internal auditor relate more to operational auditing and, unlike the 
external auditor, she is not exposed to litigation risk. Finally, not all internal auditors 
appear to understand the notion of planning materiality in the same way as external 
auditors do. Nevertheless, internal auditors may be expected to make lower materiality 
judgments as compared to external auditors primarily because they audit more than just 
the financial statements and therefore, need to perform more procedures than 
contemplated by external auditors. The nature and extent of their audit procedures would 
translate to lower planning materiality thresholds.
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Past auditing studies as well as auditing textbooks (see, for instance, Leslie, 1985; 
Read, Mitchell & Akresh, 1987; Carmichael & Willingham, 1989; Ricchiute, 1989; Pany 
& Wheeler, 1989; Thompson, Hodge, & Worthington, 1990; and Wallace, 1991) have 
suggested that materiality is typically computed as a fixed percentage (within an 
acceptable percentage range) of a chosen factor base. Selecting a fixed percentage, e .g ., 
5% o f pretax net income, for computation o f planning materiality suggests that the 
planning materiality threshold increases in proportion to the increase in net income, i.e., 
it is linear function of the chosen base. However, other literature provides evidence that 
materiality computation is best captured by a non-linear function. For instance, the 
"materiality gauge" based on a table constructed by KPMG Peat Marwick (exhibited in 
Carmichael & Benis, 1989; cf. Elliott, 1983), appears to be a convex function with step 
increases at predetermined landmark values. Warren and Elliott (1986) fitted a power 
function, based on revenues, to estimate empirically the planning materiality judgments 
made for 691 audits conducted during 1981; it turned out to be:
PMAT  = 0.038657 {Revenuesf - '^^^°^ (2.3)
With a view to ascertaining whether professional auditors viewed materiality 
computation to best described by a linear or a non-linear function, two questions were 
included in the debriefing questionnaire. These questions were designed to elicit whether 
the study participants considered planning materiality computation to increase exactly in 
proportion to the magnification of financial statement numbers (e.g., magnified by a 
factor of 10 or 100) or whether the computation should show a disproportional increase
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or decrease. The latter response would signify that participants believe that the 
computation of materiality thresholds involves non-linearity. Given the spate of lawsuits 
against public accounting firms in recent years (FOB, 1993; Albrecht & Willingham, 
1993), a reasonable conjecture is that the specter o f litigation risk has more than likely 
influenced auditors to conceive of the planning materiality function as being non-linear 
and convex in shape (i.e., the planning materiality threshold shows a disproportionate 
decrease relative to the increase in the size o f the client, and hence the factor base 
chosen). In other words, external auditors routinely seek to provide more assurance and 
hence would prefer to perform more audit procedures than less.
CHAPTER III 
METHOD
3.0 Introduction
This chapter will describe the experimental method to test the hypotheses laid out 
in the previous chapter. Input from several practicing auditors, including two retired 
partners from different Big Six accounting firms, was actively solicited to make the 
experimental task realistic. Such task realism is important because realistic scenarios 
attempt to reproduce naturalistic settings and therefore, provide a "fair" test o f the 
complex relationships among concrete referents in the real world (Swieringa & Weick, 
1982). Before experimental materials were distributed, permission was sought and 
obtained from the Human Subjects Review Committee, The Ohio State University. A 
pilot study was carried out in December 1994 to ascertain the feasibility of the study and 
the strength o f the hypothesized manipulations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the 
experimental design, including the factors manipulated and the dependent variables used 
in the study. Section 3.2 outlines the experimental procedures, including a brief 
description o f the computer program that was developed. Section 3.3 mentions the 
results of a pilot study conducted in December 1994 with a small number o f professional 
auditors as participants. Some minor changes made in the computer program based on
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pilot study findings are also described. Section 3.4 mentions several accounting firms 
and other organizations located in Columbus, Cleveland, and Chicago, respectively, from 
which professional auditors were recruited to participate in the experiment. The sample 
o f participants is drawn from a mix of organizations, although it would be difficult to 
claim that it is “representative” in a statistical sense. The number o f responses received 
are also indicated, although detailed information about the data collected is deferred to 
Chapter IV.
3.1 Experimental Design
The experiment used a tliree-factor mixed design with two-within subjects factors 
and one between-subjects factor. The first within-subjects factor, primary framing, had 
two levels; the normal audit setting vs. the suspected fraud setting. The second within- 
subjects factor, secondary framing scenario, also had two levels: efficiency vs. 
effectiveness. The between-subjects factor, suspected fraud type, had two levels: the 
defalcation condition (i.e., inventory theft) and the management fraud condition (i.e., 
illegitimate income smoothing). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below depict the design.
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Table 3.1
Mixed ANOVA 2 X (2 X 4 X S) Design
Between Subjects Factor: Suspected F raud  Type (2)
Within Subjects Factor. 
P rim ary  Fram ing (2)
Defalcation 
(Inventory Theft)
M anagem ent F raud  
(Income smoothing)
NORM AL AUDIT 
SETTING
PMAT (aud ini) PMAT (aud jn i)
PMAT (aiid_effy) PMAT (aud effy)
(Secondary Framing 
Scenarios)
PMAT (aud_effs) PMAT (aud_effs)
PMAT (aud_fin) PMAT (aud fin)
SUSPECTED FRAUD 
SETTING
PMAT (frd jn i) PMAT (frd jn i)
PMAT (frd_effs) PMAT (frd_effs)
(Secondary Framing 
Scenarios)
PMAT (frd_effy) PMAT (frd_effy)
PMAT (frd_fin) PMAT (frd_fin)
Table 3.2
PM AT Elicitation Sequence depicted in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
Figure 3.1 Sequence Figure 3.2 Sequence Figure 3.3 Sequence
Normal Audit (PMAT) Defalcation (PMAT) Management Fraud (PMAT)
A I: a u d jn i F I: f rd jn i F I: f rd jn i
A2, A3: aud effy F2, F3: frd_effs F2, F3: frd_effs
A4, A5: aud effs i i i i F4, F5: frd_effy F4, F5: frd_effy
A6: aud fin F6: frd fin F6: frd_fin
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Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 show the manner in which the experiment was designed 
and implemented by means of the computer program. In particular, note that figure 3.1 
is identical under both conditions because the "normal audit" setting is the same across 
participants in both "suspected fraud" groups. All participants start out with textual 
materials describing an hypothetical client and based on whose financial statements they 
have to arrive at PMAT judgments (Figure 3.1, Table 3.2: A l). This constitutes the 
normal audit setting. In the secondary framing scenario, the partner for the audit first 
emphasizes the competitive auditing environment and tlie risk of underreliance on internal 
controls, by implication asking for more audit efficiency (Figure 3.1, Table 3.2: A2, 
A3). Next, in another similar scenario, the partner points to the litigious environment 
and the risk of overreliance on internal controls, by implication asking for more audit 
effectiveness (Figure 3.1, Table 3.2: A4, A5). Finally, in the last PMAT estimate for 
the audit setting, participants are required to take into account all o f the preceding 
information and arrive at an overall judgment of planning materiality for the current 
year’s audit (Figure 3.1, Table 3.2: A6). The text of the partner’s comments are given 
in Appendix B.
In primary framing, the partner first calls for an emergency planning meeting, 
based on his meeting with the Finance Director of the client. One group of participants 
was framed by the partner’s indicating the presence o f defalcation (inventory theft, see 
Table 3.2, Figure 3.2: FI) while the other group was framed by the partner’s suggestions 
about the presence of management fraud (illegitimate income smoothing, see Table 3.2,
Efficiency Feedback-
driven
process
Secondary Framing 
Scenario (EFFY)
PMAT (A2)
Modified Estimate
Nonnal Audit Setting
PMAT (A6)
PMAT(A1)
Final Estimate considering 
EFFY and EFFSInitial Estimate
(Primary Framing) (After Primary and 
Secondary Framing)
Effectiveness
Secondary Framing 
Scenario (EFFS)
PMAT (A4) Feedback-
driven
process' (Secondary Framing),
[Secondary Framing’
Revised Estimate, if 
preferred
(Recommended by 
More Conservative 
Manager)
Pre-set Answer
PMAT (AS)
Revised Estimate, if 
preferred
(Recommended by 
Less Conservative 
Manager)
Pre-set answ er
PMAT (A3)
Figure 3.1
Experimental Design and Procedures (Normal Audit Setting) Sî
Secondary Framing 
Scenario (EFFY)
Efficiency 
PMAT (F4)
Secondary Framing
Defalcation Setting 
PMAT (FI)
Initial Estimate 
(Primary Framing)
Effectiveness  
PMAT (F2)
Secondary Framing)
Pre-set answ er
Feedback- PMAT (F5)
driven
1 process (Recommended by
Less Conservative
Manager)
Revised Estimate, if
preferred
Secondary Framing 
Scenario (EFFS)
Pre-set Answer
PMAT (F3)
(Recommended by
Feedback- More Conservative
driven Manager)
process
Revised Estimate, if
preferred
Modified Estimate 
PMAT(F6)
Final Estimate considering 
EFFY and EFFS
(After Pnmary and 
Secondary Framing)
Figure 3.2
Experimental Design and Procedures (Suspected Fraud Setting—Defalcation)
Secondary Framing 
Scenario (BFFY)
Efficiency 
PMAT (F4)
Secondary Framing
Management Fraud Setting 
PMAT (FI)
Initial Estimate 
(Primary Framing)
Effectiveness 
PMAT (F2)
Secondary Framing)
Pre-set answ er
Feedback- PMATtFS)
driven
\ process (Recommended by
Less Conservative
Manager)
Revised Estimate, if
preferred
Secondary Framing 
Scenario (EFFS)
Pre-set Answer
PMAT (F3)
(Recommended by
Feedback- More Conservative
driven Manager)
process
Revised Estimate, if
preferred
Modified Estimate 
PMAT (F6)
Final Estimate considering 
EFFY and EFFS
(After Primary and 
Secondary Framing)
Figure 3.3
Experimental Design and Procedures (Suspected Fraud Setting—Management Fraud)
6 8
Figure 3.3: F I). The secondary framing scenarios following this emergency planning 
meeting are identical to those in the normal audit setting. In the secondary framing 
scenario, as before, the partner first emphasizes the litigious auditing environment and 
the risk of overreliance on internal controls, by implication asking for more effectiveness 
(Figures 3.2 & 3.3, Table 3.2: F2, F3). Next, in another similar scenario, the partner 
points to the competitive audit environment and the risk of underreliance on internal 
controls, by implication asking for more audit efficiency (Figures 3.2 & 3.3, Table 3.2: 
F4, F5). Finally, in the last PMAT estimate for the audit setting, participants are 
required to take into account all of the preceding information and arrive at an overall 
judgment of planning materiality for the current year’s audit (Figures 3.2 & 3.3, Table 
3.2: F6).
Secondary framing refers to the introduction of partner’s comments emphasizing 
efficiency (abbreviated effy) or effectiveness (abbreviated effs), depending upon the 
scenario, as the goal-specific criterion.' The abbreviations for initial (ini) and final (fin) 
refer to scenarios prior to any outcome feedback in a particular setting (i.e., normal audit 
or suspected fraud) and the final scenario wherein participants come up with an overall 
planning materiality estimate that takes into account both goal-specific criteria of 
efficiency and effectiveness.
' A final computer screen at the end of each of the normal audit and suspected fraud 
sessions displayed the participant’s planning materiality (PMAT) estimates from earlier 
stages in the experiment. Thus, faced with both their estimates for audit efficiency and 
audit effectiveness, participants traded off one estimate against the other, to strike a 
balance between tliese conflicting goal-specific criteria, e .g ., in the normal audit setting, 
if  participants indicated $ 1,350,000 as their audit efficiency PMAT estimate and $
750,000 as their audit effectiveness PMAT estimate, they may potentially select any 
number in this range, say $1,000,000, as their final PMAT estimate.
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3.2 Procedure
The entire experiment was administered using computer diskettes distributed to 
participants. The programming of the experimental procedures used Microsoft’s Visual 
Basic, as was done earlier for another study (see Ramamoorti & Myung, 1994). The 
program requires a Windows environment and features a mouse-supported point-and-click 
interface that is user friendly and easy to learn. All materiality estimates elicited were 
automatically recorded on these computer diskettes (the total time taken to complete the 
experiment is automatically measured and recorded). Because structured audit 
methodologies in some accounting firms (cf. Cushing & Loebbecke, 1986; Morris & 
Nichols, 1988) may include materiality computation tables, participants were requested 
not to refer to any audit manuals or other reference sources when doing the experiment.
Please refer to Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 in conjunction with Table 3.2 while 
reading each of the subsections below. Section 3.2.1 discusses procedures pertaining to 
the primary framing manipulations, while section 3.2.2 discusses those pertaining to the 
secondary framing manipulations. Section 3.2.3 explains the context in which 
efficiency/effectiveness trade-off behavior is investigated; section 3.2.4 deals with the 
suspected fraud types in the two between subject conditions; and finally, section 3.2.5 
discusses other information relevant to the experiment. The text of all framing 
manipulations that appeared on the computer screen at selected points in time is exhibited 
in Appendix B.
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3.2.1 Primary Framing
For the "normal audit" setting as well as the "suspected fraud" setting, 
participants first evaluated client riskiness (on a 5-point scale), assessed client size 
relative to tlie industry information provided (also on a 5-point scale), and indicated the 
factor base used for materiality computation (from the categories: gross margin %, pretax 
income %, total assets %, total revenue % and other, to be specified). Carmichael and 
Benis (1989) identify client riskiness and client size as two important considerations 
which might affect PMAT judgments. The choices of factor base for materiality 
computation conform to those found most popular among professional auditors in the 
professional literature (see, for instance, Leslie, 1985; Pany & Wheeler, 1989; Wallace, 
1991). After making these qualitative assessments and indicating their preferences, 
participants are then asked to make an estimate of planning materiality and provide 
justification (usually this was done by providing a percentage measure of the factor base 
chosen). Qualitative data is collected in order to learn more about each subject’s initial 
perceptions.
3.2.2 Secondary Framing
After having made their initial planning materiality (PMAT) estimate, participants 
were then asked to make PMAT estimates with only audit efficiency and later, only audit 
effectiveness, emphasized by the partner-in-charge as the paramount criterion for conduct 
of the current year’s audit. From the experimental instructions, participants were aware 
that they would receive feedback on their PMAT estimates. However, the audit
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manager who provided these estimates was described as being "new" so that participants 
would rely less on the manager’s input and exercise more autonomy in arriving at their 
own independent judgments. Having recorded their PMAT judgments, participants 
received computer feedback from two types of managers, a less conservative^ audit 
manager assigned to give feedback in the audit efficiency (effy) condition, and a more 
conservative audit manager assigned to give feedback in the audit effectiveness (effs) 
condition. Participants, in the presence of binary outcome feedback (i.e., "go higher," 
"go lower") and using an iterative process eventually reach each extreme, but pre-set 
materiality ranges. The inclusion of these two types of managers is purely a procedural 
issue with respect to the experiment; of course, the provision of feedback (not necessarily 
a good choice because the manager is described as being “new”) is supposed to be 
informative to tlie participants. Note that a more conservative manager is likely to prefer 
driving down the planning materiality threshold to a very low level just as a less 
conservative manager is likely to raise the planning materiality threshold to a relatively 
high level. In other words, the preset ranges of materiality allow the participants to 
access the "extremes" of the materiality ranges.^ Recognizing that a subject’s risk
 ^ Smith and Kida (1991, p. 477) define auditor conservatism as " ...a  tendency to give more 
attention to, and to be more influenced by, negative information or outcomes." Such 
behavior seems a rational response to the potentially serious consequences of audit 
judgments, e.g., litigation against auditors by third parties (i.e., lenders or investors) for 
(unreported) misstatements in financial reports, especially when such reports overstate 
the profitability or economic viability o f a company.
 ^ These maieriality ranges were determined after extensive consultation with audit 
practitioners including two former partners of different Big Six accounting firms.
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preferences may not be compatible with the type of manager giving feedback and the pre­
set range available to them, subjects are permitted to modify their responses to be 
different from these pre-set ranges, if they wish.
3.2.3 Efficiency-Effectiveness Trade-Offs
As mentioned before, participants are informed at different points in time by the 
partner to emphasize efficiency (effy) or effectiveness (effy) as the case may be. 
Toward the end o f each setting (i.e., normal audit and suspected fraud) participants are 
asked to provide an overall judgment of their planning materiality threshold amount 
taking into account all prior information (e.g., client riskiness, client size, factor base 
chosen, and PMAT estimates under the effy and effs scenarios, denoted effy*effs).
For the normal audit setting, because the hypothetical company is a low-risk client 
and efficiency is quite important, the order of framing is (effy -* effs -» effy*effs); 
whereas for the suspected fraud setting, because effectiveness is more important, the 
order of framing is (effs -> effy -> effs*effy). Maintaining the same order as in the 
normal audit setting would not be justified because efficiency considerations are not as 
relevant when auditing in a fraud mode; similarly, for a low-risk audit engagement, 
efficiency is typically a more important goal, although audit procedures should not fall 
below the requirements set out by generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).'*
■* Counterbalancing these order effects was considered but eschewed in favor o f the 
arguments summarized here. Based on the pilot study experience with a few 
practitioners, I concluded that little additional insight would be gained from such 
counterbalancing.
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Participants are then asked, using all the qualitative and quantitative information they 
have provided themselves (i.e., client riskiness, client size, PMAT (effy), and PMAT 
(effs)) and now displayed on the screen, to arrive at the planning materiality estimate that 
gives consideration to all information simultaneously. Clearly, because audit efficiency 
is related to higher PMAT thresholds while audit effectiveness calls for lower PMAT 
thresholds, participants need to trade off one goal-specific criterion against the other. 
The nature and extent o f the trade-offs made can be analyzed from their final PMAT 
thresholds. Note that these secondary framing effects moderate the effects of primary 
framing. In other words, motivational factors, such as (sub)goal attainment may 
influence the nature and extent o f framing effects.
3.2 .4  Type o f  Suspected Fraud
The "suspected fraud" setting is invoked by having the partner-in-charge call for 
an emergency meeting to discuss his meeting with the Finance Director and member of 
the client’s Audit Committee (see Appendix B for text of framing conditions). The 
suspicion of defalcation is suggested by the partner’s mentioning the Finance Director’s 
account of the discovery, by a junior employee, of inventory pilferage and subsequent 
over-valuation of other inventory parts to compensate for the shortage. Subjects are 
further informed that client management is currently taking steps to assess the extent of 
the exposure by having the internal audit team investigate the situation.
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987; also called 
the Treadway Commission) laid considerable emphasis on management integrity and the
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setting of the “proper tone at the top.” This issue is highlighted in the current study by 
featuring a management fraud setting. The suspicion o f management fraud is suggested 
by the partner’s mentioning the Finance Director’s allegation that the Chief Financial 
Officer was under considerable pressure from the management to maintain the stable 
trend in net income (i.e., possibility of "illegitimate income smoothing"). In the 
terminology used in Hogarth & Einhom’s (1990) venture theory the content of these 
scenarios can be described as containing a "high perceived level o f ambiguity" 
(illegitimate income smoothing) and a "low perceived level o f ambiguity" (inventory 
theft), respectively. That is, the inventory theft scenario is quite specific and the risk can 
be assessed, while the income smoothing scenario is nebulous and remains uncertain.
3.2 .5  Other Information
While participants’ anonymity is preserved when reporting the results, a detailed 
debriefing questionnaire explained the purpose of the study, and requested information 
relating to the background and training of participants (e.g., certification held i.e., CPA, 
CIA or both certifications) and their prior experience in auditing, particularly with the 
making of materiality judgments (and whether in a primarily external or internal auditing 
context). Participants who are primarily internal auditors are asked whether the external 
audit focus of the problem scenario adversely affected their ability to perform the 
experimental task. Some technical information is also requested from participants: this 
largely has to do with ascertaining if participants’ typically think of materiality 
computation as being linear when the size of a client increases. Participants are also
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asked if  they evaluated the initial client riskiness as "high" and/or whether they never 
changed their initial PMAT estimates at all. The answers to these questions provide 
diagnostic information about a participant’s performance on the task. Finally, a couple 
of questions enquire about the participant’s assessment of whether the task was realistic 
and/or the scenarios plausible. At the very end, an open-ended question asking 
participants to comment on anything specific is included; such open-ended questions 
frequently reveal useful information about the participant’s understanding of the 
experiment (cf. Berg et al., 1990).
Participants were also requested to complete a “self-description inventory’’ that 
was developed in Professor Herbert Mirels’ laboratory in the Department of Psychology 
at The Ohio State University. This inventory helps measure the degree of self- 
confidence that a respondent has in his or her own judgments. It would be useful to 
examine the level of self-confidence participating auditors had in their own judgments 
while making these PMAT judgments under different scenarios (cf. Pincus, 1991).
3.3 Pilot Study Results
A pilot study was conducted to establish the feasibility of the main study. The 
results from the pilot study confirmed almost all the major hypotheses delineated in 
chapter II. Minor hypotheses discussed in that chapter were not tested because of the 
small sample size, viz., only 24 participants. These pilot study participants, most of 
whom were CPAs, were personal acquaintances of the author. However, the majority 
of the pilot study participants were unaware of the hypotheses that were being tested in
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the experiment. Pilot participants were randomly assigned to conditions, i.e., they had 
an equal chance of being in the defalcation or management fraud condition.
Two findings from the pilot study specifically helped in fine-tuning the 
experimental design and procedures. First, as mentioned in footnote 4, experience with 
a few practitioners revealed that counterbalancing the secondary framing conditions of 
audit efficiency and audit effectiveness would not affect their judgments. Some went 
to the extent o f pointing out that it is inappropriate to consider efficiency when there is 
a suspicion of fraud: this is tantamount to audit negligence! Consequently, efficiency 
was only featured as the latter secondary framing condition in the suspected fraud setting.
Second, some pilot study participants did not change their PMAT thresholds in 
response to tlie primary and framing manipulations. Their argument (as articulated by 
two highly experienced pilot subjects) seemed to be that "materiality" is a dollar amount 
in the mind of the average prudent investor (see FASB, 1980; Hicks, 1964; Stettler, 
1974; EAT Study, 1980, for similar views), and ought not to change in response to 
considerations such as those featured in the task context. However, they did concede 
that upon becoming aware of the partner’s comments and/or the suspicion of fraud, in 
reality they would have altered the level of audit effort (i.e., increased or decreased it 
depending upon the circumstances). This finding prompted the incorporation of a 
section in the experiment where participants are requested to indicate, after each planning 
materiality estimate, the change in the audit procedures contemplated. The information 
provided would reveal that even those participants who appeared insensitive to the 
experimental manipulations (on the basis of unchanged PMAT estimates) nevertheless
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changed their level of audit e ffo rt/ The information requested encompasses both the 
nature ( i.e ., add, drop, or no change) and extent (i.e., more, less, or no change) of 
change(s) in audit procedures.
3.4 Recruitment of Participants
Partners and managers o f public accounting firms and directors of internal audit 
departments of several companies were contacted in early Fall 1994 for the purposes of 
recruiting their audit staff for participation in the study. The response from them was 
very positive, and about 230 professional accountants with experience in auditing from 
20 accounting firms and other organizations tentatively agreed to participate in the 
experiment (see Appendix C for a list of accounting firms and the indicated number of 
tentative participants). Experimental packets containing the materials exhibited in 
Appendix D and a computer diskette containing the computer program were distributed 
in late December 1994. Each organization located in Columbus, Cleveland, and 
Chicago, was provided witli an appropriate number of diskettes to match their “qualified” 
staff ( i.e ., those who held CPA, CIA, or both certifications). Assignment of 
experimental packets could be regarded as being “double-blind” because every 
organization received odd and even-numbered packets and there was no systematic way 
of providing participants with an even or odd-numbered packet; in particular, the author
* Note that a change in the level of audit effort does translate into an adjustment of 
materiality thresholds according to several authorities in the professional auditing 
literature (see, for instance, Arens & Loebbecke, 1991; Leslie, 1985; Carmichael & 
Benis, 1989). Therefore, such changes effectively amount to a lowering or raising of 
materiality thresholds for the purposes of this experimental study.
78
and experimenter had no control at all over the manner in which the packets (including 
diskette) were distributed.
By early April 1995, 145 completed experimental packets from 16 accounting 
firms and organizations were received: a response rate of 145/230 =  63%. Participants 
were informed that an executive summary of the major findings from the completed study 
would be made available to them.
CHAPTER IV 
DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSES, AND RESULTS
4.0 Introduction
This chapter discusses issues related to the collection o f data, including the final 
sample used in the study, presents a menu o f statistical methods that are used to analyze 
the data from different angles, and reports the results from these different types of data 
analyses employed. Because the study is experimental as well as exploratory in nature, 
the wealth of information gathered from the participants is amenable to analysis in 
different ways. However, emphasis was given to those techniques that appeared capable 
of yielding the most important insights for the research questions of interest.
The rest of tliis chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.1, the nature of the 
data collected is explained in detail. A large part of the data collected could not be 
used, and the consequent shrinkage in the "usable" data is discussed in this section. In 
section 4.2, a summary of the techniques contemplated for analyzing the data is 
discussed. Section 4.3 provides descriptive statistics on the final sample selected for 
analysis, reports the results of some diagnostic tests, and suggests possible avenues of 
proceeding with the analysis. Section 4.4, the data analysis section, consists of 
numerous subsections dealing with different types of analyses carried out and the results 
obtained. Finally, section 4.5 concludes tins chapter by offering a summary o f the main
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results of the study. A summary of the major findings including linkages between the 
results obtained, their implications for this study and for future research, are 
subsequently reported and discussed more fully in chapter V.
4.1 Data Collection
By the first week of April 1995, as noted before, 145 completed experimental 
packets from 16 organizations had been received. Of these, 96 (or 66%) participants 
were professional auditors holding the certified public accountant (CPA) certificate, 21 
(or 19%) held the certified internal auditor (CIA) certificate, and the remaining 28 (or 
15%) held neither CPA nor CIA certificate.' A majority o f the CIAs (i.e., 11/21 =  
52%) indicated in the debriefing questionnaire that they were not very familiar with the 
notion of materiality or had limited experience with its determination from tlie 
perspective of external auditors. Moreover, given the external audit focus of the study, 
even in terms of the hypothetical scenario presented, it was thought appropriate to test 
the major hypotheses using only the 96 CPA participants. The small number of CIAs 
were, however, included in separate analyses so as to facilitate comparison. Thus, data 
from a total of 117 participants were (i.e., 96 CPAs +  21 CIAs) utilized in the statistical 
analyses.
I The latter category o f 28 participants included those holding the certified information 
systems auditor (CISA), certified bank auditor (CBA), and certified fraud examiner 
(CPE) designations, as well as those who did not hold any certifications. Three 
participants received "bad" diskettes in this category and were unable to work on the 
experiment, although they did complete the debriefing questionnaire.
81
The following information could be gleaned from the completed experimental 
packets. Among the 96 CPAs and 21 CIAs, the average number of years o f experience 
was approximately 6.5 years and 8.35 years respectively. Participating CPAs/CIAs took 
about 25/29 minutes to complete the computer portion o f the experiment; subsequently 
filling out the debriefing questionnaire and providing other information, may have 
required an additional 10 minutes. The average total time for completing the experiment 
was probably less than 45 minutes (this was also true of the pilot study participants).
It was clear that participants "adapted" well to the experimental design and 
procedures (cf. Hogarth, 1993; Gibbins & Jamal, 1993) from observing the steady 
decrease in the number of trials subjects took to arrive at the pre-specified dollar range 
of PMAT that was stored into the computer. Each participant received feedback at four 
different times during the experiment: during computation of aud effy, aud effs, frd_effs 
and frd efty, respectively^ (see Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). The progressive decrease in 
the number of trials-to-criterion, i.e., “task learning behavior” can be observed by 
looking at Table 4.1 below. Note that PMAT (aud effy) is the first estimate about 
which outcome feedback is received, PMAT (aud effs) is next, PMAT (frd effs) is the 
third such estimate receiving outcome feedback, while PMAT (frd effy) is the last such 
estimatefor which participants receive outcome feedback. At the end of the feedback-
 ^ The abbreviations "aud" and "frd" denote the normal audit and suspected fraud 
conditions; "ini," "effy," "effs," and "fin" refer to PMAT estimates made at the initial 
(ini) stage, after the "efficiency" (effy) secondary framing, after the "effectiveness" (effs) 
secondary framing, and at the final (fin) stage respectively.
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driven process, participants input their own PMAT estimate for that particular scenario 
which may or may not correspond to the pre-stored ranges for those scenarios determined 
by the experimenter.
Table 4.1
Mean Number of Trials-to-Criterion (CPA, CIA)
Condition 1: Defalcation Condition 2: Management Fraud
Trials For: Mean Trials Trials For: Mean Trials
Aud_Effy (6.49, 9.20) A udE ffy (11.31, 7.27)
Aud_Effs (2.74, 3.60) A udE ffs (2.84, 3.36)
Frd_Effs (3.04, 2.10) Frd_Effs (2.65, 1.27)
Frd_Effy (1.62, 1.60) Frd_Effy (1.67, 1.00)
As shown in Table 4.1, for condition 1, (CPA, CIA) participants required a mean 
number of (6.49, 9.20) trials to reach the pre-stored PMAT solution range for the audit 
efficiency condition, but only a mean of (1.62, 1.60) trials to reach the pre-recorded 
PMAT estimate for efficiency in the suspected fraud (defalcation) condition. Similarly, 
for condition 2, (CPA, CIA) participants took a mean number of (11.31, 7.27) trials to 
reach the solution range for the audit efficiency condition, but they took only a mean of 
(1.67, 1.00) trials to reach the pre-recorded PMAT estimate for efficiency in the 
suspected fraud (management fraud) condition. It certainly appears that despite the large
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number of trials at the beginning, participants were able to get used to the task 
environment quite quickly.
The debriefing questionnaire contained questions asking participants to comment 
upon task realism and plausibility of the scenarios presented in the experimental task. 
A total o f 61 out of 117 participants (i.e., 53 CPAs and 8 CIAs, or 52%) opined that the 
task was realistic and the scenarios plausible; 49 participants (or 42%) did not respond 
to this question. Only 7 out of 117 participants (or 6%), felt that the task was not 
realistic and/or the scenarios implausible.
4.2 Statistical Data Analysis Methods Used
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from each participant. The 
availability of several data inputs from each participant permits several statistical tests, 
in addition to descriptive statistical summaries. These descriptive summaries enable 
diagnostic tests to assess integrity of the data. The sign and size of adjustments made 
to the "anchor" PMAT estimate can also be determined by looking at movements in the 
PMAT estimates responsive to different secondary framing scenarios (see Appendix B). 
Such an analysis will confirm or challenge some of the predictions made in chapter II 
with reference to the "anchoring and adjustment" model that was posited for planning 
materiality judgments. Because each participant enters planning materiality (PMAT) 
estimates eight different times (i.e., 4 times in the normal audit setting and 4 times in the 
suspected fraud setting), and belongs to one of two suspected fraud settings (i.e..
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defalcation or management fraud), there are eight PMAT dollar estimates associated with 
each participant in a group. Accordingly, the experimental design can be described as 
a 2 X (2 X 4 X S) mixed ANOVA design.
Primary and secondary framing scenarios occurred sequentially, and therefore, 
each PMAT estimate serves as an input to the next PMAT estimate. Accordingly, the 
final audit scenario PMAT estimate could be used to predict the initial suspected fraud 
PM AT estimate. Another potential predictor variable could be the client riskiness 
evaluation after the primary framing with respect to the suggestion of suspected fraud 
(see Appendix B for details of the text of the decision framing implied by task 
formulation that was used). In other words, both simple and multiple linear regression 
can be used to make such predictions.
Because client riskiness assessment was operationalized as an ordinal scale 
variable and participants were asked to evaluate this before and after the "primary 
framing" (i.e., the suggestion of suspected fraud), a non-parametric test such as the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test could be employed to test whether these risk assessments 
measured on a scale from 1 to 5 (i.e., very low, low, moderate, high, and very high) 
were significantly higher for the suspected fraud condition.
Other statistical methods can be used with reference to the minor hypotheses 
referred to in chapter II as well as for exploration of observed patterns in the data 
collected. Selected comparisons between participants with the CPA, CIA and/or both 
certifications, are possible through the use o f correspondence analysis. Unlike the
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test, which merely provides a test statistic to assess statistical significance, 
correspondence analysis produces a graphical display o f cross tabular information 
(Greenacre, 1993). Such a visual display is readily comprehensible and can be useful 
in detecting patterns that might not be evident from simple cross-tabulations. Similarly, 
multidimensional scaling refers to a conglomeration o f data analytic techniques that 
enable the portrayal of data structure in a spatial fashion that can be easily understood 
(Kruskal & Wish, 1978). Both of these graphical data analysis techniques are used to 
gain additional insights about experimental findings.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics and Diagnostic Tests
Section 4.3.1 provides the descriptive statistics which are then used as the basis 
to perform some diagnostic tests reported in sections 4.3.2 through 4.3.5 to gain an 
initial understanding of the data collected. It is helpful to obtain some familiarity with 
the data collected before full-blown statistical procedures are carried out.
4.3.1 Summary o f  Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2 provides a summary of descriptive statistics, for CPAs (total N =  96), 
arranged by suspected fraud condition, i.e., defalcation (n, =47) and management fraud 
(n%=49) scenarios. Table 4.3 provides the same information for CIAs (total N =  21). 
All PMAT estimates are reported in thousands of dollars. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 reveal the 
following patterns with respect to both intra-group vs. inter-group comparisons for both
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the CPA and CIA samples: (i) the initial PMAT estimate in the normal audit setting for 
both suspected fraud conditions shows the maximum amount o f variance; (ii) the 
efficiency criterion produces higher PMAT thresholds than does the effectiveness 
criterion under both suspected fraud conditions; and finally, (iii) the PMAT estimates for 
aud_fin and frd fin lie between the bounds (aud_effy, aud effs) and (frd effy, frd_effs) 
respectively. In general, the descriptive statistics reveal patterns that are consistent 
across CPAs and CIAs. This is somewhat surprising because these are professionals with 
quite distinct backgrounds and job responsibilities. However, the notion of materiality 
is familiar to both CPAs and CIAs, and may account for the similar patterns observed.
One of the major hypotheses states that the management fraud condition exhibits 
greater ambiguity and should therefore produce a larger variance in participants’ PMAT 
estimates. Indeed, this hypothesis holds true for the CPAs in Table 4.2 but is not true 
for the small CIA sample (N =21) in Table 4.3. For the CPAs from Table 4.2, 
although the mean PMAT difference in thousands for the two suspected fraud conditions 
is only $15 (i.e., $578 -  $563), the standard error of the mean shows a much greater 
spread, that is, $74 versus $46.
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Table 4.2
PMAT Estimates under Primary and Secondary Framing (CPAs, N=96)
Normal Audit Setting Normal Audit Setting
(Group 1, n , =  47) (Group 2, iij = 49)
Variable Mean Standard Variable Mean Standard
PMAT Error PMAT Error
a u d in i $ 1,371.72 $ 303.84 a u d in i $ 972.18 $ 189.63
audeffy $ 1,273.87 $ 116.68 audeff s $ 1,281.29 $ 119.12
audeff s $ 611.81 $ 35.76 audef fy $ 720.12 $ 98.49
aud_fin $ 865.15 $ 42.88 a u d f in $ 947.33 $ 111.78
Defalcation Setting Management Fraud Setting
(Group 1, n , = 47) (Group 2, « 2  = 49)
Variable Mean Standard Variable Mean Standard
PMAT Error PMAT Error
f rd jn i $ 563.51 $ 46.05 frd jn i $ 578.24 $ 74.71
frd_effy $ 322.98 $ 40.21 f rdef fs $ 330.63 $ 42.37
frd_effs $ 558.83 $ 43.40 frdef fy $ 526.29 $ 39.25
frd_fin $ 477.55 $ 48.16 frd_fin $ 434.39 $ 38.88
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Table 4.3
PMAT Estimates under Primary and Secondary Framing (CIAs, N=21)
Normal Audit Setting Normal Audit Setting
(Group 1, n , = 10) (Group 2, Uj = 11)
Variable Mean Standard Variable Mean Standard
PMAT Error PMAT Error
aud_ini $ 1,495.70 $ 654.50 aud ini $ 2,106.45 $ 1170.46
a ude f fy $ 1,207.00 $ 151.34 audeff s $ 1,445.45 $ 373.22
audeff s $ 565.00 $ 55.80 audeffy $ 904.55 $ 186.41
aud_fin $ 899.50 $ 101.34 aud_fin $ 1,104.55 $ 222.23
Defalcation Setting M anagement Fraud Setting
(Group 1, n , = 10) (Group 2, 11)
Variable Mean Standard Variable Mean Standard
PMAT Error PMAT Error
frd jn i $ 633.20 $201 .56 frd ini $ 354.55 $ 54.96
frd_effy $ 162.50 $ 24.51 frd_effs $ 200.00 $ 42.10
f rde f fs $ 470.00 $ 76.45 frdef fy $ 463.64 $ 33.77
f rd f in $ 349.00 $ 52.71 frd_fin $ 347.73 $ 38.21
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4.3.2 Diagnostic Tests o f  Client Riskiness Perception: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
Participants were asked to provide a qualitative assessment of the client riskiness 
(on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 =  very low risk; 2 =  low risk; 3 =  moderate risk; 4 =  
high risk; and 5 =  very high risk) for both the initial audit setting and later after the 
suspected fraud setting had been invoked. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test 
is a suitable non-parametric alternative to the within-subjects t-test: the T  statistics and 
its sampling distribution allow for testing the significance of an observed difference 
between two sets of scores obtained via a repeated measures design (Diekhoff, 1992). 
The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test revealed that for both CPA participants as 
well as CIA participants significantly higher assessments of client riskiness were observed 
in the suspected fraud setting (after being exposed to the partner’s comments at the 
emergency planning meeting) than in the normal audit setting. For CPAs the value of 
the observed test statistic for the difference (rsk aud - rsk_frd) was T =  -7.72 (p <  
0.001) and for CIAs, the value of the same observed test statistic was T =  -3.24 (p <  
0.002). Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the change in background factors 
(i.e., the shift from a "normal audit" setting to a "suspected fraud" setting) significantly 
impacted participants’ perception of the riskiness associated with the hypothetical client 
in the two settings.
Because the client riskiness evaluation is a qualitative assessment, participants’ 
assessments at this stage constitute “pre-decisional behavior, ’’ part of what Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979) call “editing operations." Consequently, this result provides evidence
90
that the primary framing manipulation was successful; it remains to be shown that the 
impact o f such predecisional behavior can be linked to the making of subsequent 
decisions by auditors, i.e ., PMAT judgments.
4.3.3 Diagnostic Tests o f  Framing Effects: Direction and Size o f  PM AT Adjustments
A cursory glance at the mean PMAT thresholds in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 confirms 
that participants were using a decision strategy that has been called 
"efficiency/effectiveness tradeoffs." Under both normal audit and suspected fraud 
settings, the PMAT threshold for the efficiency is the higher amount, the PMAT 
threshold for effectiveness is the lower amount, and the tradeoff can be indirectly 
surmised by noting that the mean final PMAT threshold lies between these two 
“extreme” assessments. It should be pointed out that this “high-low then middle” 
pattern is observed partially owing to the manner in which the feedback provided to the 
participants induced them to make judgments consistent with the pre-stored solution 
ranges. However, participants were permitted to arrive at their own independent PMAT 
judgments for every scenario.
With reference to the anchoring and adjustment model underlying the making of 
PM AT assessments, it was hypothesized that if  PMAT (aud, frd; ini) is treated as a 
baseline, then PMAT (aud, frd; effy) would be a higher amount, while PMAT (aud, frd; 
effs) will likely be a lower amount. Again, because the primary framing settings are
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global to the audit engagement they are expected to exhibit a greater magnitude of 
adjustment as compared to the secondary framing scenarios which will probably show 
a smaller adjustment. In terms o f the magnitude of change in these adjustments, in 
general, effectiveness being a more important criterion than efficiency, PMAT (effs) 
should be associated with a sharper drop than the relative increase for PMAT (effy). 
Moreover, across the normal audit and suspected fraud settings one would expect PMAT 
(effs) to have a steeper slope than PMAT (effy). This prediction partially derives from 
Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) prospect theory wherein, in the domain of losses, a 
steeper function is posited. Finally, it was conjectured that participants in the suspected 
fraud scenarios would make more severe adjustments^
The large variance associated with PMAT (aud ini) is cause for some concern 
because it lacks the stability to be treated as an “anchor.” Moreover, the overall mean 
PMAT thresholds associated with PMAT (aud ini) =  $ 1,167.79 and PMAT (aud_effy) 
=  $ 1,277.66 do not appear, at first glance to differ substantially (see Figure 4.1). To 
better understand the nature of the data producing such mean PMAT thresholds, a 
Wilcoxon matched-pair signed ranks test was performed for the 96 CPA participants. 
The results were statistically significant with T = -3.73 ( p < .001) showing that the 
hypothesis that PMAT (aud effy) >  PMAT (aud jn i) was not implausible. In
 ^ Four subjects in the suspected fraud condition did not change their PMAT estimates at 
all, however, in line with the findings obtained in the pilot study, they did change the 
nature and extent of audit procedures in the direction implied by the audit partner’s 
comments. As pointed out before, such a change in audit procedures effectively
translates as a change in PMAT thresholds in the appropriate directions.
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particular, 68 participants gave estimates agreeing with the directional prediction, 28 
gave estimates counter to the prediction and there were 8 ties. Moreover, the median 
PMAT thresholds, namely that PMAT (aud ini) =  $ 500.00, and PMAT (aud effy) =  
$ 1,250.00, are much more representative of the PMAT thresholds one would expect in 
light of theoretical considerations.
In particular, it is now possible to evaluate our predictions from the general 
process model presented in equation 1.3. The model was stated as follows:
= j,A , + ^2 ^ 2  + K  {other factors) (4.1)
with Si, Sj e {-1, 1} and A, > Aj > 0.
In Equation (4.1) above, s, and Sj represent the sign, and A, and A ,^ the magnitude 
o f change. Further, the subscript 1 refers to the nature o f the setting (i.e., "normal 
audit" or "suspected fraud") while subscript 2 refers to goal-specific criteria (viz., audit 
efficiency or audit effectiveness). It was hypothesized that s, will take on a positive 
value for an audit scenario (for a low-risk client) while it will assume a negative value 
for a suspected fraud scenario ("negative framing").
Table 4.4 below summarizes whether the observed PMAT estimates for CPAs 
conformed to predictions made from equation (4.1). Note that both s and A are generic 
in that they refer to both s, and s^  as well as to A, and A .^ The notation “Y” indicates the 
prediction was confirmed, while “N ” indicates it was disconfirmed. Table 4.4 shows
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that most of the predictions related to the efficiency criterion turned out to be false. In 
other words, although it was hypothesized that PMAT (aud effy) would be consistently 
higher than PMAT (aud ini) in the two normal audit settings for each group as well as 
the two suspected fraud settings (viz., defalcation and management fraud), the observed 
PMAT (aud effy) turned out to be slightly less than PMAT (aud ini) in three out of the 
four cases. This might suggest that auditors prefer not to place too much emphasis on 
efficiency, or that the partner’s comments were not convincing enough for participants 
to respond as expected. The latter explanation is not persuasive because the partner’s 
comments with reference to effectiveness did elicit a response in the expected direction, 
and the pilot study results confirmed these predictions. The observed anomalous 
behavior is taken up again in the discussion related to efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs. 
Note that, at least witli respect to the suspected fraud scenarios, it is unrealistic to expect 
any increase in PMAT (frd effy) beyond PMAT (frd ini) because the mere suspicion of 
fraud dictates that effectiveness be the paramount consideration with efficiency playing 
only a minor role.
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Table 4.4
How Well Do Observed M ean PM AT Thresholds Conform  To Predictions?
(CPAs only, N =  96)
Normal Audit Setting Defalcation Setting
Variable Mean $ 
PMAT
s A Variable Mean $ 
PMAT
s A
a u d in i 1,371.72 Y Y frd in i 563. 51 Y Y
aud_effy 1,273.87 N N frde f fs 322.98 Y Y
audeff s 611.81 Y Y frd_effy 558. 83 N N
a udf in 865.15 Y Y frd_fin 477. 55 Y Y
Normal Audit Setting Management Fraud Setting
Variable Mean $ 
PMAT
s A Variable Mean $ 
PMAT
s A
a ud in i 972.18 Y Y frd in i 578.24 Y Y
audeffy 1,281.29 Y Y frdef fs 330.63 Y Y
aud_effs 720.12 Y Y frdeffy 526.29 N N
audf in 947.33 Y Y frd f in 434.39 Y Y
4 .3 .4  Diagnostic Tests: Decision Weighting Strategies
It is clear that participants balanced considerations of efficiency and effectiveness 
while arriving at the final PMAT estimates in the normal audit and suspected fraud 
settings respectively. By assuming a decision weighting parameter, say k , for the
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normal audit setting, and another decision weighting parameter, say X, for the suspected 
fraud setting, such that 0 <  k, X < 1, it is possible to ascertain whether a specific 
participant adopted an equal weighting strategy, an efficiency-prone strategy or an 
effectiveness-prone strategy. The calculation of k and X for the normal audit and 
suspected fraud settings proceeds as follows:
PM AT (aud J in )  =  k  PM AT (audjeffy) +  (1-k) PM AT (aud_effs) (4.2)
and similarly,
PM AT (fidJ in )  =  X PM AT ( f id jf fy )  +  ( l- \)  PM AT (fid_effs) (4.3)
If a participant obtains a decision weight value of 0.5 for the corresponding k and 
X, tlien s/he is described as one who has adopted an “equal-weighting” strategy for that 
setting, if the decision weight value exceeds 0.5 then s/he is described as being 
“efficiency-prone” and finally, if the decision weight value is less than 0.5 then s/he is 
described as being “effectiveness-prone.” Table 4.5 summarizes the number of 
participants who preferred specific decision strategies (in terms of the weights assigned 
to efficiency or effectiveness) according to the context in which these decisions were 
made.
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Table 4.5
Decision W eighting Strategy P referred  by CPA, CIA and Both Participants
Certification CPA CIA Both
Strategy Audit Fraud Audit Fraud Audit Fraud
Equal Weighting 20 17 8 10 0 0
Efficiency-Prone 16 28 5 6 3 3
Effectiveness-Prone 42 23 8 3 3 2
TOTAL 78 68 21 19 6 5
Wherever the total does not correspond to the total number of CPAs (90), CIAs 
(21) or participants with both certifications, denoted Both (6), it is because not all 
participants could be so classified. For instance, some participants chose to input the 
same dollar amount for all PMAT estimates, some chose to go beyond the parameter 
bounds o f 0 and 1 etc. Accordingly, Table 4.5 has already been adjusted for 
“degenerate” strategies (with reference to those defined) such as not changing PMAT 
thresholds at all, or changing it in such a way that the value of the decision weighting 
parameters exceeds 1 or falls below 0.
It appears that CPAs are generally effectiveness-prone in the normal audit setting 
but efficiency-prone in the suspected fraud setting; CIAs prefer to be equal-weighters in 
both the normal audit and in the suspected fraud setting; as for those holding both
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certifications, the only statement we can safely make is that they do not tend to be equal- 
weighters at all. A slightly different version of Table 4.5 has been used to perform a 
correspondence analysis in section 4.4.3 (see Figure 4.8 wherein these patterns can be 
readily observed).
4 .3 .5  Diagnostic Tests: Plotting Confidence Intervals Around Means
Figures 4 .1 , 4.2 and 4.3 depict the 95% confidence intervals around the mean 
PM AT thresholds by utilizing error bars. Note that Figure 4.1 depicts the combined 
means for the normal audit setting across both groups of participants. Clearly, this kind 
of pictorial representation is visually quite appealing and tells at a glance, the amount of 
variation associated with mean PMAT thresholds reported (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Loftus and Masson (1994) strongly espouse the practice of plotting a set of sample means 
along with their confidence intervals. They believe that such plots can be illuminating 
because an intuitive assessment of the best estimate of the underlying pattern of 
population means as well as the degree of statistical power becomes possible. However, 
see the discussion pertaining to the results of the Wilcoxon matched pair signed ranks test 
reported in section 4.3.3 earlier in the case when t-test assumptions may have been 
violated.
From Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it is evident that mean PMAT estimates for the 
efficiency and effectiveness criteria differ considerably. Similarly, in Figure 4.3 again.
98
there appears to be no overlap in the confidence intervals between the efficiency and 
effectiveness criteria. Because o f the small sample sizes, similar error bar graphs for 
CIAs are not presented. Nevertheless, information from Table 4.3 pertaining to CIAs 
does suggest that there was a significant difference in PMAT thresholds for the normal 
audit vs. suspected fraud settings. However, there did not appear to be a significant 
difference between mean PMAT thresholds elicited from subjects in the defalcation and 
management fraud conditions respectively. In sum, the CIA data reveal patterns and 
relationships that closely mirror the data obtained from the CPAs.
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4 .3 .6  Non-Linearity in Materiality Computation Function
The question in the debriefing questionnaire asking subjects to "scale" materiality 
computation in response to magnification of the financial statements by a factor is now 
considered. Specific questions in the debriefing questionnaire (see Appendix D) were 
designed to elicit participants’ opinions as to whether the planning materiality 
computation is non-linear. Participants were asked to respond whether magnifying the 
financial statements by 10 or by 100 would result in PMAT thresholds being also 
magnified by greater than 10, less than 10, or by exactly 10 or 100 as the case may be.
Almost 82% of the 117 participants considered the computation of PMAT to be 
non-linear. Only 10% considered the computation to stay the same percentage of the 
factor base even though the size of the client increased. Most of the responses 
supporting non-linearity (i.e., 70%) indicate that PMAT levels would decrease with 
increasing client size. This convexity in the shape of the planning materiality estimation 
function presumably reflects contemporary auditors’ concerns about litigation risk (see, 
for instance, POB, 1993). This finding is supported by Warren & Elliott’s (1986) 
power function using "revenues" as the factor base, and will be discussed in chapter V.
4.4 Statistical Analyses
As mentioned earlier, several statistical analyses can be performed to investigate 
interesting hypotheses and conjectures. Some of the important techniques that have been
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used in this study are; analysis o f variance (ANOVA), simple and multiple linear 
regression, correspondence analysis, and multidimensional scaling. Each o f these is 
taken up in turn in the sections below.
4.4.1 Analysis o f  Variance (ANOVA)
There were two groups consisting entirely of CPAs, exposed to two types of 
suspected fraud: the group exposed to defalcation (inventory theft) had 47 subjects, while 
the group exposed to management fraud (illegitimate income smoothing) had 49 subjects. 
All mean PMAT thresholds pertaining to CPA participants have been reported in Table
4.2 earlier. Comparable information for groups consisting entirely of CIAs is available 
in Table 4.3.
To recapitulate, PMAT threshold is the dependent variable; suspected fraud type 
(i.e., defalcation or management fraud condition) is a two-level between subjects factor 
(labeled suspected fraud type), normal audit or suspected fraud is a two-level within- 
subjects factor (labeled primary framing), and PMAT elicitations for the scenarios 
corresponding to audit efficiency or audit effectiveness (i.e., aud ini => aud effy =» 
aud_effs => aud fin as opposed to frd ini => frd effs => frd effy => frd fin) is a four- 
level within-subjects factor under secondary framing (labeled scenario).
Referring back to the major hypotheses outlined in chapter III, the following 
comparisons are of interest: (a) whether the within-subjects factor, primary framing, i.e.,
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normal audit setting” vs. “suspected fraud setting” produces statistically significant 
differences in PMAT thresholds; (b) whether the between-subjects factor, suspected fraud  
type (i.e., defalcation vs. management fraud) produces statistically significant differences 
in PMAT thresholds; (c) whether the within-subjects factor, scenario, generates 
sufficiently large differences in the PMAT estimates within each of the normal audit and 
suspected fraud settings, respectively, which prove to be statistically significant; and (d) 
finally, whether there is any evidence of significant interactions among any of these 
factors enumerated above. Clearly, these questions can all be answered by performing 
an analysis of variance.
ANOVA results are reported in Table 4.6 below. Both sum of squares (SS) and 
mean sum of squares (MS) have been rounded to the nearest integer; only F-ratio’s are 
reported to three decimal places. Table 4.5 shows that the ordinal predictions of the 
major hypotheses, with respect to the within-subjects factors primary framing  and 
scenario, were correct. However, the main effect for the between-subjects factor, 
suspected fraud type, was not statistically significant. In other words, mean PMAT 
thresholds for the defalcation (low ambiguity) and illegitimate income smoothing (high 
ambiguity) conditions did not reveal a difference that was statistically significant. Some 
of the reasons for the result which is inconsistent with the hypotheses outlined earlier, 
will be discussed in chapter V. Figure 4.4 should be viewed in conjunction with Table
4.6 below.
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Table 4.6
Source Table for Mixed ANOVA Design
Source SS d f MS F P
Fraud Type (A) 194923 1 194923 0.128 n.s
S/A 142537286 94 1516354
Audit/Fraud (B) 54190701 1 54190701 53.919 < .001
AB 65692 1 65962 0.066 n.s
BS/A 94473675 94 1005039
Scenario (C) 20920793 3 6973598 17.630 <.001
AC 1768352 3 589451 1.490 n.s
CS/A 111543262 282 395543
BC 4311175 3 1437058 4.091 < .01
ABC 2321755 3 779318 2.203 n.s
BCS/A 99066932 282 351301
Figure 4.4 shows that the mean PMAT threshold in thousands (the initial estimate) 
averaged across both suspected fraud conditions for the normal audit setting ($1,168) was 
far higher than for each individual suspected fraud setting, i.e., defalcation ($564) and 
management fraud ($578) respectively. However, the mean PMAT difference between 
the two groups identified by exposure to type of suspected fraud was quite small. Also 
contrary to predictions made earlier, the mean PMAT threshold for management fraud 
was higher than that for the defalcation setting. A comparison between the PMAT
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estimates in the normal audit and suspected fraud settings is provided in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5 clearly displays that mean PMAT estimates in the normal audit setting were 
consistently higher than those for the suspected fraud setting. Again, the overlapping 
sequences pertaining to the two suspected fraud  settings, the between-subjects condition, 
suggests that there is very little difference between these two groups; however, 
significant differences are observed with reference to the within-subjects factors, primary 
framing  and scenario, respectively.
4.4.2 Simple and Multiple Linear Regression
Given the “anchoring and adjustment” nature of the audit judgment process and 
the design of the experimental task, the outcome from a prior decision frequently 
constitutes the input at the next decision phase, the very essence of dynamic decision 
making (see Wallsten & Rapoport, 1972; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). This feature 
o f the PMAT estimates elicited sequentially under primary and secondary framing 
conditions raises the possibility of performing simple and multiple regressions. First, 
the final PMAT estimate in the normal audit setting (which reflects 
efficiency/effectiveness tradeoffs), must form the “anchor” for the initial PMAT estimate 
in each of the suspected fraud settings. Accordingly, a simple linear regression with 
frd ini as the dependent variable and aud_fin as the independent variable, for both 
groups of subjects, was carried out.
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A brief overview of the regression model is now presented. Suppose there are 
n observations on the dependent variable Y corresponding to the n sets of values for the 
independent variables, Xj,, X|2 , X ^  where i =  l ,2 ,., , ,n . It is then possible to express 
this in matrix notation as:
F  = XP + e (4.4)
where Y is the vector of dependent variable values, X is the (design) matrix containing 
the values of the independent variables, /3 is the vector of parameters, and e is the vector 
of error components assumed to be uncorrelated with mean zero and common variance 
(p-. The parameter values (8j’s can be estimated using the principle of least squares. In 
particular, once the data are available, we choose as the estimates of /3| those values that 
minimize S  or the sum of squared deviations of the observed Y/s from the 
corresponding values given by the regression function. Now, provided (X’X)"‘ exists, 
the solution can be represented in matrix form as follows:
p = (4.5)
This equation (4.5) above is important in regression analysis because it provides the 
means (on the right hand side) for obtaining the least squares values for any multiple 
regression model linear in parameters.
109
Table 4.7 reports the results o f this regression; based on this Table, aud_fin turns out 
to be a good choice as a predictor variable. Subsequently, to improve the R^, the 
inclusion of the level of client riskiness assessment, i.e ., risk frd variable, was 
examined (see multiple regression results in the next Table 4.8).
Table 4.7 
Simple Linear Regression
Reg. Equation (Defalc.): f rd jn i  =  28.48 +  0.618 (aud fin)
Variable B S.E. of B P T Sig. T
Aud_fm 0.618 0.131 0.575 4.725 .0000
Constant 28.48 119.46 0.238 .8126
Corr (aud fin, f rd jn i)  =  0.58; R  ^ =  0.33; Adjusted R  ^ =  0.32
Reg. Equation (M It. Fraud): f rd jn i  =  288.07 +  0.306 (aud_fm)
Variable B S.E. o fB T Sig. T
A u d rin 0.306 0.087 0.458 3.535 .0009
Constant 288.07 106.03 2.717 .0092
Corr (aud fin, frd jn i)  =  0.46; R  ^ =  0.21; Adjusted R^  =  0.19
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Table 4.8 
Multiple Linear Regression
Reg. Equation (Defalc.): frd ini =  665.73 +  0.711 (aud_fin) -192.72 (risk frd)
Variable B S.E. of B 13 T Sig. T
Aud fin 0.711 0.111 0.662 6.410 .0000
R isk frd -192.72 42.26 -0.471 -4.561 .0000
Constant 665.73 171.56 3.880 .0003
Multiple R =  0.73; R  ^ =  0.55; Adjusted E? =  0.53
Reg. Equation (Mgt. Frd): frd ini =  915.06 +  0.294 aud_fin) -158.77 (risk frd)
Variable B S.E. o fB P T Sig. T
Aud_fin 0.294 0.087 0.458 3.535 .0009
Risk_frd -158.77 112.42 -0.182 -1.412 .1646
Constant 915.06 456.20 2.006 .0508
Multiple R =  0.49; R  ^ =  0.24; Adjusted If  = 0 .2 1
The inclusion of risk frd as an additional independent variable is appropriate for 
the defalcation condition (the increment to is over 0.20 and statistically significant) 
but it does poorly with reference to the management fraud condition (here the increment 
to is only about 0.03 and is not statistically significant). As noted earlier, the 
ANOVA showed that the two groups did not differ significantly with respect to the
1 1 2
between-subjects factor, viz., type o f suspected fraud, yet the results of multiple 
regression suggest that there seem to exist some very stark differences between the two 
groups. This is also evident from a quick examination o f the beta weights for risk frd. 
M ore sophisticated analysis may be needed to tease out these differences. Client size, 
choice of materiality base, and work experience could potentially prove to be other good 
predictor variables, but for the data in this study, their inclusion as an additional 
independent variable did not account for much more variance and the associated 
regression weights proved not to be statistically significant. Further analysis was deemed 
unnecessary keeping in mind the primary intention of using multiple regression to test 
the validity of the “process model” assumed.
4.4 .3  Correspondence Analyses
Wliile correspondence analysis is available in major statistical software packages 
such as SAS, it has not yet gained sufficient popularity as an exploratory technique 
whenever cross tabular information needs to be analyzed. One o f the aims o f using the 
correspondence analysis technique in this study is to introduce it as a viable method that 
can be exploited in psychology and accounting research.
The ensuing discussion largely draws upon Greenacre (1993). Correspondence 
analysis is a technique that facilitates examination of the row-column associations in cross 
tabulated information. Such associations can be displayed in a one, two or three
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dimensional display called a map. A fundamental notion in correspondence analysis is 
that of a profile which is obtained simply by dividing each element of a row by the row 
sum or alternatively, each element column of a column by the column sum. A 
correspondence map depicts row and column profiles on a map: such pictorial 
representation is amenable to interpretation in terms of their location and their proximity 
to or distance from the average profile. Anotlier basic concept is that of inertia, a metric 
that captures the overall disparity among profiles. The dimensionality of cross tabular 
information subjected to correspondence analysis is defined as {min (number of rows, 
number o f columns) - 1}, i.e., subtract one from the number of rows or columns, 
whichever is smaller. Inertia measures the similarity or dissimilarity among profiles and 
takes on a value of zero when all profiles are identical and are coincident with the 
average profile; it attains a maximum when its value reaches the dimensionality of the 
cross tabular information. Further, the statistic with reference to a contingency table 
is obtained by multiplying the inertia by the total number of responses in the table (i.e., 
sample size). A significant supports the conclusion that any differences between 
profiles can be attributed to more than merely chance occurrence. To adequately 
represent the similarities and dissimilarities in the profiles and to avoid loss of 
information, it is important that a large proportion of the inertia be reflected on the 
correspondence map. Consequently, when a map has as many dimensions as the 
dimensionality of the problem itself, a perfectly accurate representation is achieved.
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Given a cross tabulation with non-negative entries, the problem to be solved by 
using correspondence analysis is finding a weighted least squares approximation to N (the 
data matrix). The following equation presents such an approximation:
N  = nrc ' + A) {nD ) {D J ) '  (4.6)
where
n =  grand total of entries in N (=E E  n y)
r  =  row masses; c =  column masses
Df =  diagonal matrix of row masses
De =  diagonal matrix of column masses
=  diagonal matrix of square roots of principal inertias
X, Y =  matrices whose column vectors contain standards coordinates (note that these can 
rescaled to obtain the principal coordinates)
Solutions o f rank k  are obtained from the above Equation (4.6) by using the first k 
cohm ns of X, Y, and by choosing the (k x k) partition from the top left corner of D^.
In this study, the correspondence analysis technique is used to compare three
groups of professional auditors: CPAs, CIAs, and persons holding both certifications. 
The comparisons make use of two distinct pieces of empirical data collected: choice of
materiality factor base to arrive at an initial estimate of PMAT and the levels of PMAT
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thresholds (on a 7-point scale from extremely low to extremely high). Table 4.9 below 
presents the cross tabular information that was used to carry out the correspondence 
analysis for choice of materiality factor base.
Table 4.9
Cross-Tabular Inform ation for Correspondence Analysis (Factor Base)
Certification By Choice of M ateriality Factor Base
CPA CIA CPA & CIA
Gross Margin 6 0 1
Pretax Net Income 24 6 2
Total Assets 24 6 1
Total Revenue 32 7 2
Other Base 4 2 0
TOTAL 90 21 6
The test statistic for this cross tabulation with a value of 4.04 and 8 degrees 
of freedom was not significant at the .05 level. Therefore, all the interpretations from 
the correspondence map appearing as Figure 4.6 need to be made with caution. First, 
it must be noted that the map is of high quality because 100% (i.e., 94.28% +  5.72%) 
of the inertia is captured (the dimensionality of the problem is 2, and the map itself is 
represented in two dimensions). Although it appears that persons holding both 
certifications seem to prefer the choice of gross margin as a base for the initial
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computation of materiality, a quick glance at Table 4.9 shows why such a claim may 
be unjustified. The total number o f participants with both certifications is only 6, and 
only one of them chose gross margin as a materiality factor base. It appears the sample 
size is too small to arrive at any firm conclusions. In terms o f the participants in this 
study, both CPAs and CIAs appeared to prefer “Total Revenue” and “Total Assets” as 
the factor base for materiality computation although the professional literature suggests 
that the most popular base is (pretax) net income (see Leslie, 1985; Wallace, 1991). 
One reason for this finding might be the relatively large proportion o f participants in the 
study who were affiliated with banks and utility companies where total assets is an 
important item on the financial statements.
Table 4.10 shows the frequency with which CPAs, CIAs and Both (certifications) 
fell into one of arbitrarily chosen seven ordered categories of threshold PMAT levels 
from "extremely low" to "extremely high." The frequency information enables the use 
o f correspondence analysis to detect any patterns or trends in the profiles that would 
merit further attention.
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Table 4.10
C ross-Tabular Inform ation fo r Correspondence Analysis (Anchor Levels)
Certification By “ A nchor” (Initial Audit M ateriality) Levels
CPA CIA CPA & CIA
Extremely Low ( <  $100) 22 4 1
Very Low ($101-$300) 14 7 0
Low ($301-$500) 10 1 2
Moderate ($501-$1000) 17 1 1
High ($1001-$1500) 10 2 0
Very High ($1501-$2000) 6 1 1
Extremely High (>  $2001) 11 5 1
TOTAL 90 21 6
The test statistic for the cross tabulation in Table 4.10, with a value of 13.25 
and with 12 degrees of freedom, was again not significant at the .05 level. Therefore, 
all the interpretations from the correspondence map appearing as Figure 4.7 must be 
made with extreme caution. For the same reasons given to account for the excellent 
quality o f the correspondence map, the map in Figure 4.7 also captures all the inertia, 
i.e ., 73.79% +  26.21% =  100%.
Some general statements can be made about the map in Figure 4.7. First, it
appears that there is a lot o f scatter in the frequencies associated with each one of the
PM AT level categories. While there is a preference among all types o f auditors to
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assess planning materiality across the entire range from extremely low to extremely high, 
CPAs in particular were observed to remain in the moderate to high range in their PMAT 
estimates, relative to the other two groups.
Finally, Figure 4.8 shows yet another correspondence analysis map based on 
Table 4.11. This time it displays the type of decision weighting scheme adopted by each 
participant: they are either equal weighters giving equal importance to criteria such as 
efficiency and effectiveness or whether they are likely to overweight efficiency or 
effectiveness considerations in different contexts. Because the dimensions in the solution 
are 2, the map in Figure 4.8 also captures all the inertia, i.e ., 81.37% +  18.63% =  
100% and thus, is an accurate representation.
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Table 4.11
Cross-Tabular Information for Correspondence Analysis 
(Decision Weights)
1 2 1
Certification by Decision Strategy in Different Contexts
CPA CIA Both
Audit Equal 20 8 0
Audit Efficiency 16 5 3
AuditEffectiveness 42 8 3
Subtotal—Audit 78 21 6
Fraud Equal 17 10 0
Fraud Efficiency 28 6 3
Fraud Effectiveness 23 3 2
Subtotal—Fraud 68 19 5
The correspondence map in Figure 4.8 is highly interpretable and enables us to 
draw distinctions among participants with specific certifications by looking at their choice 
of decision strategies. First, participants who hold both certifications appear to 
emphasize efficiency when in the suspected fraud setting relatively more than CPAs and 
CIAs (note that there are only 6 such participants and hence one must be careful not to 
draw any strong inferences from this observation). While CIAs prefer an equal 
weighting strategy in general, CPAs appear to emphasize the effectiveness criterion in
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both normal audit and suspected fraud settings. None o f the participants appeared to 
gravitate towards the use of efficiency in decision weighting when in the normal audit 
setting. Although the test statistic for the cross tabulation shown in Table 4.11, with 
a value of 13.73 and with 10 degrees of freedom, was not significant at the .05 level, the 
correspondence map brings out some relationships that cannot be readily be discerned 
otherwise. It is important to recognize the simplicity and power o f the correspondence 
analysis technique and its ability to explore patterns that may not readily be evident from 
contingency tables. Correspondence maps should supplement the tabulated information 
available and not supplant it. Finally, it is important to ascertain whether the observed 
is significant before making interpretations of correspondence maps. If the observed 
X^  statistic is statistically significant, this fact enables us to gain comfort that it is not 
merely chance occurrences that may be responsible for the patterns/trends observed.
4 .4 .4  M ultidimensional Scaling
The goal of multidimensional scaling (MDS) is to uncover the dimensional 
structure of a set of elements by examining the “similarities” or proximities between 
those elements (Diekhoff, 1992). In other words, for a set of observed dissimilarities 
or distances between every pair of k elements, MDS seeks to find configurations in q <  
(k -1) dimensions such that the inter-element proximities “nearly match” the original 
similarities (or distances) as closely as possible (Johnson & Wichern, 1992). The
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numerical measure o f closeness, called “stress,” measures the extent to which a 
geometrical representation falls short o f a “perfect match” (Kruskal, 1964). For a set 
o f k items or elements, it is possible to arrange them in a low-dimensional co-ordinate 
system using only rank orders of the k(k-l)/2 original similarities or distances, without 
recourse to their magnitudes. Shepard’s (1962) path-breaking work introduced what is 
now called mn-mctric multidimensional scaling wherein a multidimensional map can be 
obtained from distance-like numbers defined only at the ordinal level (Young & Hamer, 
1987). Previously, starting with Torgerson (1952) and Messick & Abelson (1956) who 
used the Euclidean distance model, and Attneave (1950) who discussed the City-Block 
model, actual magnitudes of the original similarities (or distances) were required to carry 
out what is known as metric multidimensional scaling.
The following discussion is based on Johnson & Wichern (1992). For N 
elements, there are T =  N(N - l)/2  similarities (distances) or rank orders thereof 
between pairs of different elements, which constitute the basic data set. It is possible 
to arrange tliese T  similarities in a strictly ascending order, where the smallest similarity 
pair identifies the pair of elements that are least similar. The objective is to find a q- 
dimensional configuration of the N elements such that the distances, d ^  between pairs 
of items matches the ordering of similarities. If the distances are laid out in a 
descending order, analogous to the ascending ordering o f the initial similarities, a perfect 
match occurs when:
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For a given value of q, finding a configuration of points whose pairwise distances are 
monotonically related to the original similarities may prove infeasible. Accordingly, 
Kruskal (1964) proposed a measure of the extent to which a geometrical representation 
approximates a perfect match. This measure, called stress, is defined as follows:
Stress (q) = K k
SS
K k
1/2
(4.8)
Note that the d'"" ‘s in the stress formula above in Equation (4.8) are monotonically 
related to the similarities. However, they are not distances in the sense that they satisfy 
the usual distance properties but are merely numbers that are used in evaluating the 
nonmonotonicity of the observed d‘‘ ‘s.
Libby (1981) briefly reviews three studies in accounting with a focus on studying 
accounting policy preferences that have employed MDS analyses, viz., Libby (1979), 
Rockness & Nikolai (1977), and Brown (1981). Because the intent here is to use MDS 
procedures for exploratory data analysis, the following stages are contemplated: first, 
generate proximity data for all possible pairs of elements being examined; next, use 
these proximities or similarities to map or scale the elements into one or more spatial
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dimensions, and finally, interpret the resulting graphical display. There is a plethora 
of MDS techniques available and to assess the appropriateness and quality of the results 
obtained, it is important to know which type o f MDS, what measure of similarity or 
distance and which computer program was used. It is also significant to understand how 
the number of dimensions in the solution was arrived at. Each o f these concerns is 
discussed before the results o f the analysis are presented.
The items sought to be “scaled” using MDS will be the eight PMAT estimates 
obtained from every participant, four estimates each under the normal audit and the 
suspected fraud conditions respectively. These PMAT estimates are dollar amounts 
expressed in thousands. The averaged z-score differences between pairs of variables are 
assumed to constitute the measure o f dissimilarity that forms the input to the MDS 
procedure. The squared Euclidean distance is then used as a measure of proximity. It 
is computed as the sum of squared differences between those elements across a series of 
k descriptor variables, e.g..
(4.9)
where,
d \g  =  squared Euclidean distance between elements A and B
k =  number of descriptor variables on which the elements are being
compared
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A =  values on the k descriptor variables for elements A
B =  values on the k descriptor variables for elements B
Although the squared Euclidean distance is sensitive to both profile differences as well 
as level differences, it remains fairly susceptible to distortion from magnitude differences 
that exist from one descriptor variable to the next. Accordingly, to eliminate this 
susceptibility to score magnitude, we standardize descriptor variables prior to computing 
d\
Two dimensions were selected for the solution space based on the rationale that 
two distinct experimental manipulations were used and the stimulus configuration map 
typically summarizes an immense quantity of information about how participants 
perceived the elements being examined. Finally, it must be pointed out that among the 
several competing software packages, this analysis was conducted using ALSCAL 
(Alternating Least-squares SCALing) which systematically minimizes SSTRESS, created 
by Takane, Young, and De Leeuw (1976).
Figures 4.9 and 4.11 are MDS derived stimulus configurations of the eight PMAT 
estimates for 96 CPAs and 21 CIAs respectively, using the squared Euclidean distance 
model. Figures 4.10 and 4.12 are scatterplots of the linear fit o f distances against 
disparities (i.e., dissimilarities). Both graphical displays in Figures 4.9 and 4.11 are 
striking because the two dimensions represented are so clearly marked off. The first 
direction of interpretation, dimension 1, may be viewed as separating the positive and
1 2 8
negative framing settings (i.e., normal audit vs. suspected fraud). The second direction 
o f interpretation, dimension 2, can then be viewed as distinguishing efficiency criteria 
from effectiveness criteria. While the pattern o f PMAT estimates in the normal audit 
setting for CPAs and CIAs are quite comparable, the PMAT estimates for the suspected 
fraud setting are quite distinct for the two groups of auditors. In particular, while the 
suspected fraud PMAT estimates for CIAs are quite spread apart, the same estimates are
clustered togetlier for the CPAs, suggesting greater similarity among them. The cluster 
pattern observed with reference to the suspected fraud setting suggests that CIAs react 
the same way whether they are exposed to a normal audit or suspected fraud setting; 
CPAs however, show a tendency to respond to suspected fraud settings quite differently 
than they would to a normal audit setting. This observed pattern seems only to confirm 
what we have already noted from Figure 4.8 earlier with respect to the correspondence 
analysis involving adoption of specific decision strategies concerning efficiency and 
effectiveness considerations,
The scatterplot of linear fit for both CPAs and CIAs looks reasonably good. The 
Kruskal’s stress value for both displays is 0.04 and the R-squared value is greater than 
98% (here, R-squared values are the proportion of variance of the scaled data or 
disparities in the partition matrix accounted for by their corresponding distances. Ceteris 
paribus, a stress value of less than 0.15 coupled with an R-squared value exceeding 90% 
indicates quite a good fit (Diekhoff, 1992; Kruskal, 1964; Kruskal & Wish, 1978). The
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interpretation o f the stress measure depends on the number of elements, I, and the 
dimensionality, D. However, as a rule of thumb, the stress measure is not sensitive to 
I or D, provided I> 4 D , which is marginally satisfied in the current case where 1=8 and 
D = 2 .
It should be pointed out that an MDS performed on the (8 X 8) correlation matrix 
o f PMAT threshold dollar amounts (by obtaining measures of dissimilarity as follows; 
first, take the absolute values of all the correlations; then, subtract each absolute 
correlation value from a constant, say 1.00, to obtain measures of dissimilarity), yielded 
a comparable map as exhibited here. This is probably because it can be easily shown
that the squared Euclidean distance for standardized scores is proportional to the 
dissimilarity measure computed above.
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4.5 Summary
This chapter has reported the results o f several data analyses: Wilcoxon signed- 
rank test, ANOVA, simple and multiple regression, correspondence analysis, 
multidimensional scaling, and conformity to predictions made in the general process 
model mentioned in section 1.3.1.
In this section the main results are now recapitulated: (a) the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test revealed that participants assessed client riskiness to be significantly higher for 
the suspected fraud setting than they did for the normal audit setting; (b) the ANOVA 
results showed a main effect for the within subjects factor (primary framing), viz., 
normal audit vs. suspected fraud, and also for the (secondary framing) scenario, viz., 
efficiency vs. effectiveness criterion, and also a significant interaction between the two;
(c) the multiple regression enabled a significant proportion o f the variance in PMAT 
(frd jn i) estimates to be explained by predictor variables PMAT (aud fin) and risk_frd;
(d) three correspondence analyses were carried out, however, only the last one showed 
that while CPAs emphasize the effectiveness criterion, CIAs prefer to balance 
considerations of efficiency and effectiveness; (e) the multidimensional scaling produced 
a stimulus configuration that, in a sense, recovered the experimental design: in a plot 
with two dimensions, one dimension could be interpreted as separating positive vs. 
negative framing while the other separated efficiency from effectiveness. While many 
o f the ordinal hypotheses mentioned in chapter III were borne out, there were some
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specific results that need explanation. Interpretations o f these results and their 
implications have been deferred to chapter V,
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION
5.0 Introduction
A menu of data analysis methods were employed in chapter IV to extract as much 
information from the data collected as possible. With reference to the results obtained 
from statistical analyses in the previous chapter, this chapter offers interpretations and 
highlights the implications o f the findings.
Section 5.1 briefly discusses the role of primary, secondary framing, and trade­
offs in auditors’ PMAT judgments. Section 5.2 discusses the implications of the study’s 
findings for two behavioral decision theories, Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect 
theory and Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990) venture theory. Section 5.3 shows that the 
general process model assumed to operate in this experimental study is not an implausible 
assumption. Section 5.4 takes up the results of correspondence analyses and 
multidimensional scaling to compare the PMAT judgment behavior of internal and 
external auditors with reference to their decision strategies. In section 5.5, the 
preference indicated by participants for viewing planning materiality computation as 
being non-linear is reviewed and the implications discussed. Finally, in section 5.6, 
other findings are reported and discussed.
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5.1 Role of Primary, Secondary Framing and Trade-Offs in PMAT Judgments
Although a substantial amount of variance was noted in participants’ initial PMAT 
estimates in the normal audit setting, this is in line with findings from past research 
(e .g ., Mayper, 1982; Pany & Wheeler, 1989; Mayper et al., 1989) and serves to re­
emphasize the motivation for this study, v iz., to investigate the sources of variance in 
auditors’ planning materiality judgments, in particular, the influence o f psychological 
variables such as decision framing and decision strategies. Studying the impact of 
psychological variables on professional judgment is important for understanding 
knowledge intensive behavior in complex domains (Hogarth, 1993).
This research study extends past research in at least two methodological ways, 
i.e., the experiment featured a realistic task and was computer-simulated so as to allow 
for the provision of feedback. Data from the participants preserves some ordinal 
relationships in PMAT judgments under different scenarios, implied by authoritative 
professional standards such as SAS 31 and SAS 39. It is thus seen that PMAT (and, frd; 
effy) >  PMAT (aud, frd; effs) as well as PMAT (aud, frd; effs) <  PMAT (aud, frd; 
fin) <  PMAT (aud, frd; effy) hold under both conditions. This indicates the 
participants’ recognition that the effectiveness criterion requires a higher level of audit 
effort than the efficiency criterion. Tradeoffs between efficiency and effectiveness 
criteria are routinely made; for the normal audit setting, the tradeoff is nearer to PMAT 
(aud; effs), however, for the suspected fraud setting, the tradeoff is nearer PMAT (frd; 
effy). As noted before, the variance in the PMAT(frd ini) estimate for the management
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fraud condition is substantially greater than for the defalcation condition, possibly owing 
to more ambiguity perception.
The results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test were significant suggesting that the 
qualitative assessment of client riskiness for the suspected fraud setting was significantly 
greater than that for the normal audit setting. This finding provides further evidence 
that the experimental manipulations were strong enough to elicit a large effect size in 
PMAT thresholds. Also, from a sequential decision making perspective, it appears that 
auditors are extremely sensitive to incoming information. Following Haskins & Sack 
(1994), one must carefully distinguish between information and evidence, in this regard. 
Information does not constitute "evidence" until it has been processed and verified in 
different ways. Accordingly the primary framing manipulation seeks to introduce 
additional information rather than supply persuasive evidence. Note that both situations 
required evaluation of the same set of financial statements, with the only difference being 
this provision of additional information about the meeting of the Partner with the client’s 
Finance Director. The strong impact of the primary framing manipulation suggests that 
mere provision of information can have a significant impact upon an auditor’s judgment 
and therefore, this issue of "editing" and “evaluating” a problem continue to be given 
more emphasis in future research.
The results from the mixed ANOVA design are now interpreted. Both within- 
subjects factors, v iz., normal audit vs. suspected fraud and PMAT elicitation scenario, 
produced significantly different estimates. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 constitute plots of the 
results from secondary framing manipulations against the normal audit and suspected
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fraud scenarios. Tliese figures highlight that the difference in PMAT estimates between 
the defalcation and management fraud scenarios was not significant. Several explanations 
could be advanced to describe why no significant difference between these PMAT 
thresholds was observed. One general observation is that at the planning stage, the 
PMAT judgment is still a "fluid" threshold that might undergo several changes as 
auditors receive more and more information and or evidence (Ashton & Ashton, 1988; 
Asare, 1992; Gibbins, 1984). Accordingly, a "data sufficiency" explanation could be 
provided as follows: while it is important for auditors to invoke a global "decision 
frame" for the problem, and alter PMAT judgments at the planning stage, further fine- 
tuning and adjustments could be deferred until such time that more information and/or 
evidence is gathered. Thus, recognizing red flags is important, but the development of 
an appropriate audit response must be dictated by further information that may need to 
be collected, basically a “wait and watch” strategy (Albrecht & Willingham, 1993; 
Carnall, 1989).
Alternative explanations might be that auditors are desensitized to the presence 
of some “income smoothing” in every financial audit (e.g., Smith et al., 1994), hence 
they did not make a sharp distinction between the two scenarios. Bonner & Pennington 
(1991) have suggested that sound materiality judgments may require as many as 8.5 years 
of experience-but the mean experience level o f participants was only about 6.5 years. 
This inadequate level of experience for the task at hand may also have impacted their 
judgments. Other factors might be insufficiency of “framing” information, lack of
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exposure of participating auditors to the industry to which the hypothetical client 
belonged, etc.
Consideration of auditors’ decision strategy, i.e ., efficiency/effectiveness 
tradeoffs, reveals interesting patterns. In tlie normal audit scenario, the PMAT (aud_fin) 
reflecting the trade-off, is closer to the PMAT (aud effs) because of auditor conservatism 
demanding a downward adjustment (or a stronger impact of the effectiveness criterion). 
However, for the suspected fraud settings, this finding is reversed. One explanation 
appears to be that participants made a really steep downward adjustment to their PMAT 
(aud_fin) and in the process o f balancing efficiency and effectiveness attempted to 
compensate for their "overreaction." Past research has primarily focused on risk 
propensity of auditors’ but this picture may be incomplete without consideration being 
given to the strategies of expert auditors (see, for instance, Shanteau, 1992; Kleinmuntz, 
1985). The number of CIAs was quite small, i.e ., only 21, so these results must 
necessarily remain tentative and await more research.
5.2 Implications of Study’s Findings for Behavioral Decision Theories
Several results obtained from the study have a bearing upon the predictions made 
by Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory as well as Hogarth & Einhorn’s (1990) 
venture theory. The findings are first related to the predictions of prospect theory and 
subsequently to venture theory.
The basic ideas behind prospect theory, i.e, the relevance of reference points, 
values, and frames, and the importance o f pre-decisional behavior, viz., editing
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operations, appear to hold substantial promise in the context o f this experimental study. 
In particular, a low-risk audit scenario can be viewed as evoking a positive frame, 
thereby producing higher PMAT thresholds, while a suspected fraud setting evokes a 
negative frame and elicits lower PMAT thresholds from participants. However, two 
other findings are pertinent to prospect theory. First, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 clearly show 
that tlie slope of PMAT (aud, frd; effs) is less steep than that o f PMAT (aud, frd; effy). 
This is contrary to the assertion in prospect theory that, in the loss domain, the prospect 
theory value function is steeper. One reason this prediction is not confirmed may be 
because of “floor” effects. Maybe participants had already lowered PMAT (frd; ini) so 
drastically that little further decline could really be expected. Indeed, it would be naive 
to expect CPAs to fall below 0.5% of the pretax net income to arrive at the initial anchor 
PMAT threshold. Another interesting finding is that in addition to the framing effects 
predicted by prospect tlieory, the results provide evidence that framing effects are further 
subject to mediation by goal-specific considerations such as efficiency and effectiveness. 
In other words, decision strategies such as efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs further 
accentuate or mitigate framing effects depending on the situation. This finding 
constitutes a valuable addition to the existing research on applications of prospect theory, 
by refining the notion of framing effects.
Venture theory predicts that in the face of high perceived ambiguity, auditors 
would tend to exhibit more conservative behavior and lower PMAT thresholds even 
further. Thus, for the more serious type of suspected fraud, viz., illegitimate income 
smoothing by management, which has higher ambiguity, lower PMAT thresholds are
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expected to be observed. As discussed before, this prediction did not get confirmed. 
No significant difference was observed in the mean PMAT thresholds between the two 
suspected fraud scenarios. It is interesting to note, however, that participants appeared 
to evaluate tlie management fraud setting as one containing more ambiguity as evidenced 
by the larger variance associated with the PMAT (frd; ini) for that group. Again, 
several reasons may be advanced for this particular finding. First, it is possible that the 
framing manipulation was not strong enough-this is unlikely because a significant 
difference was found for these scenarios in the pilot study. The pilot study participants 
did appear to have more work experience ( > 1 0  years, on average) than the participants 
in the main study did (approximately 6.5 years). If this difference in experience levels 
is the reason for this anomaly, it would be interesting to investigate at what stage in their 
professional careers do auditors start making these fine distinctions between a breakdown 
in internal controls involving employee fraud vs. an override of internal controls 
involving management fraud, both of which have been indicated as precursor conditions 
to the perpetration of fraud (KPMG Survey, 1994). Second, it is possible that 
management fraud typically concerns very large dollar am ounts-after all, why would 
management go to the trouble of “tinkering” with the financial statements if these involve 
only modest amounts? This line of reasoning suggests that the directionality of the 
original hypothesis is somewhat suspect and needs to be reconsidered. In any case, the 
lack of a significant difference between the two groups distinguished by their exposure 
to defalcation and management fraud respectively is an intriguing finding and merits 
further research, especially in a climate where fraud is on the rise (KPMG Survey, 1994;
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Albrecht & Willingham, 1993). Indeed, in an environment where white-collar crime 
is becoming more common such suspicions of different types of fraud are assuming more 
importance than they ever did before. Moreover, it appears quite likely that planning 
materiality judgments should be responsive to such real-life scenarios so as to support the 
conduct of an audit that is close to being “optimal.”
5.3 Validity of Process Model
In simple linear regression, it was discovered that the correlation between the 
variables PMAT (aud_fin) and PMAT (frdjni) was 0.58 in the defalcation condition and 
0.46 in the management fraud condition. This is a high enough correlation that PMAT 
(aud fin) may be usefully viewed as the basis for arriving at modified estimates-the 
general process model appears to have some plausibility. For both conditions, the beta 
weights proved to be statistically significant. In order to improve the R^, the variable 
risk frd was next included in the regression model. For the resulting multiple linear 
regression, the went up from 0.33 to 0.55 for the defalcation condition, but remained 
relatively unchanged from 0.21 to 0.24 for the management fraud condition. The 
inclusion of risk frd in the management fraud condition was not statistically significant. 
Inclusion of an additional variable, client size, also did not yield statistical significance.
Given that the mean difference in PMAT (frd ini) thresholds between the two 
conditions, defalcation and management fraud, were not statistically significant, it is 
somewhat surprising that the multiple regression models are so distinct. Even the R^
for the defalcation vs. management fraud conditions differs by over 30%. From Table
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4.2, it can be seen that one reason for this inconsistency between the two models is that 
both PMAT (aud fin) and PMAT (frdjni) for the defalcation condition has much tighter 
confidence intervals as compared to the relatively wide confidence intervals for the 
management fraud condition. In other words, for the management fraud condition, the 
variance associated with these estimates is extremely large and therefore, the fit of the 
multiple regression model is poor.
5.4 Comparing External Auditors (CPAs) and Internal Auditors (CIAs)
W hile the ANOVA and multiple regression tapped into mean and variance 
information, some of the more interesting explorations involving the data occurred with 
the use of graphical display techniques such as correspondence analysis and 
multidimensional scaling. These methods delve into the dimensional and thus, 
correlational, structure of data to produce an easily digestible visual display. These 
methods were employed to ascertain whether CPAs, CIAs and/or Both (i.e., persons with 
both certifications) exhibited judgment and decision behavior that looked remarkably 
different on imjxDrtant dimensions. Figure 4.8, is a correspondence analysis that seeks 
to examine the relationship between the type of decision strategy with the kind of 
professional certification (i.e., CPA, CIA, or Both). In particular, CPA are observed 
to emphasize effectiveness criteria in both normal audit and suspected fraud settings, 
whereas CIAs are more balanced and equally weight effectiveness and efficiency criteria 
under both settings. Once we factor in litigation risk, the behavior o f CPAs and CIAs 
seems perfectly reasonable. Because CPAs face the possibility of lawsuits, they have
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to treat effectiveness as the most important criterion as it justifies their performance; the 
CIA, on the other hand, works within an organization and is not concerned with litigation 
risk, therefore she is able to grant equal importance to both criteria. Although the map 
shows that “Both” prefer to look at efficiency in the presence o f suspected fraud, there 
were only six such individuals out of 117, and so must not be over interpreted. Internal 
auditors (i.e., CIAs) are more concerned with the “process” which produces financial 
statements, among other things, while external auditors are more interested about the 
“product,” i.e ., the big picture afforded by the financial statements taken as a whole.
It appears that these differences in perspectives are usefully captured in the 
correspondence analysis map and deserve more attention.
Multidimensional scaling displays available as Figures 4.9 and 4.11 are also 
extremely informative. Both displays, one relating to CPAs and another to CIAs, are 
clear-cut in their stimulus configurations by distinguishing along the lines of 
positive/negative framing and effectiveness/efficiency considerations. Further, the 
spread in PMAT estimates in the normal audit setting (i.e.,aud_ini, aud effy, aud_effs, 
and aud fin) on the displays is quite comparable. The difference arises when one looks 
at the suspected fraud PMAt estimates (i.e., f rd jn i, frd_effy, frd effs, and frd fin). 
For the CIAs, these PMAT estimates are evenly dispersed whereas for CPAs these PMAt 
estimates are all clustered quite close together. Again, the litigation risk interpretation 
is a powerful way to explain this phenomenon. Once in an environment where fraud 
is suspected, CPAs appear to become very “watchful and vigilant” and possess very little 
flexibility in their decision strategies except to design procedures that would increase the
148
likelihood of detecting fraud. CIAs, on the other hand, appear not be affected and are 
able to act in a manner that remains consistent with the goals o f balancing efficiency and 
effectiveness.
The similarity in interpretations of correspondence analysis maps and 
multidimensional scaling displays stems from the fact that both techniques exploit 
correlational information contained in data structures. The aspect of visual display 
further adds to their verisimilitude.
5.5 Non-Linearity in Materiality Computation
Almost 80% of the participants opined that the estimation o f planning materiality 
across client size is non-linear. It can be argued that the current litigious environment 
has made several public accounting firms more conservative than before in their planning 
materiality estimates. The shape of the planning materiality estimation function is likely 
to be convex such that increases in the planning materiality thresholds are less than 
proportionate to increases in client size. This is certainly an issue warranting more 
attention in future research.
5.6 Other Findings
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the statistic associated with both the 
correspondence analyses conducted proved to be statistically insignificant. 
Consequently, only very general statements can be hazarded with respect to these 
contingency tables (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10). With respect to choice of materiality base
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(see Table 4.9), it appeared that the most common choices were pretax net income, total 
assets, and total revenues. ' The choices picked most rarely were gross margin and 
"other category" (this included factor bases such as "equity" and "net income").
As for the contingency table ordering PMAT anchor levels into seven pre­
determined classes (see Table 4.10), CPAs showed a tendency to assess planning 
materiality thresholds at the "moderate" level. However, it must be mentioned that 
there was a wide scatter in this data and the PMAT levels appeared to be distributed 
across all classes and across all certifications.
' Past research on auditors’ materiality judgments has revealed that the most popular choice 
o f  materiality factor base is the pretax net income (e.g., Libby, 1981; Ashton, 1982a; 
Holstrum & Messier, 1982). However, Warren & Elliott (1986) use a materiality power 
function that incorporates total revenues as the factor base. It would appear that because 
a large number of the participants come from the banking, insurance, and utility sectors, 
total assets is a popular choice of factor base for materiality computation.
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
6.0 Summary of Study
In order to understand the nature of expertise in problem solving and decision 
making and driven by a concern for ecological validity, behavioral decision researchers 
are increasingly turning their attention to the study of decision making and judgment by 
"experts" (see Chi, Glaser & Farr, 1991; Bazerman, 1994; Smith & Kida, 1991). This 
experimental study investigated the effects o f decision framing and the use of decision 
strategies on auditors’ planning materiality judgments. Several contributions of the study 
can be highlighted: research focus on an important unresolved problem for audit 
practitioners-planning materiality judgments; the development of a conceptual framework 
that depicts the cognitive and contextual factors that impinge on auditors’ planning 
materiality judgments; the use of a realistic experimental task simulated on computers by 
using a state-of-the art, object-oriented programming language, viz.. Visual Basic 3.0; 
the participation of a large number of professional auditors (96 CPAs and 21 CIAs); and 
the use of statistical methods such as correspondence analysis and multidimensional 
scaling which yield graphical displays that aid interpretableness of results. Each of these 
is briefly recounted below.
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In the current competitive as well as litigious environment in auditing, making 
sound planning materiality judgments is critical for proper audit "scoping" and 
establishment of the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures. Three decades of 
behavioral auditing research on issues pertaining to materiality attest to the importance 
of this topic to the auditing profession; it is hoped that the present study is seen as 
continuing this rich tradition of bringing together theory and practice.
Past research has indicated that auditors’ planning materiality judgments exhibit 
low consensus, leading some researchers to characterize audit judgment performance in 
this area as being "poor" (e.g., Bonner & Pennington, 1991). If different auditors come 
up with drastically different assessments for planning materiality under the same 
circumstances, this can only imply that "auditors are delivering variable precision in the 
financial statements." (Elliott, 1981). Although previous research has noted the effects 
o f context and experience in attempting to explain these variances, little research has 
focused upon psychological variables such as "decision framing" to account for this 
variance. Further, the practicalities of the auditing environment make it necessary for 
auditors to adopt decision strategies (e.g., efficiency/effectiveness trade-offs) which must 
be emphasized in judgment studies.
The primary goal of this experimental study (with professional auditors as 
participants) was to manipulate decision framing (primary framing) and examine the use 
of decision strategies (secondary framing) to assess the influence of goal-specific criteria 
on framing effects. A computer-administered experimental task that permitted sequential 
revision of planning materiality judgments by auditors for differing scenarios and in the
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presence of feedback was the prime source of experimental control and data collection. 
This methodology falls between being a tightly controlled experimental study and a 
straightforward paper-and-pencil survey. Such research contributes to the psychology of 
decision making and judgment by investigating psychological notions like decision 
framing in professional environments. More specifically, the mediation o f framing 
effects by consideration of goal-specific criteria represents an advance in this line of 
research in psychology. The external validity of the study was greatly increased by the 
participation of a large number of CPAs from a mix of organizations including public 
accounting firms, and companies in the banking and insurance, food service, and utility 
sectors.
Given the wealth of data collected, a menu of statistical techniques was employed 
to plumb the data and gain insights. While ANOVA, multiple regression and the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test helped answer research questions predicated on mean and 
variance information, other statistical methods became necessary to tap into correlational 
and dimensional structures of the data. For this purpose, techniques that yield a 
graphical display such as correspondence analysis and multidimensional scaling were 
employed. Use of these methods has provided insights into the data that may not have 
been gleaned otherwise. Moreover, hypotlieses have been generated from these analyses 
that can be the basis for future research.
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6.1 Msyor Findings, Contributions and Implications
First, the results from the study show that professional auditors are extremely 
sensitive to incoming information that has the potential to alter their entire conception of 
an audit engagement. This finding has significant implications for both practitioners as 
well as auditing faculty. Auditors are regarded as market agents who serve to reduce 
"information risk" (Arens & Loebbecke, 1991). Such information risk is arises from the 
notion of decision framing: every client knows that the same set of financial statements 
can be "window dressed" so as to make them appear better than they actually are. This 
type of behavior by a client could be described as "framing implied by task formulation." 
It is the auditor’s responsibility to “see through” such a deception frame and act 
accordingly (Jamal et al., 1994). Johnson et al. (1991, 1993) have done some pioneering 
work in tins area and have attempted to make it relevant to audit practice. Professional 
auditors and auditing students should be made familiar with the psychology of decision 
making so that they are better able to appreciate and benefit from this research literature.
Second, with reference to the use of decision strategies, labeled "secondary 
framing" for the purposes of describing the experimental task, these strategies seem to 
either accentuate or mitigate framing effects depending on the circumstances. This is 
an important result because it shows that framing effects can themselves be moderated 
in a sequential decision making process (see Asare, 1992). The lack of a statistically 
significant difference between the two groups exposed to different types of suspected 
fraud can be explained in many ways. One reasonable explanation appears to be that 
auditors go into a "wait and watch" mode when they receive "negative" information that
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needs furtlier clarification or processing. Of course, as mentioned previously, it is also 
possible that the manipulation in this respect was not powerful enough to produce a 
difference in PMAT judgment or that the participants were not sufficiently experienced 
to make these sharp distinctions. More research is needed to better understand the types 
o f decision strategies used by auditors. In particular, because an external audit is 
conducted in phases, such as the “interim” and the “final” phase, it is quite conceivable 
that an auditor’s testing strategy considers “short-term” as well as “long-term” 
possibilities. Thus, some tests may be executed at an earlier stage of the audit, depending 
on staffing availability and the client management preferences. Another strategy, which 
might flow from the first is the interface between compliance and substantive tests with 
a view to enhancing audit efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Kinney, 1975; Bailey & 
Jensen, 1977; Anderson, 1976). It would be interesting to ascertain if there exists a 
hierarchy of some sort to conceptualize the nature and usefulness o f specific decision 
strategies used in audit practice and assess the influence they may exert on specific audit 
judgments.
Third, SAS 47 (AICPA, 1983), the authoritative professional pronouncement 
concerning materiality and audit risk is now over a decade old and, in the author’s 
opinion, needs to be updated. To help examine the conceptual underpinnings of SAS 
47, studies such as the present one are needed. In this sense, this research is "pro­
active" and attempts to address a set of problems about which the standard-setting bodies 
need information before commencing their deliberations. In particular. Figure 1.1 
provides an overview of the myriad cognitive and contextual factors that bear upon the
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materiality decision. Materiality decisions have direct relevance for audit sampling 
strategies and the determination o f appropriate sample sizes and therefore, exert an 
influence that permeates the entire audit. Indeed, planning materiality decisions lie at 
the very heart of auditing and need to be understood better. Such understanding will 
permit the introduction of audit efficiencies while maximizing audit productivity.
Extensions to this study can be readily imagined. First, it would be of interest 
to conduct a similar study on a national or even international basis to inquire into the 
robustness of the “framing effect,” its mediation by the use o f decision strategies, and 
have these results validated for large sample sizes. Second, because materiality is a 
notion fundamental to the auditing profession in all countries with strong stock markets, 
it would be interesting to expand the reach of the study to these countries. Third, taking 
Holstrum’s (1982) recommendations, similar studies should be taken up with reference 
to non-profit organizations where, in the absence of a net income factor base, it would 
be of interest to ascertain how the computation of materiality would proceed. Fourth, 
to secure a better handle on user-defined notions of materiality the experiment could also 
feature bankers, investors, analysts, the courts etc. to broaden our understanding of this 
important construct. Fifth, one o f the factors that must go into the computation of 
materiality at a segment level is information about the underlying nature and number of 
transactions, i.e., the distribution of transactions, so that an optimal materiality threshold 
may be “engineered” to generate audit efficiencies. Also, it is extremely important that 
these results, whether conceptual or statistical, be communicated to practitioners and
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means developed to "de-bias" these framing effects, e.g ., accountability and evidence- 
focusing (cf. Emby & Finley, 1994, cited in Emby, 1994).
Framing, however, may not always be undesirable, especially when we think of 
it as an evolutionarily adaptive strategy that carries significant implications for survival. 
It is possible that the strategy could prove to be sub-optimal in a laboratory setting, but 
it does make a lot of sense in the real world. Thus, it could be argued that an auditor’s 
extremely conservative response to the mere suspicion of fraud is an adaptive, 
precautionary strategy that may save her from a lot of grief later on. After all, the 
penalties of non-discovery of fraud or material error are so prohibitive that even small 
probabilities of occurrence are to be dreaded. This perspective suggests that it may be 
inappropriate to think o f “framing” as a bias. In fact, it would be more realistic to 
accept it as being an integral part of the repertoire of the decision making environment 
and yielding a positive outcome on average, with adverse outcomes being relatively 
infrequent. In this sense, “de-biasing” is unnecessarily harsh terminology to make use 
o f and perhaps needs to be eschewed altogether.
6.2 Limitations of the Study
In order to gain experimental control, this study necessarily needed to limit its 
scope o f enquiry as well as the contemplated experimental procedures. For instance, 
although every attempt was made to incorporate as much task realism as was possible, 
the time to complete the task was carefully worked out so as not to exceed one hour. 
Similarly, a number of factors that influence materiality decisions were not considered
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so as not to clutter up the hypothetical scenario. Thus, while the secondary framing 
manipulation referred to time and budget constraints, no exact numbers, e.g, audit fees 
or budgeted number of hours, was provided. Again, in order to study auditors’ unaided 
professional judgments, it was important not to allow them use o f their firm audit 
manuals or other information, such as past years’ working papers, or materiality 
judgments from the previous year (cf. Steinbart, 1987).
One of the most important applications of materiality in audit settings is for audit 
sampling purposes. The idea of ’tolerable error’ emerges from the determination of 
materiality and is necessary to arrive at a sample size. This study did not address issues 
in audit sampling because the research question of interest here pertains to a much earlier 
stage of the audit. Future studies should attempt to integrate the setting of materiality 
thresholds with the issue of sample selection and size (see Guy, Carmichael & 
Whittington, 1994). Materiality intentions may differ from materiality adjustments 
(Coakley & Loebbecke, 1986) and therefore, asking for justification for audit materiality 
judgments would leave a cognitive "audit trail" which could then be analyzed.
With reference to the topic of materiality, the Canadian Extent o f Audit Testing 
(EAT) Study (1980) has made some excellent recommendations highlighting the need for 
the development of standards/guidelines for (a) definition of errors and the requirement 
to extrapolate them within a defined framework, (b) materiality in nonmanufacturing 
situations like governmental and nonprofit entities (cf., Holstrum, 1982), and (c) the 
relationship of materiality to otlier procedures such as analytical review. Although these 
issues are still hanging fire, the need to resolve them satisfactorily is urgent.
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Dr. Herbert Mirels’ Self-Description Inventory was distributed to and completed 
by all 117 participants. It was decided to wait to analyze this data until a scale is 
developed to evaluate each individual’s scores. As soon as the instrument is validated, 
however, it would be useful to perform this analysis. In particular, it would be 
interesting to trace back the participants’ scores to determine whether their self-reports 
about their confidence in judgments are consistent with their actual performance on the 
task. This line of research would extend Pincus’ (1993) work on audit judgment 
confidence.
6.3 Suggestions for Further Research
Elliott (1981) has claimed that audit quality largely remains an "unobservable" 
and even client managements hiring auditors are at a loss to explain the audit fee 
variability they encounter in the market. Specifically, Elliott (1981) observes,"...[client 
management] cannot know whether [audit fee variances] result from precision 
differentials (one auditor striving for tighter financial statement precision than another), 
efficiency differentials (one firm using a better audit technique than another), profit 
differentials (one firm willing to work for a smaller profit than another) or something 
else." Clearly, "precision differentials" are directly a consequence of materiality 
thresholds and moreover, may have a direct or indirect impact on several issues in a n  
audit engagement. It is important to understand the reasons behind such stark differences 
and more work needs to be done in this area. This study is only a first step in the 
direction of understanding the basis for "precision differentials."
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The study of professional judgment in similar vein must be extended to other 
domains such as medicine and law (see, for instance, Amsel et al., 1991). It is very 
likely tliat professionals in these domains face similar constraints and it would not come 
as a surprise if they also adopt decision strategies such as efficiency/effectiveness trade­
offs. Of course, the goals of every profession are different and therefore, considerations 
o f effectiveness criteria are bound to differ too. Similarly, both “red flags” (with 
implications for effectiveness) and “red herrings” (with implications for efficiency) 
deserve systematic study. Studying Icnowledge intensive behavior is likely to gain in 
importance in the future. Psychologists interested in studying the nature of expertise 
have immense potential in being able to contribute to the development of a general theory 
of expertise. Learning about commonalities across domains will yield rich rewards in 
terms of cross-training and enable the solution of difficult and complex problems that 
may have parallels in other domains.
The methodological paradigm employed for eliciting auditor judgments can be 
usefully adapted to future studies of audit judgment. Professional auditors are a difficult 
group o f “experts” to have access to, and researchers must find ways and means of 
involving their participation with the least cost and effort. This study demonstrates that 
studying professional judgment in complex domains is a fertile ground for collaborative 
efforts between cognitive psychologists and professionals in different domains. Because 
of the theoretical as well as practical challenges inherent in such research coupled with 
advances in technology that make more innovative research designs possible, it is likely 
to hold considerable appeal to future generations of researchers.
APPENDIX A
A FEW WORDS ON AUDITING: THE RATIONALE AND PROCESS 
(with specific emphasis on the notion of "materiality")
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1. Financial Statem ent Credibility: Shareholders, creditors and regulators (called 
"market participants") need a basis for assessing a company’s past and present operating 
results as well as its potential future performance. Financial statements, usually 
consisting of the balance sheet, income statement, statement of retained earnings and 
statement of cash flows, are prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). In addition to conformity with GAAP, financial statements must 
have credibility if they are to be accepted by third parties. Independent auditors are 
engaged by the shareholders, board of directors (or its audit committee), or management 
of a company to "attest" to the financial statements. Auditing assists in reducing 
"information risk" by helping evaluate the quality of the accounting information conveyed 
to users of financial information.
2. Purpose of an  Audit: Auditors are typically Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) who 
examine the financial statements of a company and express their professional opinion on 
them. The objective of an audit is to evaluate whether the financial statements fairly 
present the financial position (balance sheet), the results of operations (income 
statement), and changes in financial position (statements of cash flows, and retained 
earnings) in conformity with GAAP consistently applied.
3. The Audit Report: The audit report, containing the auditor’s professional opinion, 
is the final product o f a thorough examination of the data supporting the financial 
statements.
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4. Audit Sampling: The volume of transactions taking place in business today makes 
it impossible for the auditor to examine all evidentiary documentation supporting the 
financial statements. To recognize time and budget constraints, the auditor has to resort 
to sampling. There is always the risk, however, that the conclusions drawn from any 
sample will be different from the conclusions that would have been reached had the entire 
population been examined. The auditor seeks to minimize this risk when projecting the 
results of testing samples on to the entire population and forming an audit opinion. The 
auditor needs a way to decide how to sample from the population of accounting records 
in such a way that the maximum results are obtained for a given amount of audit effort: 
a balance is sought between "overauditing" (an inefficient outcome) and "underauditing" 
(maybe an ineffective outcome) while nevertheless meeting professional auditing 
standards.
5. M isstatements in Financial Statements: Financial statements are "significantly 
misstated" when they contain errors (accidental or purposeful) whose effect, individually 
or in the aggregate, is important enough to cause them not to be presented fairly in 
accordance with GAAP. When reaching a conclusion as to whether the individual or 
cumulative effect o f errors is significant, an auditor should consider the nature of the 
errors and their amount in relation to the nature and amount of other items in the 
financial statements. To assess the relative importance of amounts in error, auditors 
invoke the concept o f "materiality."
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6. F raud: Under SAS 53 (AICPA, 1988), the term "irregularities" refers to intentional 
misstatements or omission of amounts or disclosures in financial statements (i.e., fraud). 
Irregularities include fraudulent financial reporting undertaken to render financial 
statements misleading, sometimes called management fraud, and misappropriation of 
assets, sometimes called defalcation.
7. Business/Audit Risk: Business risk represents the risk of loss or injury to an 
auditor’s professional practice from litigation, adverse publicity, or other event arising 
in connection with financial statements examined or reported upon. Audit risk is the 
risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his/her opinion on 
financial statements that are significantly misstated. To decide what constitutes a 
"significant misstatement" we need to rely upon the concept of materiality.
8. M ateriality: An error in the financial statements is "material" when it is important 
enough to influence an investors decision. Carmichael (1969) lucidly explains that 
"...the auditor uses materiality in essentially two ways: (1) evaluating the fairness of 
presentation and reporting (materiality in accounting) and (2) in deciding questions 
involving the development and execution of the audit program (materiality in auditing)." 
He proceeds to point out that it is important to recognize that materiality in auditing is 
dependent upon materiality in accounting. Thus, an item would be material for auditing 
purposes if failure to detect misstatement or misrepresentation of the item would 
influence decisions based upon the factual statements. Materiality, a threshold amount
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that helps distinguish the important from the trivial, is critical to deciding which 
segments of a company to audit as well as the amount of effort to be devoted to 
examining certain portions of the financial statements; it affects both audit efficiency and 
effectiveness. While planning an audit engagement, an auditor must not only make a 
preliminary judgment about the overall materiality that applies to the financial 
statementcs taken as a whole (OVMAT) but also estimate the segment-specific materiality 
which refers to allocation of materiality to a segment of a company (SYSMAT), e .g ., in 
a transaction cycle approach, the sales, purchases, finance, or administration cycle.
9. OVMAT/SYSMAT Examples: Suppose at the end of the audit it is determined that 
the financial statements are overstated by $15,000 when the OVMAT (overall materiality) 
has been set at $10,000. In such a case, the auditor would require that a financial 
statement adjustment be made by the client with regard to the overstatement. Should the 
client choose not to make the adjustment, the auditor would communicate, in his report, 
his reservations about the disclsures made in the financial statements by issuing a 
"qualified" opinion. SYSMAT (testing materiality), on the other hand, provides a 
systematic way to partition segments of the population of accounting records to be 
examined in such a way that auditors completely examine supporting evidence for larger 
amounts while verifying documentation for only a sample of the smaller amounts. For 
instance, from a purchases transaction cycle aggregating $200,000 and consisting of
1,000 invoices, an auditor may choose to select all invoices exceeding $5,000 in amount 
(assume there are 20 such invoices with amounts greater than $5,000, totalling $125,000)
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and sampling from the remaining 980 invoices which account for the remaining $75,000.
10. Risk, M ateriality, and Audit Evidence: Arens & Loebbecke (1991) point out that 
risk is a measure of uncertainty and materiality, a measure of magnitude or size; taken 
together, they measure the uncertainty of amounts of a given magnitude. Notice that, 
for a particular segment of the audited population, using testing materiality (i.e., 
SYSMAT) is a strategy that trades off risk, materiality, and audit effor expended to 
gather evidence. Thus, an increase in perceived client riskiness should cause a lower 
level o f materiality to be set (inverse relationship) so that more evidence may be gathered 
to support the final audit opinion. Similarly for a less risky client, a higher materiality 
amount may be set so as not to perform "overauditing" but not less than the standard 
minimum amount of audit procedures (required by Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards-GAAS).
Table A .l gives a comprehensive outline of the audit process based on Cushing & 
Loebbecke (1986). Section 2.0 ("Planning Activities") is directly relevant to this study, 
particularly subsections 2.12 ("Appraisal of Risk") and 2.2 ("Preliminary Estimation of 
Materiality").
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TABLE A .l
A COM PREHENSIVE OUTLINE O F TH E AUDIT PROCESS
(From Cushing and Loebecke (1986, pp. 6-7))
1.0  PRE-ENGAGEM ENT AC TIVITIES
1.1 Accept/Reject New Client
2.1 Establish Terms of Engagement
1.3 Assignment of Staff
2 .0  PLANNING ACTIVITIES
2.1 Obtain Knowledge of the Business
2.11 Preliminary Analytical Review
2.12 Appraisal of Risk
2.2 Preliminary Estimation of Materiality
2.3 Review of Internal Accounting Control
2.31 Preliminary Phase
2.32 Completion Phase
2.4 Develop Overall Audit Plan
2.41 Determine Optimal Reliance on Internal 
Accounting Control
2.42 Design Compliance Testing Procedures
2.43 Design Substantive Procedures
2.44 Write Audit Program
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3.0  COMPLIANCE TESTING AC TIVITIES
3.1 Conduct Tests
3.2 Make Final Evaluation o f Internal Accounting Control
3.21 Make Evaluation
3.22 Modify Audit Plan
4.0  SU BSTANTIVE TESTING AC TIVITIES
4.1 Conduct Substantive Tests of Transactions
4.2 Conduct Analytical Review Procedures
4.3 Conduct Tests o f Details of Balances
4.4 Post Balance Sheet Review Procedures
4.5 Evaluate Results of Substantive Procedures
4.51 Aggregate Findings
4.52 Make Evaluation
4.53 Modify Audit Plan
4.6 Obtain Representations
4.61 Management
4.62 Attorneys
4.63 Others
5.0  OPINION FORMULATION AN D  REPORTING AC TIV ITIES
5.1 Review Financial Statements
5.2 Review Audit Results
5.3 Formulate Opinion
5.4 Draft and Issue Report
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6.0 CONTINUOUS AC TIVITIES
6.1 Supervise Conduct of Examination
6.2 Review Work of Continuing Relationship with Client
6.3 Consider Appropriateness of Continuing Relationship with Client
6.4 Make Required Special Communications
6.41 Material Weakness in Internal Accounting Control
6.42 Material Errors or Irregularities
6.43 Illegal Acts by Client
6.5 Consult With Appropriate Persons in Connection With Special 
Problems
6.6 Document Work Performed, Findings, and Conclusion in 
Appropriate Working Papers
APPENDIX B
TEXT OF FRAMING MANIPULATIONS APPEARING 
ON THE COMPUTER SCREEN DURING EXPERIMENT
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1. PRIMARY FRAMING
(i) Normal Audit Setting: See Problem Description in Appendix D
Note that this section is identical for both groups of participants.
(ii) Suspected Fraud Setting (Defalcation condition):
"NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
EMERGENCY PLANNING MEETING
ONE WEEK LATER after the initial planning meeting, the Partner calls an 
EMERGENCY audit planning meeting to discuss his meeting with the Finance Director 
and member of the client’s Audit Committee.
It appears that a junior employee of the client has blown the whistle on certain 
alleged irregularities perpetrated by another employee who has been on forced medical 
leave. The junior employee, during a physical count of inventory, noted several 
expensive inventory parts to be missing. Further, numerous other inventory parts had 
been over-valued presumably to compensate for the shortages. The management, with 
assistance from internal audit, is currently taking steps to determine the nature and extent 
of the exposure, if any, arising from this situation.
The partner has concluded that, in light of this information, all planning 
materiality estimates may need to be appropriately re-evaluated."
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(ii) Suspected Fraud Setting (Management Fraud condition):
"NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
EMERGENCY PLANNING MEETING
ONE WEEK LATER after the initial planning meeting, the Partner calls an 
EMERGENCY audit planning meeting to discuss his meeting with the Finance Director 
and member of the client’s Audit Committee.
The Finance Director seems to have questioned the client management’s integrity 
indicating that the Chief Financial Officer was under considerable pressure from the 
management to maintain the stable trend in earnings. As a result, the Finance Director 
claimed, the hypothesis of income smoothing could not be ruled out. The Partner felt 
that client management was not setting the proper ’tone at the top’ and hence, 
management override of internal controls appeared to be a distinct possibility. Although 
there was no direct evidence of any irregularities having occurred, there was a 
heightened need for the audit firm’s staff to exercise professional skepticism while 
conducting their audit for the current year.
The Partner has concluded that, in light o f this information, all planning 
materiality estimates may need to be appropriately re-evaluated."
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2. SECONDARY FRAM ING
(i) Audit Efficiency Condition
"Scenario I: Read this carefully...
Suppose that at the planning meeting, the Partner expresses concerns about (1) the 
fiercely competitive auditing environment and (2) the risk o f under-reliance on the 
client’s internal controls.
In particular, he emphasizes the need for (a) RESTRICTING THE EXTENT of audit 
work, and (b) CONFORMING STRICTLY TO TIGHT BUDGETS AND TIME 
DEADLINES."
(ii) Audit Effectiveness Condition 
"Scenario II: Read this carefully...
Disregarding scenario I, suppose that at the planning meeting, the Partner expresses 
concerns about (1) the highly litigious environment and (2) the risk of over-reliance on 
the client’s internal controls.
In particular, he emphasizes the need for (a) exercising PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM 
and performing (b) a THOROUGH, HIGH-QUALITY AUDIT that lays the basis for (c) 
DEFENSIBILITY of audit decisions and conclusions."
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(iii) Suspected F raud  Effectiveness Condition 
"Scenario III: Read this carefully...
Suppose that at the EMERGENCY planning meeting, the Partner expresses concerns 
about (1) the highly litigious environment and (2) the risk o f over-reliance on the 
client’s internal controls.
In particular, he emphasizes the need for (a) exercising PROFESSIONAL 
SKEPTICISM and performing (b) a THOROUGH, HIGH-QUALITY AUDIT that 
lays the basis for (c) DEFENSIBILITY of audit decisions and conclusions."
(iv) Suspected F raud  Efficiency Condition
"Scenario IV: Read this carefully...
Disregarding scenario III, suppose that at the EMERGENCY planning meeting, the 
Partner expresses concerns about (1) the fiercely competitive auditing environment 
and (2) the risk of under-reliance on the client’s internal controls.
In particular, he emphasizes the need for (a) RESTRICTING THE EXTENT of audit 
work, and (b) CONFORMING STRICTLY TO TIGHT BUDGETS AND TIME 
DEADLINES."
APPENDIX C
ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
PARTICIPATING IN STUDY
174
175
Participants from public accounting firms hold the CPA certification; participants from 
Internal Audit Departments hold either CIA, CPA, or both certifications.
Accounting firms
1. Arthur Anderson
2. Deloitte & Touche
3. Greene & Walllace
4. Heimlich, Spettel & Michalak
5. Kenneth Leventhal
6. KPMG Peat Marwick
7. Manoranjan & Jayanthan
8. Nerone & Associates
9. Price Waterhouse
Location
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Dayton, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio
Other Organizations
1. American Electric Power
2. Banc One Corp
3. Household International
4. Huntington Bancshares
5. Key Corp
6. McDonald’s Corp
7. National City Corp
8. Nationwide City Corp
9. The Ohio State University
10. Wendy’s International
Location
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Chicago, Illinois 
Columbus, Ohio 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio 
Columbus, Ohio
APPENDIX D 
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
DISTRIBUTED TO PARTICIPANTS
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EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS INDEX-I (Sections D.l to D.6)
(**to be used during experiment**)
I. READ Sections D .l through D.3 FIRST;
Sec. D .l :  Instructions for the "Audit Materiality" experiment
Sec. D.2: Preliminary Judgment About Materiality-Problem Description
Sec. D.3: Helmvolz Inc.-Condensed Financial Statements
II. NEXT, REVIEW PICTORIAL SEQUENCE in Section D.4
Sec. D.4: Experimental Setup and Sequence Picture
III. REFER to GLOSSARY in Section D.5, if necessary
Sec. D.5: Glossary of Selected Terms
IV. NOW, follow instructions to LOAD the PROGRAM in Section D.6
Sec. D.6: Loading the Program
YOUR SUBJECT ID#______________________
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SECTION D .l!
INSTRUCTIONS FOR TH E "AUDIT M ATERIALITY" EXPERIM ENT 
(Note: Do NOT refer to audit manuals or other sources while doing this experiment!!)
1. Hypothetical scenario
In this experiment, you are to assume that you are an audit supervisor with Lippman & 
Coates, CPAs, assigned to the annual audit of Helmvolz, Inc. for the year 1994.
2. Information provided
Based on a brief description of the client, Helmvolz Inc., relevant industry information 
and a set of condensed financial statements for the years 1992, 1993 and 1994, you will 
be making planning materiality (PMAT) judgments for the 1994 audit. Your PM AT 
estimates will be responsive to the audit partner’s comments in two distinct scenarios 
followed by feedback on your estimates from a new audit manager o f Lippman & Coates, 
CPAs (in relation to other audit managers, the new manager will be described as "more 
conservative" or "less conservative" corresponding to the specific scenario.) Please 
review the attached "Experimental Setup and Sequence Picture" (see PIC-p4) to 
understand this better.
3. Experimental task and time required
The experimental task requires you to computer-input your planning materiality 
estimates. At each stage, please take your time to read all materials and instructions 
displayed on the computer screen carefully, because the data will be collected only once.
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The entire computer exercise should not take more than 30-35 minutes. In addition, you 
will be requested to fill in some background and other information (contained in a 
separate envelope to be opened only at the end of the experiment) which will not take 
more than 10-15 minutes. The total time required is unlikely to exceed one hour.
4. Confidentiality
All the data collected from this study will be kept confidential (you need not reveal your 
name). Please do not discuss the experiment with your friends and/or colleagues.
5. Completed experiment
Upon completion, please place the whole packet including the diskette and the filled-in 
forms into the box in the custody of the person designated for this purpose in your unit. 
Otherwise, please mail back all materials to: Sridhar Ramamoorti, CPA, Department of 
Psychology, The Ohio State University, 1885 Neil Ave Mall, Columbus, OH 43210.
Please proceed to read the problem description accompanied by the condensed financial 
statements.
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SECTION D.2!
PRELIMINARY JUDGMENT ABOUT MATERIALITY- 
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this two-part planning materiality estimation problem, you are to assume that you are 
one o f the audit supervisors employed with the medium-sized public accounting firm of 
Lippman & Coates, CPAs. Further, along with a newly promoted audit manager, you 
have been assigned to the audit of the 1994 financial statements of an existing client, 
HELMVOLZ, Inc. The balance .sheets and income statements of HELMVOLZ Inc. for 
the years 1992 through 1994 are presented in condensed form in Section D.3. 
Annualized amounts for 1994 are based on third quarter information.
HELMVOLZ Inc., which went public in 1990, is engaged in the manufacture and 
nationwide distribution of uninterrupted power supply (UPS) systems to computer 
installation locations. The Helmvolz™ brand o f UPS systems is quite popular, and has 
achieved a stable market share of approximately 35 % over the past 4 years. While the 
cost of production for their standard model has largely remained unchanged, its selling 
price has been marginally raised for the current year. The company has 4 major 
competitors (see Table D .l for summary of relevant industry information).
Table D .l
Sum m ary of Relevant Industry  Inform ation
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Company 
(Year UPS 
introduced)
Product
profile
M arket
share
(US
only)
Total Sales 
Revenue in 
1993 ($)
Total 
Assets in 
1993 ($)
Pretax Net 
Income/ 
(Loss) 
fo r 1993 ($)
Helmvolz 
Inc. (1990)
UPS
systems
only
35 200 million 131 million 20 million
CompuWare
Inc.(1989)
UPS 
systems 
and other
15 65 million 55 million 6 million
Electronix
Inc.(1992)
UPS 
systems 
and other
5 13 million 40 million (11 million)
PWRsupply
Inc.(1986)
UPS
systems
only
20 114 million 93 million 13 million
Computer 
Support Inc. 
(1987)
UPS 
systems 
and other
20 445 million 360 million (1 million)
TOTAL 95% 837 million 679 million
A standard practice at Lippman & Coates, CPAs, is to begin each audit with a planning 
meeting approximately three weeks prior to commencing the fieldwork. At the meeting, 
the current year’s draft financial statements of a client are discussed. One objective of 
the planning meeting is to quantify the preliminary judgment about materiality to be used 
in planning the scope of audit procedures. Helmvolz Inc. is one of the larger clients of 
the firm, and, over the years, Lippman & Coates’ audit remuneration has kept pace with 
the growth in the client’s revenues. "Clean" audit opinions have been rendered in the
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past; also, no material weaknesses in internal control have been noted over the past four 
years. From 1992 onwards, the management o f Helmvolz Inc. has established an Audit 
Committee that coordinates the work of the internal audit department. With a view to 
improving audit efficiency and controlling costs o f the external audit, since 1993, 
Lippman and Coates, CPAs, have decided to rely on the work done by the internal audit 
department for specific areas o f the audit.
Using the financial information in Section D.3, you are to make a preliminary 
judgment about materiality for use in audit planning. Your estimates will be 
discussed (1) at the planning meeting in the presence of the partner-in-charge and 
the newly promoted audit manager for the audit of Helmvolz Inc. and later, (2) 
separately, with the new audit manager providing you with feedback on your 
estimates.
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HELMVOLZ INC.-CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(All amounts expressed In US S'OOOs except EPS and selected financial ratios)
BALANCE SHEETS December 31
ASSETS
1992
(Audited)
1993
(Audited)
1994
(Unaudited)
Cash
Accounts receivable, net 
Inventory
Other current assets
Plant and equipment (less dep.)
6,133
22,605
30,611
5,285
68,521
6,412
21,334
31,402
2,557
69,411
6,212
22,310
34,034
2,44S
70,008
Total assets 133,155 131,116 135,089
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current Liabilities 
Long-term liabilities 
Common stock 
Retained earnings
31,145
21,665
20,000
60,345
32,778
19,120
20,000
59,218
33,005
20,786
20,000
61,298
Total liabilities and equity 133,155 131,116 135,089
STATEMENTS OF INCOME Years ended December 31
1992
(Audited)
1993
(Audited)
1994
(Unaudited)
Net sales 
Cost of goods sold
199,733
118,842
200,518
119,320
210,899
126,777
Gross margin on sales 
Selling, general & other expenses
80,891
59,924
81,198
61,121
84,122
62,225
Income before income taxes 
Provision for income taxes
20,967
8,389
20,077
8,042
21,897
8,320
Net income 12,578 12,035 13,577
Earnings Per Share (EPS) $0.63 $0.60 $ 0 .6 8
Selected Financial Ratios/Percentages
Gross Margin on Net Sales (%) 
Net income to Net Sales (%) 
Asset-Tumover ratio 
Inventory-Tumover ratio 
Return on Investment (%)
40.50% 
6.30% 
1.50 times 
3.88 times 
9.45%
40.50% 
6.00% 
1.53 times 
3.80 times 
9.18%
39.88% 
6.44% 
1.56 limes 
3.73 times 
10.05%
This schematic representation is designed to help you follow 
the progression of computer screens.
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Figure D.l 
Experimental Setup and Sequence Picture
SESSION II
SESSION I
Final Estimate 
(Computer screen 2-G)
Modified Estimate 
(Computer screen 1-G)
END OF 
EXPERIMENT
TRIVIAL "WARM-UP’' GAME
EXPERIMENT BEGINS HERE
General Evaluations, 
Initial FMAT Estimate 
(Computer screens 
2-A and 2-B)
General Evaluations,
Initial PMAT Estimate 
(Computer screens 1-A and 1-B)
Partner’s Comments 
followed 
by New Manager's 
Feedback 
(Computer screens 
2-C and 2-D)
Scenario
Partner's Comments 
foilowed 
by New Manager's 
Feedback 
(Computer screens 
2-E and 2-F)
Scenario iVPartner's Comments foiiowed 
by New 
Manager's Feedback 
(Computer screens 
1-C and 1-D)
Scenario I
Partner's Comments followed 
by New Manager's Feedback 
(Computer screens 
1-E and 1-F)
Scenario II
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SECTION P.5
GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS 
(This glossary is optional. Read if necessary.)
A U D IT  RISK: The risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify 
his/her opinion on financial statements that are significantly misstated. To decide what 
constitutes a "significant misstatement" we need to rely upon the concept of materiality 
Materiality and audit risk are really inseparable-materiality relates to how precise 
auditing procedures need to be; and audit risk, to the degree of certainty achieved by the 
procedures.
BU SIN ESS RISK: The risk of loss or injury to an auditor’s professional practice arising 
from litigation or adverse publicity in connection with the financial statements examined 
or reported upon.
CONSERVATISM : A prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties 
and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered. Among auditors, the 
tendency to give more attention to, and to be more influenced by negative information 
or outcomes, probably owing to the potentially serious consequences of audit judgments 
(e.g., liability to third parties, especially when financial reports overstate the profitability 
or economic viability of a company).
1 8 6
CONTROL RISK: The risk that material error in an account balance may occur and not 
be prevented or detected on a timely basis by prescribed accounting control procedures.
EVALU ATIVE M ATERIALITY: At the conclusion of an audit engagement, the auditor 
uses evaluative materiality to determine whether the financial statements are presented 
fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. For this purpose, the 
auditor should aggregate the "unadjusted" errors in a way that helps conclude wliether 
in relation to individual amounts, subtotals, or totals in the financial statements, they 
materially misstate the financial statements taken as a whole.
INTERNAL CONTROL: A process effected by an entity’s board o f directors, 
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement o f objectives in the following categories: effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations; reliability of financial reporting; and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations.
M ATERIALITY: The magnitude of an omission or misstatement of accounting 
information that in the light o f surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the 
judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information would have been changed or 
influenced by the omission or misstatement.
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PLANNING M ATERIALITY: A preliminary judgment about the amount to be 
considered material to the financial statements taken as a whole that constitutes an 
important general planning decision. The auditor may use this judgment to identify 
components o f financial statements to be emphasized, the locations to visit in a multi­
location company, and, naturally, the size o f an error to be considered material in 
planning the nature, timing and extent of specific auditing procedures. Both qualitative 
and quantitative considerations influence an auditor’s preliminary judgment about 
materiality.
R ISK  OF OVER-RELIANCE ON INTERNAL CONTROLS: The risk of assessing 
control risk too low. If the auditor’s planned level o f reliance on internal accounting 
controls is higher than warranted, the auditor would proceed to limit the scope of 
substantive tests applicable. In these circumstances, the audit might appear to be more 
efficient but may compromise audit effectiveness. It is to avoid this undesirable outcome 
that the auditor is advised to allow for only a low level of risk of over-reliance.
R ISK  OF UNDER-RELIANCE ON INTERNAL CONTROLS: The risk of assessing 
control risk too high. If the auditor unnecessarily reduces the planned level of reliance 
on internal accounting controls, the auditor would ordinarily increase the scope of 
substantive tests to compensate for the reduced reliance. In these circumstances, the 
audit might be less efficient but would nevertheless be effective.
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SECTION D.6;
LOADING TO E PROGRAM
Having reviewed all the textual materials on the previous pages, you are now ready to 
insert the computer diskette, run the program, and begin the experiment. Please follow 
the instructions carefully.
How to use the diskette enclosed
A 3-1/2", high-density diskette (1.44 MB) is enclosed. The computer program requires 
an IBM or compatible personal computer (386 or 486) with a Windows environment. 
To start the program, load the Windows Program Manager and follow these procedures:
(i) Insert the diskette into drive a; or drive b: as appropriate.
(ii) Go to the "File" menu (leftmost menu) on the Program Manager and choose 
the "R un ..."  command. See the computer screen representation below.
PROGRAM  MANAGER
File Options W indow Help
New ...
Open
M ove...
Copy...
Delete
Properties
R u n ... (choose this)
Exit W indows...
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(iii) When prompted, type a:\audm at2.exe or b:\audm at2.exe as appropriate.
(iv) Press ENTER or mouse-click OK, and the program should load 
automatically.
(v) From this point onwards, follow the instructions on each screen.
(vi) In case o f any difficulty, please call "Shree" Ramamoorti at (614) 488-0933.
•S’ Please involve yourself seriously in the experiment so that the data collected can form 
the basis for valid and meaningful interpretation. Thank you for your cooperation.
YOUR SUBJECT ID#
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EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS INDEX-II (Sections D.7 and D.8)
(**to be used at end of experiment**)
V. PLEASE READ AND FILL IN:
Sec. D.7: Debriefing Questionnaire
VI. NOW, PLEASE COMPLETE THIS INVENTORY:
Sec. D.8: Professor H. Mirels’ Self-Description Inventory
YOUR SUBJECT ID#
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SECTION D.7 
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE
I. Research Goals and Motivation
Making sound professional judgments is the hallmark o f an auditor. Over the past two 
decades, behavioral auditing and cognitive science researchers have been interested in 
how professional auditors make judgments and decisions. The eventual aim of such 
research is to understand, evaluate and improve auditors’ decision making capabilities, 
thus enhancing audit efficiency and effectiveness. Such research has potential to benefit 
both the academic and practitioner constituencies—academic researchers are interested in 
understanding the nature and determinants of professional expertise, the process by which 
expertise is acquired, and improving the teaching of auditing, while practitioners need 
such experimental and empirical data to carefully design professional training programs 
and to develop computerized decision aids such as expert and decision support systems. 
The problems in this area o f research are complex and challenging and my PhD 
dissertation focuses on aspects of planning materiality judgments. Your voluntary 
participation in this study is greatly appreciated and indicates your commitment towards 
research designed to enhance the standing of our profession.' I will be glad to share the 
results of this study if you wish to know how it all turned out.
' The author o f the dissertation is a member o f the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, New York, as well as the Institute o f Internal Auditors, Florida.
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2. Please answer the following questions (you need not divulge your name): 
General
(a) What is your current affiliation and position? (i.e ., company or firm name; 
designation)
(b) Please list your certification(s) (e.g., CPA, CMA, CIA, CIS A, CBA, CFE etc.)
(c) How many years of post-certification experience do you have in:
(i) external auditing yrs m onths_ (ii) internal auditing yrs m onths___
(d) Have you had experience in making planning materiality judgments? If yes, how 
many years o f experience, specifically in making such judgments (internal audit, external 
audit)?
(e) If  you are an internal auditor, how did the external auditing focus o f the problem 
affect your ability, if  at all, in making appropriate planning materiality judgements?
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Technical
(i) Suppose the numbers in the financial statements are made 10 times larger (i.e., pretax 
net income is made $ 2.1 billion) will you magnify your preliminary judgment of 
planning materiality by a factor o f 10? (Check /  one o f the options below)
Y e s   By more than 10 tim es  By less than 10 tim es___________
What if  the multiplication factor is 100 (i.e., pretax income is made $ 20.1 billion)? 
Y e s   By more than 100 tim es  By less than 100 tim es___
(ii) If your initial risk assessment for this client by merely glancing at the financial 
statements was High or Very high, please explain what led you to this conclusion?
(iii) I f  you never changed your materiality judgments throughout this experiment, why 
so?
Realism o f  experimental task
What were your general impressions about this experiment? Did you think the task was 
realistic and the scenarios plausible? Do you wish to comment on anything specific?
Thank you fo r participating in this experim ent. ©
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Thank you for participating in this experiment. ®
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Self-Description Inventory -  Form SD30.P-S (page 1 of 2)
For each numbered item below, check /  the phrase which best indicates your degree of 
agreement or disagreement. Phrases Used: sd = strongly disagree; md = moderately 
disagree; d = disagree; a = agree; ma = moderately agree; and sa = strongly agree
ft ITEM
DESCRIPTION
sd md d a ma sa
1 I usually think most clearly when I am alone.
2 1 have diffieulty making 
decisions.
3 I often depend too much on w hat others say.
4 I rarely doubt my 
judgm ents.
5 Not knowing for su re  what to do paralyzes me.
6 1 have an active 
imagination.
7 I have a tendency to change my mind according to 
the last opinion I hear.
8 Oftentimes, I feel "studk" because o f  being uncertain 
about w hat to believe.
9 1 usually feel com fortable deciding things by m yself 
without asking others what they would do.
10 A fter deciding som ething, I tend to w orry about 
whether my decision was wrong.
11 I find m yself asking others for their opinions, even 
when it would be better to think through an issue first 
myself.
12 It is easy for m e to persuade others o f  my views.
13 I frequently find m yself afraid o f not doing the right 
thing.
14 Once I m ake a decision, I don’t stew  on the matter 
any longer.
15 I often have a sense that others know  better than I do.
16 I tend to think a great deal about the future.
17 Oftentimes, I put off making difficult decisions.
18 I often find m yself changing my opinion several times 
after hearing the various opinions o f  others.
19 M any times I d o n ’t know  what to do next.
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20 I o f te n  d o n ’t t r u s t  m y s e l f  to  m a k e  th e  r ig h t  d e e ts io n .
21 M y w ork  is usually  w cll-organizcd .
22 I o ften  d o n 't  know  w hat to  feel o r  believe.
23 In alm ost all situations I am  confident o f  m y ability to  m ake 
the  right choices.
24 I g e t nervous w hen  I have to  m ake a d ifficult decision.
25 I o ften  trust tlie jud g m en t o f  others m ore than  m y ow n.
26 I o ften  w orry  about w hetlier a decision  I m ake w ill h ave  bad 
consequences.
27 I d o n ’t have m uch difficulty  keeping  my atten tion  focused .
28 I have a g rea t deal deal o f  confidence in  m y opin ions.
29 M y judgm en ts  abou t situations o ften  tu rn  ou t to  be m istaken.
30 In m aking a decision , 1 often tiro m yself out by  sw itching 
back  and forth from  one eoncfiision to  anotlier.
31 U sually , the m ore 1 think about an  issue, the sim pler it 
b ecom es.
32 I enjoy m aking difficult decisions.
33 1 am  inclined to  have troub le know ing w here to  stand on  an  
issue.
34 W hen m aking a decision , I often feel confused  because I 
have trouble keeping  all tlic relevant factors in  m ind.
35 I feel 1 know  m y se lf  w ell.
36 I w ish 1 w ere  m ore confident in m y opinions.
37 F requen tly , 1 doubt my ability to m ake sound judgm ents.
38 I rarely  sw itch back and forth  from  one conclusion to  
ano ther; 1 m ake a decision  and stick w ith it.
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